Bioterrorism preparedness: a state public health and molecular approach by Shipp, Ginger Marie
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2003 
Bioterrorism preparedness: a state public health and molecular 
approach 
Ginger Marie Shipp 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Shipp, Ginger Marie, "Bioterrorism preparedness: a state public health and molecular approach" (2003). 
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 20041. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/20041 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Bioterrorism preparedness: a state public health and molecular approach 
by 
Ginger Marie Shipp 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Microbiology 
Program of Study Committee: 










Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the master's thesis of 
Ginger Marie Shipp 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
111 




CHAPTER 2. HISTORY OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 3 
Background 3 
Biological Warfare during the Middle Ages 4 
Exploration of the "New World" 5 
World Wars I and II 7 
Post World War II BW activities by the United States 11 
Alleged BT activities during the Korean War 14 
Microbial and BW Stimulants during the 1950's and 1960's 19 
Bacterial Organisms Proposed In BW Use by The 22 




Clostridium botulinum toxin 38 
Smallpox 45 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fever 55 
Ebola and Marburg Viruses 63 
Overview of Salmonella 73 
CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF MOLECULAR SUBTYPING 90 
CHAPTER 3. PFGE EXPERIMENTS 96 
Materials and Methods 96 
Preparation of Chromosomal DNA 97 





CHAPTER 4. A Three-Year Study (2001-2003) of Bioterrorism 113 
Preparedness in State Health Departments: Accomplishments 
and Dilemmas 
Sullllilary 113 
Article (In MMWR format) 114 
Discussion 119 
Conclusions 120 
APPENDIX 1. Resistance if Salmonella isolates tested 122 
APPENDIX 2. Grouping of antibiotic resistance profiles 124 
APPENDIX 3. Serotyping, PFGE profiles and antibiotic susceptibility testing 127 
APPENDIX 4. Bioterrorism Survey, December 2002 129 




When I began graduate school over three years ago, I could not have predicted being in the 
area of study that I am now in. However, I believe that things happen for a reason and feel 
that I am fortunate. I was able integrate my study of microbiology with disciplines I equally 
enjoy (e.g. public health, history.) While I enjoyed working in the laboratory, I also 
appreciated the opportunity to work with a dedicated group of public health professionals at 
the State oflowa Department of Health, Center for Acute Disease Epidemiology (CADE). 
Even during the alarming events of September 11th 2001, they were-and continue to be-
consummate and compassionate professionals. I would like to personally thank them for my 
professional (and in many ways, personal) growth. 
I owe much to members in the Department of Microbiology. First, I would like to thank 
my major professor, Dr. Jim Dickson for giving me second chance in the department. His 
students often joke to one another that we are "strays" from elsewhere. I would like to thank 
him for picking up "this stray". I would also like to thank Drs. Dennis Bazylinski and Robert 
Andrews for their comments, suggestions and encouragement. I appreciate my committee 
members as well (Drs. Bazylinski, Patricia Quinlisk, George Jackson and Charles Thoen). 
Thank you for allowing me to learn from you (and for being so kind and patient). 
Additionally, I would like to thank the staff in the Department of Microbiology for 
assisting me with my laboratory work with Salmonella. Steve Gaul took (much) time out of 
his schedule to teach me PFGE. I would not have been able to complete my experiments 
without his skillful assistance. I would also like to thank Dr. Hank Harris for allowing me use 
his laboratory. Rob Hubert, Kay Christiansen and Steve Niebuhr assisted me with some of 
VI 
my "hard to grow" Salmonella isolates (Kay, thank goodness for terrific broth and selenite.) I 
would also like to thank NVSL and the Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory for their work on 
my Salmonella isolates. 
I must also acknowledge my fellow graduate students who were there to provide 
comments and suggestions concerning my work-as well as comic relief. We were sometimes 
under tremendous pressure, however I appreciated the fact that we could laugh at ourselves 
and not take everything so seriously. I have made some life-long friends from around the 
world and I appreciate their thoughtfulness. 
I also want to acknowledge the contribution from my family and friends. I want to thank 
my parents, Don and Phyllis whose support and strict (yet loving) advice guided me through 
this process. They have made many sacrifices and I truly appreciate everything they have 
provided me. My sister, Kim and her family continue to remind me of what is truly important 
in life (she is a wonderful sister and mother.) I would also like to thank those who assisted in 
editing my thesis (especially Tom O'Neill.) Lastly, I wish to dedicate this thesis to an 
individual who had a profound influence in my life-both academically and personally. Dr. 
Patrick S. Cox (1955-1999) not only taught me biology, he taught me the value of friendship. 
For that I will always be grateful. 
vu 
ABSTRACT 
Sixty-three Salmonella isolates from five farms in Texas were analyzed to determine if any 
of the isolates were implicated in a human food-borne outbreak. The suspected source of the 
outbreak (plant produce) was irrigated by a water supply that beef farms had access to. The 
National Veterinary Services Laboratory (Ames, Iowa) conducted serotyping of all isolates 
and the Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory completed antibiotic susceptibility testing at Iowa 
State University's Veterinary School (Ames, Iowa). Isolates were also analyzed by Pulsed 
Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE). Eleven serotypes of Salmonella was used for this 
experiment; 3,10: 1, monophasic (1), 3,lO:nonmotile/Alamo (1), agona (15), anatum (17), 
carru (2), cerro (1), edinburg (1), kentucky (17), madelia (1), mbandaka (4), newport (2), 
and orianieburg (1). PFGE plugs were made according to the protocol of CDC PulseNet, the 
Minnesota Department of Health and the laboratory ofD.L. Harris (Iowa State University) 
with minor modifications. Electrophoresis was preformed on a CHEF-DR III apparatus with 
an induced angle of 120 degrees, 6 V/cm for 21 hours at 10-11 ° C, with a ramped switch 
time of 2.2 seconds to 66 seconds. The gels were then compared utilizing the criteria of the 
National Center for Infectious Diseases. Antibiotic profiles and serotyping was used along 
with PFGE gels to confirm relatedness of Salmonella. 
S. agona with an antibiotic profile of 1 and PFGE profile of 1 (S. agona al/ p 1) was 
implicated as a possible "outbreak strain" candidate. However, limited information was 
provided with the isolates (e.g. the outbreak strain was not provided for analysis and very 
little was known about the exact location of the isolates on each farm.) 
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Additionally, the Department of Microbiology and the State oflowa Department of 
Health, Center for Acute Disease Epidemiology (CADE) completed a three-year study 
(2001-2003) of infectious disease (ID) epidemiologists employed by state health 
departments. Initially the study was to determine how states were spending bioterrorism-
related grants awarded by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). After the events of 
September 11 2001, the survey evolved to include how states were using their funding in 
improving ID epidemiology capacity. In summary, ID epidemiologists are essential in BT 
preparedness activities, but they also contend with issues such as hiring qualified personnel, 
finding time to conduct typical day to day public health activities and implementing federal 
mandates (e.g. pre-event smallpox vaccination). BT funding has also improved the public 
health infrastructure to respond to emerging infectious disease such as west nile virus and 
monkeypox. 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter covers general information 
regarding the content of this thesis. The second chapter is a history of biological warfare 
(BW) use. Since this issue has been and continues to be controversial. the author has elected 
to use a restrictive definition of what would constitute a bioterrorism (BT) event- conceived 
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). A literature review is 
provided; first ''ideal" bacterial and viral agents that could be used in BT as advised by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention·s (CDC) Strategic Planning Workgroup is 
covered. Each microbial agent will be characterized as well as major factors in pathogenicity, 
the clinical background and presentation of disease. how each agent could be used in BW and 
treatments (if applicable). The bacteria Salmonella will also be covered. reviewing general 
characteristics. major pathogenic factors. clinical presentation and background. Additionally, 
the chapter will describe how Salmonella has been used to intentionally contaminate foods. 
The CDC's Strategic Planning Workgroup has recognized Salmonella as a possible BW 
agent. but is considered "lower priority .. when compared to bacterial organisms such as 
anthrax and plague. Molecular subtyping. specifically the procedure Pulse Field Gel 
Electrophoresis (PFGE) will also be addressed. Chapter three describes PFGE experiments 
that were completed with possible Salmonella isolates concerning an outbreak on farms in 
Texas. Suspect Salmonella isolates were taken from locations such as farms and different 
water supplies. The isolates were later analyzed to determine if the were clonal (originating 
from a common source). Chapter four includes the results of two national surveys regarding 
BT preparedness in the United States over a 3-year period (2001-2003) that have been 
submitted for publication in CDC"s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR). The 
CDC began providing federal monies to all 50 states to improve BT readiness and the 
nation's overall public health infrastructure. The first national survey was completed in order 
to determine how individual states were applying BT funding in preparedness activities. It 
was completed in early September 2001, approximately one week before the September 11. 
2001 attacks. All 50 states were given a second survey. beginning in October 2002 that 
focused on workforce needs of ID epidemiologists and factors that could make their job more 
difficult such as lack of funding and time to devote to BT planning activities. In conclusion. 
chapter 5 cites the literature used in this thesis and the appendices. 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF BIOLOGICAL WARF ARE 
Background 
Till now man has been up against nature: from now on he will have to be up against his own 
nature. 
Dennis Gabor. 1900-1979 
Biological warfare (BW)-the intentional use of living organisms or their toxic products to 
cause death, disease. disability or damage in humans, animals or plants ( 1) is a notable 
historical fact. Consequences of biological offensives have varied from the marginal (the 
unsuccessful spraying of Clostridium botulinum toxin in Tokyo, Japan by the Aum Shinrikyo 
cult) to highly successful (infection of Native Americans with smallpox during European 
colonization activities. beginning in the 16th century.) Many alleged incidents of BW have 
been chronicled. however historians and medical researchers tend to investigate reports as 
questionable. Since awareness in BW has increased, there has been corresponding interest in 
investigating historical claims of BW. Prominent organizations involved in warfare/policy 
issues. notably The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) employ strict 
criteria to determine the credibility of BW allegations. SIPRI"s criteria are as follows; 1) that 
allegations should be supported with sufficient data to allow evaluation 2) the alleged actions 
should be technically feasible in the context of the state of knowledge at the time 3) reported 
outbreaks should be clearly documented 4) and there should be some evidence to support 
allegations (i.e. participant confession, eyewitness accounts and circumstantial evidence) (2). 
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A summary of notable events related to BW will be covered here using the aforementioned 
criteria. 
BW during the Middle Ages 
The first reportable incident that met SIPRI's standard occurred in what was France during 
the 1340 siege of Thrun l' Eveque (currently referred to as the Thyne Levesque). Land 
disputes. economic differences as well as political disagreements between King Edward III 
of England and King Phillippe VI of France resulted in the '"Hundred Year's war·· (1337-
1453)(3). During one of many battles that took place. British troops attacked the Thum l' 
Eveque castle (at that time under French control). A solider of the British Army. Gautier de 
Mansy ordered his troops to "cast dead horses and beasts" over the walls of the castle (2). 
The smell of decaying carcasses was described as being so repulsive that castle inhabitants 
wondered how long they would "endure the horrendous conditions" (2). It was determined 
that the siege was likely a case of attempted BW, however. there were questions of whether 
dead animals were hoisted over the Thum l' Eveque as a result of the shortage of ammunition 
or disposal of carcasses (2). Additionally. the prevailing belief of that time was that "bad air" 
due to decomposition was a major contributor to illness; British troops could been using "bad 
air·· resulting from carcass decomposition to cause a disease epidemic ( 4 ). 
In 1346. there was an incident that was even more consistent with BW-the siege of Caffa 
that led to an extensive outbreak of plague (Yersinia pestis). Caffa (now Feodosia, Ukraine) 
was a Genoese seaport that connected Mediterranean maritime trade with that of the Far East 
and Russia (2). Hostilities broke out between the residents of Caffa and the Mongol (Far 
Eastern) forces led by Janiberg, Kahn of the Golden Horde (2). Factors such as deteriorating 
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sanitation and hygiene led to a catastrophic outbreak of plague outside the gated city of C affa 
(2 ). Mongol troops abandoned efforts to seize control of Caffa. but the troops did catapult 
plague-infected cadavers into the city. One excerpt from Biological and Toxin TVeapons 
described the result of plague on the Tartar armies (a nomadic Turkish tribe of Mongolia) as 
well as BW actions against the citizens of Caffa. "But behold. the whole [Mongol] army was 
affected by a disease which overran the Tartars and killed thousands upon thousands 
everyday ... all medical advice and attention was useless: the Tartars died as soon as the signs 
of the disease appeared on their bodies; swellings in the armpit or groin ... followed by a 
putrid fever. The dying Tartars, stunned and stupefied by the immensity of the disease. and 
realising that they had no hope of escape. lost interest in the siege. But they ordered corpses 
to be placed in catapults and lobbed into the city in hopes that the intolerable stench would 
kill everyone inside. What seemed like a mountain of dead were thrown into the city, and the 
Christians could not hide or flee or escape from them, although they dumped as many of the 
bodies as they could into the sea. And soon the rotting corpses tainted the air and poisoned 
the water supply. and the stench was so overwhelming that hardly one in several thousand 
was in a position to flee the remains of the Tartar army"(4). 
Plague spread westward along established trade routes and within a few years. the disease 
raged across Europe and the Middle East ( 4 ). By 1400. plague had reduced Europe's 
population by 25-30 %(13). 
Exploration of the "New World" 
European exploration of the '·New World" (North and South America) beginning in the 
late 15th century contributed to the spread of disease. One notable incident of BW occurred 
in Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh, PA) in 1763. Indian Trading Company staff, Fort Pitt 
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administrations and the associate Deputy Superintendent oflndian Affairs of the Cro\\11 
(United Kingdom) conspired to infect Native Americans (in particular. the Onawa tribe and 
other tribes along the eastern seaboard from New York and Virginia) with smallpox by the 
use of blankets and handkerchiefs: 
·· ... they (the Delaware tribe who at that time was negotiating with settlers) returned and said 
they would hold fast of the chain of friendship. Out of our regard to them. we gave them two 
blankets and a handkerchief out of the Smallpox hospital. I hope that it will have the desired 
effecf'(2). 
Exploration officials were concerned that the Native Americans wanted to massacre 
settlers on the pretense ofleading them on a "safe passage'" out of the area (2). 
Reports did surface of Native American use of BW during combat. In 1710. the British 
Army had sent 2500 men to upstate New York to establish outposts at Lake Saint Sacrament 
(now Lake George) (2). 
" ... The (British) Army was encamped on the banks of a little river: the Iroquois who spent 
almost all the time hunting. threw into it. just above the camp. all the skins of the animals 
they flayed. and the water was thus all corrupted. The English. unsuspicious of this treachery, 
continued to drink this water, and it carried off so many. that Father de Mareuil (a Jesuit 
Missionary) and two (French) officers who went to Orange ... observing the graves where the 
dead were buried. estimated the number at over a thousand"(2). 
During the American Revolution, reports surfaced that British troops were inoculating 
fleeing civilians with material taken from smallpox pustules and later allowed inoculated 
civilians to associate with Continental troops; in addition black refugees were used to spread 
smallpox to southern plantations (2). A British General (Alexander Leslie) wrote the 
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followirnz to his collea!me. General Charles Cornwallis in Julv. 1781 ·· ... about 700 Ne£!roes - - .. -
are coming dov.n the river (to Portsmouth, Virginia) in the Small Pox ... I shall distribute 
them about the Rebell plantations'"(6). 
World War I and World War II 
Throughout World War I (from 1914-1919) German officials were accused of inoculating 
horses and cattle leaving United States for Allied ports with .. disease-producing bacteria .. (7). 
In addition, German spies were apprehended trying to spread plague in Russia in 1915 and 
1916 (6). In 1917. 4500 mules were infected with glanders (Burkholderia mallei) by a 
saboteur in Mesopotamia (8). As the result of the use of microbiological organisms (and 
more upsetting to the "world community" mustard gas by the German army). the United 
Nations ratified the Geneva Protocol on June 17, 1925 (8). The Geneva Protocol prohibits the 
use of asphyxiating. poisonous and other gasses and bacteriological agents in warfare (8). 
Notable countries that signed the protocol include France (1926). the United Kingdom 
(1930). Mexico ( 1932). Canada (1930) and the former Union of Soviet Socialists Republics 
(Russia) (1928). Nations that ratified the Geneva protocol at a later time included Japan 
(1970) and the United States (1975) (7). 
One of the most infamous accounts of BW took place from 1931-1945 during the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria, located in the northeastern part of China. Shiro Ishii. a physician 
and a Ph.D.-level microbiologist (who was eventually promoted to General in the Japanese 
military). became convinced that BW was an effective method of military engagement (7). 
Ishii convinced Japanese authorities to set up a BW ··research station" at a military hospital 
(9). In order to convert the hospital into a military facility. those who resided in the 
surrounding area were forced to leave and additional buildings were added including prisons, 
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laboratories for human experimentation and crematoria ( 10). Individuals used as 
'·experimental subjects .. included the Chinese (who accounted for the majority of the 
victims). members of anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Communist rebels. American and 
Russian prisoners of war (POWs) as well as individuals who "had the misfortune of being 
rounded up and branded as suspicious"(6). Witnesses reported that those who served as 
·'laboratory subjects .. wore shackles and were given a "good diet"" to yield·· ... useful data 
when they [prisoners] were subjected to experiments:'(6). Experiments included taking blood 
samples to the point of death to observe how the human body functions. injecting individuals 
with poison and brain experiments in which a person was killed with a blow to the head. The 
brain was later removing the brain for further analysis ( 6). Research was also conducted 
observing how long individuals could live while being starved and given different types of 
water. Some were given •·ordinary" (tap) water and others were given "distilled water'"(6). 
Despite the precautions made to secure the hospital. a number of prisoners escaped from the 
facility and the true purpose of the hospital became known (6). 
A new compound was built in Pingfang between 1936 and 1938 with secrecy to nearby 
residents (6). Pingfang was built on a six-square-kilometer tract ofland and consisted of 
more than seventy buildings (9). Assembled prison blocks held adult males and adult 
females/children separately. Cells were made to accommodate the types of experiments that 
would be performed (i.e. openings to extend arms to receive injections or to have blood 
drawn): buildings were also equipped with heating and cooling systems and had extremely 
thick walls to prevent escape (9). 
The outside community eventually questioned the purpose of this facility. During one 
community meeting intended to pacify residents. a researcher stated that a lumber mill was 
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being built-and referred to the prisoners as .. maruta .. or '·logs·· (9). Satellite research facilities 
were later built in Anda. Xinjang. Guangzohu. Beijing. Singapore and Hiroshima (9). A 
summary of the experimentation activities are summarized below: 
Anda: Outdoor tests of plague. cholera and other pathogens in BW bombs as well as 
exposing humans to pathogenic organisms in "'open air situations"'(9). 
Xinjing: Veterinary research on pathogens considered effective against domesticated animals 
and sabotage of food and crops by poisons and toxins (9). 
Guangozohu: A former unit employee stated that human research subjects were given water 
contaminated with typhus and subjects were deprived of food (9). Additionally, it was 
reported that human subjects were operated on daily and rats were experimentally infected 
with fleas for plague experiments (9). 
Beijing: Human experiments were conducted exposing victim~ to plague. cholera and typhus 
(9). 
Singapore: ··vector experiments .. were performed in which plague-infected fleas were picked 
off of experimentally infected rats and later used on humans (9). 
Hiroshima: Toxic gasses such as mustard. yperite. lewsite and cyogen were produced and 
used on human subjects (9). 
The collection of research institutions listed above eventually became knov.n as "Unit 
731 .. ( 13 ). Below is a description of a •·typical"' experiment that took place: 
·· ... an experiment (was conducted) infecting ten Chinese individuals ... with gas gangrene 
(Clostridium per.fringes). They were tied to posts (located) 40 feet from a shrapnel-type 
bomb containing gas gangrene bacteria. To prevent instant death from the exploding weapon, 
their head and backs were covered with special metal shields and thick cotton blankets while 
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their legs and hips were left bare. After the bomb was electronically detonated. the victims 
took the force of the bacteria-infected shrapnel in their legs. Each wounded man perished 
within a week in agonizing pain ... "( 13 ). 
Additional experiments included forcing prisoners to eat chocolates containing anthrax or 
cakes and biscuits containing plague. The prisoners were also forced to consume drinks 
containing cholera ( 13 ). There were reports of human subjects being forced to infect others 
with venereal disease such as syphilis by direct (sexual) contact and the progression of the 
diseases was studied over time (9). Babies were carried to term infected with venereal 
disease in order to observe disease progression while in utero as well as to use in additional 
research activities (9). 
Individuals who died as a result of experiments were taken to pathologists for autopsy. 
Many who survived infections were autopsied without anaesthetic and operated on while still 
alive ( 6). Others were killed using methods such as injection/inhalation of poison gas. toxins 
or electrical current. carefully measuring the length of time for death to take place (9). 
When it became evident that the Axis powers would lose to the Allies in World War II. 
most of BW facilities were destroyed by the Japanese military in an attempt to conceal 
evidence of existence (9). In spite of attempts at destruction. several units were not destroyed 
and are open to the public to this day. Important records regarding human experiments were 
fonvarded to Ishii. who had by war·s end returned to Japan. A number of Japanese scientists 
who were directly involved in human BW experimentation later became prominent scientists 
in Japan and the United States-several finding employment at the National Institutes of 
Health (13). Facing indictment for war crimes. Ishii attempted to deceive Allied military 
forces by having stories ""planted'" about his death and staging a "funeral" in his home village 
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(13 ). American investigators eventually located Ishii but he was not arrested (9. 13 ). Ishii 
later met with American intelligence officials and promised to give a full account of his BW 
activities. Ishii was granted immunity from war crime persecution and died in 1959 at the age 
of 69 (11). 
The U.S. government collected numerous items from Ishii including the results of 
experiments on human subjects and mechanical instruments for BW (such as flint guns and 
bombs). In addition. biological slides and specimens from those who were part of BT 
experiments were provided (7). In contrast, in December, 1949 (four years after World War 
II) the Soviet government placed twelve Japanese POWs on trial as war criminals in 
Khabarovsk, Siberia (6). During the trial, the POWs were accused of waging BW in China. 
the USSR and Mongolia using •·plant and animal pathogens'' causing '·planned illnesses 
among people. animals and plants" using agents such as anthrax. chicken pox and typhoid 
(6). The author was not able to discern the verdict regarding Soviet trials as well as what 
happened to the POWs at the trial's conclusion. Recently, lawsuits have been filed against 
the Japanese government by Chinese families and descendants of those who were allegedly 
subject to experimentation (12, 42). Even though Japanese district courts have rejected 
victims' claims for compensation, these lawsuits have not been resolved (12). 
Post World War II BW activities by the United States 
Extensive research into offensive B W by the United States government began in 1941 with 
U.S. intelligence concerns that Germany and Japan may be involved in offensive BW 
research (2). Representatives of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) held meetings with the 
Surgeon General's office and the War Plans Division of the General Staff (2). The group 
determined that offensive BW research was an option to be considered: 
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··Biological Warfare is regarded as distinctly feasible. We are of the opinion that steps should 
be taken to formulate offensive and defensive measures'· (2). 
Planners also stressed that BW could be achieved by military attack or sabotage: targeting 
both civilians and the enemy·s military (2). Contamination of water, food. serum and 
vaccines by bacteria as well as dispersal of biological agents and toxins by aircraft. bombs. 
artillery or missiles were selected as possible areas of study (2). Investigating the use of 
infected animals and insects as disease-carrying vectors was also considered (2). 
Recommendations of diseases to be studied included plague. smallpox. dengue fever, yellow 
fever. encephalitis and malaria (2). Rinderpest (cattle plague). foot-and-mouth disease (a 
virus from the genus Aphtovirus) and fowl plague (avian influenza) were recommended as 
anti-animal weapons (2). The list was later extended to include anthrax and botulism (10). 
Ethical concerns regarding the military's role in BW as well as possible moral/ethical 
dilemmas for physicians and scientists resulted in the creation of the War Research Service 
(WRS). Membership included representatives of the Army and Navy, Public Health Service 
and the Department of Agriculture (2). The Roosevelt administration selected George W. 
Merck. director of the Merck pharmaceutical corporation as the WRS director (2). 
Responsibilities of the WRS fell into three categories; 
I) Research and Development which launched 26 projects related to protection against 
and offensive use of pathogenic agents. 
2) Anti-biological warfare. that designed "anti-sabotage" measures to protect civilians and 
military personnel against the threat of contamination of water supplies, food, milk and 
biological products (vaccines and serums). 
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3) Intelligence and information. which oversaw intelligence activities and guarded against 
possible leaks in published materials (2). 
These responsibilities were eventually transferred back to the War Department under the 
umbrella of the U.S. Biological Warfare Committee (2). Membership of this committee was 
expanded to include the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as well as British and Canadian 
officials (2). Scientific membership was crucial and a committee was formed. termed the 
"DEF committee .. (2). DEF committee members were appointed by the National Academy of 
Sciences and the National Research Council (2). Because of the program's increasing size. 
all BW functions were again transferred to the Special Projects Division (SPD). The 
responsibilities of the SPD were greatly expanded; " ... to develop measures for defense and 
retaliation against BW. to produce or procure the necessary material to collect and evaluate 
intelligence on enemy activity. to maintain liaison with other military and civilian 
organizations concerned with BW in the U.S. and abroad and to supply technical advice to 
the armed forces ... ''(2). Beginning with a modest $250.000 grant. the SPD became the most 
dominant force in BW planning. It has been estimated that construction of BW installations 
by the U.S. was around $45-50 million dollars during World War II (1939-1945) (6). By the 
time that President Nixon stated in November. 1969 to end all" offensive BW research", the 
Pentagon alone had spent a total of $726 million dollars on efforts related to offensive 
research activities (13 ). 
The research division of the U.S. BW program took place in four locations; Camp Detrick 
(now renamed Fort Detrick) in Frederick, MD: Hom Island, located in the Mississippi Sound, 
about 10 miles from Biloxi; Vigo Plant. located outside of Terre Haute, IN; and Granite Peak 
Installation. located at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah (2). Camp Dietrick's scientists 
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studied 18 diseases including anthrax. botulism. brucellosis (Burcella sp.). glanders. plague. 
rinderpest (Yirus from the genus Morbillivirus) that causes cattle plague and tularemia 
(Franciscella tularensis) (2). Horn Island was initially selected as a test facility for biological 
agent dissemination but because of its close proximity to maritime craft and the mainland. 
tests were limited to botulism and ricin (a toxin derived from the castor bean) (2). Research 
was discontinued at Horn Island after the Second World War. The Granite Peak facility 
conducted field tests for selected BW agents (2). Scientists at the Vigro plant manufactured 
BW munitions. The objective of the Vigro plant (which was never accomplished) was to 
grow and load anthrax into 4-pound bombs (2). Up to 500.000 units (bombs) were to be 
produced per month (10). After the conclusion of World War II. it was determined that BW 
research by the United States Government should continue. Research activities were 
expanded and U.S .. British and Canadian authorities reaffirmed their intention to continue 
collaboration in the development of BW (10). 
Alleged BW activities During the Korean War 
Questions remain as to whether the U.S. participated in offensive BW activities against the 
North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean War (1950-1953). In 1952. reports of deaths 
from atypical pneumonia were being reported in the Rebe and Liaoxang provinces of China 
( 10). Public health authorities were baffled and as a result, investigated suspect cases among 
the population. An example of a case investigated by Chinese officials is presented below. 
According to investigators:·u.s. airplanes had flown over an area and a railway worker 
identified as Qu Zhanyun discovered a large number of black beetles. Qu brought these bugs 
(samples) to the rail station where he worked. A second rail worker. Liu Zhongguo also had 
contact with the bugs. Liu reported to the disease prevention post for disinfection and Qu did 
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not. Qu became ill with what was described as headache. pain and nausea. Qu entered the 
hospital two days later with high fever. continuous vomiting. insomnia. incontinence. a high 
blood count and large bacilli in the sputum. Qu died the next day. An autopsy was conducted 
and .. anthrax .. was listed as the cause of death. It was noted that Qu had no history of contact 
with animals and no animal disease was found in his village. Before Qu became ill. he ate 
pork with his family. There were no reports of illness from his family .. ( 10). 
Added reports of ··atypical illnesses" such as (viral) encephalities. plague. cholera and 
relapsing fever (brucellosis) were also documented (10). 
Uncharacteristic health problems were also noted south of the Yalu River (the boundary 
between China and Korea). Information surfaced that U.S. aircrafts were dropping objects 
from planes including tree leaves. soybean sticks. pads. cardboard boxes (containing live 
insects and rotten fish). decaying pork. frogs and rodents (10). According to the (North) 
Korean Medical Headquarters. an incident was investigated by Chinese fighters close to the 
main line of resistance (the Cheumdon. Chorwon district). Three American F-51 aircraft 
dropped gray cylindrical objects 10 cm in diameter and 20 cm long containing yellow 
packets ( 10). Inside the packets were flies. fleas. ants and other insects. The insects were 
collected for analysis and the area cleaned. One flea specimen tested positive for plague (I 0). 
The Chinese military (People·s Liberation Army or PLA) claimed to have interviewed 
American and South Korean POWs: the POWs told their captors that they had been 
inoculated against plague. The POWs later signed confessions that they were involved in 
activities related to BW(l 0). 
Reports of alleged incidents ofBW were presented to Mao Zedong, chairman of the 
Central Military Commission. PLA and the premiere of the PLA. Zhou Emlai (10). 
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According to reports. the Chinese government was skeptical that BW was taking place. but as 
more unexplained illness and deaths took place. attitudes began to change (I 0). The Chinese 
and Korean governments implemented aggressive prevention measures such as vaccination 
and testing insects from the ··front lines" of battle (10). A .. serious protest"" to the United 
Nations against the .. germ warfare crimes of the Americans·· was also submitted by the North 
Korean and Chinese governments (I 0). 
One organization involved in the protection of Chinese and Korean citizens against alleged 
U.S. aggression were the Central Epidemic Prevention Committee. The committee sent a 
directive to all scientific institutes. universities and colleges to participate in anti-BW 
research and to utilize a mass educational campaign to educate people about prevention 
measures (I 0). Many scientists who participated in investigation efforts had advanced 
degrees from prominent institutions located in China and the U.S (I 0). According to the 
Chinese. public health and prevention efforts were largely successful: in a two-week period. 
almost five million people were inoculated with anti-plague vaccine ( 10). 
Three months after the North Korean and Chinese public health/prevention campaign. the 
Central Epidemic Disease Prevention group evaluated their response to alleged BW attacks. 
It was reported that with the assistance of .. the masses··. millions of insects and rodents had 
been destroyed and an immense quantity of trash had been collected (l 0). Additionally, over 
11 million individuals had been vaccinated against plague and 3.5 million people had been 
given (unspecified) types of vaccines (10). Reports of U.S. warplanes ''brazenly waging 
bacterial war in the northeast" continued to be investigated (I 0 ). Atypical reports of illnesses 
were also scrutinized. some examples include over I 00 '"acute deaths" from January to April, 
1953 from a ··special type of pneumonia·· and .. a congestion and swelling of the lungs" (I 0). 
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The causes of deaths were never determined but public health officials believed that BW 
could not be ruled out. According to Chinese public health officials, the U.S. Air Force 
dropped "bacterial bombs"' until the conclusion of the war (6). 
When the North Koreans and Chinese perceived that little was being done by the 
international community to address their concerns. the Chinese government formed an 
.. International Science Commission·' (ISC) led by Joseph Needham. a prominent biochemist 
from Cambridge University (United Kingdom). Although Needham and other committee 
members were sympathetic to the Chinese revolution, only one member was from a Soviet-
bloc country and all had ··distinguished careers and reputations to protect in the west""( 6). In 
October 1952. a 700 page report was released stating that ··the peoples of Korea and China 
did serve as targets for bacterial weapons""(6). According to the ISC. techniques used to 
infect individuals varied from "fountain pens filled with infected ink'", to .. anthrax-ridden 
letters" (10). There is also circumstantial evidence to suggest U.S. involvement in BW. First 
as mentioned. the U.S. did not try Japanese scientists for war crimes during World War II 
and in return. Japanese researchers made their experiments available which the U.S. could 
have utilized (10). Secondly, the U.S. military felt that one advantage of BW was that it 
would be difficult for ··the enemy .. to discern whether disease was the result of an "natural 
outbreak'" or if unusual diseases were detected, they could be attributed to .. poor sanitary 
conditions·· (10). Additionally. during the Korean. war. increased amounts of funding was 
given to expand the U.S. offensive BW infrastructure (7). 
The U.S. government vigorously denied the allegations of the Chinese and North Korean 
governments concerning BW activity (7). Regarding American POW"s statements that the 
U.S. was engaging in BW against Chinese and North Korean citizens, U.S. governmental 
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officials stated that the allegations were ··nonsense .. and that U.S. pilots that were POWs had 
been "brainwashed.'(7). The confessions themselves were suspect: they typically contained 
statements that were political in nature: 
From an American Pilot. John Quinn •· ... How I was forced to take part in this inhume [sic] 
bacteriological warfare launched by the US Wall Street. .. brought up as I was on the 
propaganda law of the Wall Street imperialists .. :' (15). From American Pilot Paul B. Kennis 
·· ... This inhuman warfare must be stopped"; also "All men are brothers and until we all learn 
to live together and help each other, we cannot have the world peace we desire so much'. (I). 
Lastly. from the confession of American pilot F.B. O'Neal; ··Let us change the tune of the 
piper and dance to the tune of peace .... Speak! Act! And your efforts for peace will be 
blessed·' (1 ). All American POWs retracted their confessions immediately after release from 
captivity (6). 
The U.S. government also presented three arguments to explain why the North Koreans 
and Chinese were misteiken in their allegations: I) The U.S. lacked the technological capacity 
for bacterial warfare during the Korean War. 2) The U.S. did not have the funds to create BW 
programs and 3) The Korean war was supposed to be a "limited war'' and the use of BW may 
have escalated this war into a regional conflict. (These assumptions can now be questioned 
due to what is now known about U.S. BW program proliferation after World War II) (7). 
ISC's findings found no conclusive evidence of BW against China and Korea by the US 
government (6) but the investigative team was careful to not totally dismiss accusations (16). 
ISC investigators. while crediting the efforts of Chinese and North Koreans citizenry who 
collected ground samples (i.e. bugs, animals who may have died of plague, containers), 
stated that there was no concrete evidence that these samples were vectors/fomites intended 
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to transmit disease (6). Efforts of the ISC may have been well-intentioned. however many 
believe that the ISC' s investigation may have been compromised because members of the 
ISC did admit accepting the •·word·· of Chinese scientists closely connected with North 
Korean and Chinese governments (6). Additionally. much of the facts provided to the ISC 
was not discovered by the committee members-information were described as .. third hand ... 
Facts regarding BT were·· ... received through Chinese interpreters from Chinese scientists 
working on reports from Chinese peasants•· (16). U.S. officials believed that North Korean 
and Chinese epidemics were the result of the activities of war (6) and that --communist 
propagandists'· were making BW allegations " ... to conceal their own inadequacies in coping 
with seasonal epidemics ... " (14). Unfortunately. ISC committee members' careers were 
detrimentally affected as a result of activities related to its work in Korea and China (14 ). 
The U.S. continues to deny any involvement in BW in the Korean War conflict (7). 
Microbial and BW stimulant t~sting in American cities during the 1950s and 1960s 
During the 1970s. Americans were made aware of the testing of microbiological agents in 
selected U.S. metropolitan areas. Many U.S. military scientists believed that the United 
States was ·'particularly susceptible to covert attack with BW agents" and that additional 
options had to be considered to determine how clandestine attacks would affect American 
cities (218). A decision was made to test ·'BW stimulants considered by the scientific 
community to be safe .. (218). A BW stimulant is defined as living organisms (not normally 
capable of causing infection) that have many of the physical and biological characteristics of 
pathogenic agents (218). It is believed that over a 20-year period ( 1950s and 1960s ). the 
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U.S. Army exposed millions of Americans to a variety of organisms and chemical particles 
(218 ). Prior to American tests. it was revealed that U.S .. Canada and Britain cooperated in 
··spraying pathogens in the area of the Bahaman Islands in the Caribbean .. (218). Details of 
the experiments are still considered classified by the U.S. government but pathogens used 
were described as "highly virulenC(2 l 8). Declassified documents revealed that the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted field tests with Haemophilus pertussis (now Bordetella 
pertussis) along the Florida Coast (218). The incidence of whopping cough along the Florida 
coast tripled from 339 cases and one death in 1954 to 1080 cases and 12 deaths in 1955 
(218). In yet another declassified experiment. the U.S. Army intentionally exposed a 
'·disproportionate number of black people·• to Aspergillusfumigatus: A. fumigatus is 
implicated in disease in a healthy host (toxicosis. allergic asthma/rhinitis and cutaneous 
infections) as well as in the the compromised host (central nervous system aspergillosis, 
invasive/disseminated aspergillosis and sino-orbital infection) ( 15, 218). In experiments 
conducted in 1951 at a supply center in Norfolk, Virginia. laborers handled crates that had 
been contaminated with Aspergillus spores (218). The rationale given for the experiments 
was that since African-Americans were susceptible to the fungus. the enemy may attempt to 
target laborers-many who were African-American. From the report:·· ... there are employed 
large numbers of laborers, many of them Negroes, whose incapacities would seriously affect 
the supply system. Since Negroes are more susceptible to coccidioides than are whites. this 
fungus disease was simulated using Aspergillus fumigatus Mutant C-2" (218). 
During the time that experiments took place, the Army released bacterial and/or chemical 
clouds on locations throughout the United States. Bacterial organisms frequently utilized 
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include Bacillus subtilis. Serratia marcescens and Aspergillusfumigatus (218). Organisms 
were sprayed in cities such as Norfolk. Virginia (A.fumigatus). Minneapolis. Minnesota. 
New York City. St. Louis, Missouri. and San Francisco. California (B. suhtilis and S. 
marcescens). (218) Zinc cadmium sulfide* experiments were conducted to simulate how 
organisms would act in an urban environment (7). This fluorescent particle is easily detected 
in minute quantities in the atmosphere and was used in the states oflowa. Nebraska. South 
Dakota and Virginia. (7) In Clouds of Secrecy: The Army's Germ J:Var:fare Tests over 
Populated Areas. Leonard Cole meticulously detailed the efforts of the descendants of 
Edward J. Nevin to investigate the circumstances of Nevin's death. The Nevin estate 
believed that Nevin's death on November 1. 1950 was directly attributed to a series of 
Serratia marcescens experiments carried out by the U.S. Army in the San Francisco area 
(218). Mr. Nevin originally was admitted to the hospital for the removal of his prostrate 
gland: he became extremely ill and unexpectedly died. His physicians insisted on an autopsy 
and the family was told that he died from bacterial endocarditis (146). When Nevin·s family 
later learned about the bacterial tests and contacted the Army. they felt that the Army was not 
forthcoming with information. Nevin"s estate filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government. 
The suit was dismissed on the basis that the decision to spray was based on .. national 
planning .. (preparing for possible BW attacks) and that the Army •·used appropriate care in 
the choice of stimulants·· (the belief at the time was that S. marcescens was not a harmful 
organism to humans) (218). It is now known that S. marcescens is implicated 
*Both •·zinc cadmium sulfide'' and •·zinc cadmium sulphide'' are used in literature. There 
were instances in which this substance was used in the company of biological agents. There 
is ongoing debate on whether this substance is harmful to humans. 
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in many nosocomial outbreaks associated with blood transfusions, surgery and urinary tract 
infections (204). B. subtilis can cause bacteremia/septicemia, endocarditis and respiratory 
infections (204). As mentioned, A. fumigatus is implicated in disease in a healthy host as well 
as in the compromised host (204). Infection withA.fumigatus is also associated with tissue 
damage or implantation of a foreign body (burn wound infection, vascular graft infection and 
prosthetic valve endocaditis) (204). 
Bacterial Organisms proposed in BW use by the CDC's Strategic Working Group 
As historical analysis demonstrates; instances ofBW and BW research occurred during 
notable historical events (colonization and war) as well as during times of peace 
(experiments on the dispersion ofBW agents). Countless bacterial organisms have been 
proposed as those that could be used in BW. However, according to a report by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention's Strategic Planning Working Group titled Biological 
and Chemical Terrorism, Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response, there are five 
bacterial and viral agents in two viral families that should be of particular concern; Bacillus 
anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Franciscella tularensis (tularemia), Clostridium 
botulinum toxin (botulism) variola major (smallpox), filoviruses (particularly those causing 
Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers) and arenaviruses (especially those causing Lassa 
fever and Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever) (16). 
Anthrax 
Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax is a large gram-positive, aerobic, spore-
forming bacillus measuring 1.0 to 1.5 µm by 3.0 to 10.0 µm (17). When nutrients are scarce, 
the cell sporulates and become resistant to environmental conditions including heat, 
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the cell sporulates and become resistant to environmental conditions including heat, 
ultraviolet and ionizing radiation, pressure and chemical agents (17, 18). Spore size is 
approximately 1-5 µm, have a "jointed bamboo rod" like cellular appearance and display no 
hemolysis on sheep agar (19). Anthrax spores germinate when they enter an environment rich 
in amino acids, nucleosides and glucose, such as that found in the blood or tissues of an 
animal or human host (17, 20). Anthrax is a disease of herbivores but mammals including 
humans are susceptible (17). The principal endemic areas of the world include sub-Saharan 
Africa, central and southern Asia and the central region of China (20). There are three 
manifestations of anthrax infection: cutaneous, gastrointestinal and inhalational (inhalational 
anthrax is of particular concern in BW). The cutaneous form (about 95 % of reported cases) 
first presents as a small papule that develops into a painless, black, necrotic ulcer referred to 
as an eschar (the word antharcis is derived for the Greek word for coal, anthrakis) (19). Both 
the gastrointestinal and inhalational forms are subtle in presentation with symptoms of 
gastroenteritis, slight fever and flu-like symptoms (20). Progression results in systemic 
disease that is resistant to treatment and rapidly fatal, with shock-like symptoms, sepsis and 
respiratory failure (20). 
The disease process is initiated by the entry of spores into the host body and this can occur 
via abrasions, insect bites, eating contaminated meat or by inhalation (24). Spores are then 
phagocytosed by macrophages and germinate into vegetative bacteria. Germination typically 
occurs within 1 to 6 days but occasionally can take up to 60 days (21). Macrophages 
containing bacilli migrate to the regional lymph nodes and continue to proliferate causing 
regional lymphadenitis (24). Eventually the bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause severe 
septicemia (24). High levels of exotoxins are produced leading to hemorrhage, toxemia, 
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edema. necrosis and death once exotoxins reach a critical level (19). Specifically in the case 
of pulmonary anthrax. lymphatic drainage is blocked due to peribronchial hemmorhagic 
lymphadenitis resulting in pulmonary edema and death from septicemia. toxemia or 
pulmonary complications ( 19). 
An important virulence factor of B. anthracis include two toxins composed of three 
proteins; protective antigen (PA: 83 kDa) lethal factor (LF: 85 kDa), and edema factor (EF: 
89 kDa) (22). In addition. the capsule of the organism (the outermost element of the cell 
wall) is important in virulence. B anthracis toxins are encoded by the genes pag 
(Qroliferation ~ssociated protein gene). /ef(.lymphoid ~nhancer factor) and cya (~denyl 
,£yclase gene) that are carried on the virulence plasmid pOX 1 ( 185 kbp) (22 ). The anthrax 
toxins are of two components: a receptor/cell-binding, or "'B domain··: and a biochemically 
active '·A domain" that has toxic and enzymatic activity ( 197). Edema toxin (PA + EF) 
induces edema formation at the inoculation site by converting intracellular ATP into cAMP 
(20). Lethal toxin (PA + EF) has been found to cause death in animals after intravenous 
injection (22). It is believed that lethal toxin induces macrophages to release 
proinflammatory cytokines such as tumor necrosis factor (TNF), interleukin (IL)-1 and IL-6, 
resulting in toxic shock and death (20). It should be noted that the toxin proteins (PA, LF and 
EF) have no biologically activity separately (197). 
The capsule of B. anthracis is a polymer of y-D-glutamic acid (23). The capsule 
contributes to pathogenicity by enabling the bacteria to evade the host-immune response and 
provoke septicemia (23). B. anthracis capsule synthesis is encoded by the plasmid pX02 
(23). In an environment of increased bicarbonate, carbon dioxide and temperature (typically 
found in the infected host), there is increased transcription of genes for the synthesis of the 
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capsule as well as lethal and edema toxins (197). Curing B. anthracis of either plasmid 
(pXOl and pX02) attenuates virulence (25). 
The best selective medium for isolation of B. anthracis is polymyxin B-lysozyme EDT A-
thallous acetate (PLET) agar ( 197). If B. anthracis is present after incubation at 3 7 °C for 36 
to 40 hours. colonies appear rough, circular and creamy-white with a "'ground-glass texture .. 
(197). These colonies can be later be subcultured on sheep blood agar to test for gamma 
phage and penicillin susceptibility or subcultured in blood to look for capsule production 
(197). Presumptive identification is based on the direct Gram-stained smear of a skin lesion. 
cerebrospinal fluid or blood showing encapsulated, broad. gram-positive bacilli (17, 23). 
Visually on sheep blood agar. the colonies are nonhemolytic, large. nonmotile and 
nonencapsulated (17. 23). Growth does not occur on MacConkey agar (17.23). 
Asymptomatic patients with suspected exposure to anthrax spores can be treated with a 
six-week course of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin (24). For individuals allergic to penicillin, 
antibiotics such as chloramphenicol. erythromycin. tetracycline or ciprofloxain can be 
administered (24). Recently. the CDC has recommended that systemic anthrax not be treated 
with penicillin G. ampicillin or amoxicillin alone due to the presence of constitutive and 
inducible ~-lactamases in B. anthacis isolates used in the •·anthrax attacks" in Florida that 
occurred October, 2001 (17, 23). If the suspected dose of spores is high. treatment may be 
extended beyond the 14 days recommended (24). In the case of a suspected BW exposure, 
treatment for postexposure prophylaxis is for at least six weeks ( 198). Extended treatment is 
necessary for total pulmonary clearance of spores that are not affected by the presence of 
antibiotics (24 ). Intravenous administration of treatment is recommended in cases of 
inhalational. gastrointestinal and meningeal anthrax (24 ). Cutaneous anthrax with signs of 
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extensive involvement (extensive edema or lesions on the head or neck) also require 
intravenous treatment (24 ). 
Both an attenuated live vaccine and a killed vaccine have been developed for human use. 
In the former Soviet Union. the live anthrax vaccine has shown to have good preventative 
efficacy (174. 41 ). Anthrax vaccine is given by scarification or subcutaneously (24 ). In the 
United States. vaccine is produced by the Michigan Department of Public Health and is made 
from sterile filtrates of microaerophilic cultures of an attenuated. unencapsulated. 
nonproteolytic Sterne strain of B. anthracis (197). The filtrate containing predominantly PA 
is adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide along with minute amounts of formaldehyde and 
benzethonium chloride (197). Some vaccines contain small amounts of LF and EF (197). The 
vaccine is stored at 2-8 °C and the recommended schedule for vaccination is 0.5 mL given 
subcutaneously at 0. 2. and 4 weeks. followed by boosters of 0.5 mL at 6. 12. and 18 months 
( 197). For those who may have been exposed. a combination of antibiotic treatment and 
vaccination is considered optimal (174). In veterinary medicine. spores of the B. anthracis 
Sterne strain are used as a live vaccine against anthrax in cattle (30. 38). This strain. which 
harbors pXOl (and is cured of pX02) develops in vivo (e.g. germinates. persists and/or 
multiplies) and produce antigens. including anthrax toxins that induce imrnunoprotection 
(39). Promising work has been published involving bacteriophage lysins (lytic agents used by 
double stranded DNA phages to coordinate bacterial host lysis with completion of viral 
assembly) (26). Schuch et al (2002) purified a bacterial lysin. PlyG (or Qhage lvsin gamma, 
produced by bacteriophages which specifically infect B. anthrancis) that has strong lytic 
activity against anthrax strains used in laboratory tests (27). When mice were 
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intraperitoneally injected with a lethal dose of B. cereus (a close phylogenetic relative of B. 
anthrancis) and later injected with PlyG 15 minutes after infection, 13 of 19 mice (68.4 %) 
recovered fully (26). PlyG and the amino acid L-alanine was also found to kill germinating 
anthrax spores; this characteristic was exploited in order to develop a rapid and specific 
system to detect spores using a hand-held luminometer (26, 27). L-alanine was used to 
germinate spores (which are susceptible to PlyG) and the emerging bacteria were later treated 
with PlyG, causing lysis and release of cellular components. One of the released cellular 
components, ATP ~denosine 5' !riQhosphate, a high energy molecule that serves as a cell's 
major form of energy currency) was later used by researchers in a luciferase-luciferin system 
(26, 27). Luciferase enzyme degrades lucerfin in the presence of ATP, producing light that 
can be detected by a luminator (199). Schuch and others are hopeful that this system could be 
used for rapid, specific monitoring of anthrax in domestic and battlefield environments (26). 
Plague 
Yersinia pesits, the causative agent of plague is a member of the family 
Enterobacteriaceae. Members of this family include Salmonella sp., Shigella sp., 
Escherichia coli and Bordetella sp. (26). Y. pestis, a gram-negative coccobacillus, is 
microearophilic, and non-motile; the non-motility of Y. pestis distinguishes it from other 
yersiniae, particularly Y. psuedotuberculosis and Y. enterocoliticia which are pathogenic for 
humans, both causing food and water-borne illnesses (28). Y. pestis measures from 0.5 to 0.8 
µmin diameter and 1-3 µm long (40). The organism can multiply within a wide range of 
temperatures (from 4 to 40° C) but the optimum temperature is from 28-30° C (40). 
Additionally, Y. pestis has a characteristic bipolar staining pattern (referred to as a "closed 
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safety pin" appearance of individual cells) (29). Methylene blue. Giemsa. Wright and 
Wayson stains are recommended for visualizing this trait. which is best observed in direct 
smears of infected specimens. Selective media used for isolation include MacConkey agar 
and cefsulodin-irgasan-novobiocin (CIN) agar with reduced cefsulodin content (200). Non-
selective media such as 5 % blood agar or brain heart infusion (BHI) agar can be used for 
sterile materials such as blood. bubo aspirates or biopsy specimens: additionally enrichment 
cultures of sterile specimens should be made with BHI broth (200). It is believed that Y. 
pestis is a recently emerged clone of Y pseudotuberculosis that evolved 1.500 to 2.000 years 
ago, shortly before known pandemics of human plague (29). There are three biovars of Y 
pestis-Antigua. Medievalis and Orientalis, each biovar classified according to minor 
phenotypic differences (31 ). Many believe that biovar Antiqua caused the first recorded 
pandemic ('"Justinian's plague". 541-767 A.D.): biovar Medievalis resulted in a second 
pandemic (the "Black Death"" and later epidemics from 1346 to the early 19th century), and 
biovar Orientalis is the cause of a third pandemic (from 1894-current) (31 ). During the 
months of September and October 1994. India experienced a plague epidemic which killed 
56 people in Surat and surrounding areas: an estimated 640.000 persons fled the region as a 
result ( 40). The outbreak in India caused global alam1. disrupted travel and resulted in severe 
economic problems in the region ( 44 ). 
Efforts have been made to use molecular technique in order to confirm "historical cases" 
of plague. Drancourt et al. (1998) completed a study in which DNA extracts were taken from 
17 unerupted teeth of those thought to have died of plague during the 18th century in 
Marseille, France as well as 7 ancient "control teeth" which were taken from 16th century 
graves in Lambesc. France (44). Polymerase Chain Reactions (PCR) amplifications were 
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preformed on all teeth and confirmed that plague was present during the end of the l 81h 
century (32). 
Y. pestis is maintained in enzootic cycles involving resistant wild rodents and their fleas in 
mostly remote. lightly populated areas of Asia, Africa and the Americas as well as limited 
rural locations in southeastern Europe near the Caspian Sea (32). Human and other non-
rodent animals are incidental hosts (195). The oriental rat flea (Xenopsyl/a cheopis) is the 
classic vector for plague but species such as X brasiliensis can transmit the disease (195). 
Rats such as the common black or roof rat (Rattus rattus) and the brown sewer/Norway rat 
(R. norvegicus) are infected via a bite from an infected flea (40). In the United States, 
important reservoirs include the ground and rock squirrel (Spermophilus sp.) as well as 
prairie dogs (Cynomys sp.) (205, 195). Once a flea takes a blood meal from an infected rat. Y. 
pestis organisms multiply in the midgut and eventually block the proventiculus and 
esophagus, preventing ingested blood from reaching the flea·s stomach (205. 195). As the 
flea repeatedly attempts to feed, blood from the mammalian host distends the esophagus, 
mixes with bacilli and is regurgitated into the mammalian host when the feeding attempt is 
terminated (205). It has been estimated that as many as 11.000 to 24.000 bacilli are 
regurgitated by the flea into the mammalian host (208). A number of researchers believe that 
this figure may be an overestimate (fewer organisms may be required to cause infection) 
(205). Direct handling of contaminated animal tissues also transmits plague and inhalation of 
respiratory secretions from domesticated cats (Felis catus) that are susceptible to the disease 
or coughing human patients (205). 
There are three clinical manifestations of plague. The first (and the most common) is 
bubonic plague. Typically after the bite of an infected flea and an incubation period of 2 to 8 
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days. bacteria proliferate in the regional lymph nodes (205). Symptoms include the sudden 
onset of fever. chills. weakness and headache (205). From a period of a fev.· hours to the next 
day. the patient often discovers a bubo. an extremely painful lymphadenitis typically located 
in the groin. axilla or neck (206). Without effective treatment. patients later experience a 
toxic state of fever. tachycardia. lethargy. agitation and confusion (205). Secondary plague 
sepsis may result in bleeding. shock. organ failure and disseminated intravascular 
coagulation (or DIC. characterized by systemic blood clotting marked and profuse 
hemmorhaging) (205). Purpuric lesions can also develop in instances of a systemic infection. 
The lesions become necrotic and gangrenous. explaining the term "'black death'" as a 
description of plague ( 195 ). Death can occur as soon as 2-4 days after the onset of symptoms 
(29). The second manifestation of plague is septicemic. a progressive. overwhelming 
bacterial infection. In the absence of regional lymphadenitis, victims become ill with fever 
and may die suddenly (29). Victims are febrile and most have chills. headache, malaise and 
gastrointestinal disturbances ( 195). The mortality rate for individuals with septicemic plague 
is from 30-50 %. possibly because treatment used to treat undifferentiated sepsis (antibiotics) 
are not effective against r. pestis (195). Pneumonic plague is a rare form of the disease that 
is spread via respiratory droplets through close contact (2 to 5 feet) with an infectious person 
( 40). It progresses from a flu-like illness to an overwhelming pneumonia with coughing and 
production of bloody sputum ( 40). The incubation period for primary pneumonic plague is 
between 1 and 3 days ( 40 ). Perry et al. noted that the majority of the pneumonic plague cases 
diagnosed in the United States between 1970 to 1993 were contracted from infected cats 
which is a significant concern to veterinarians and other animal care personnel (40). Some 
patients develop pneumonia secondary to either the bubonic or septicemic form of the 
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disease and in general. patients who develop secondary pneumonic plague have a high 
fatality rate (40). The pneumonic form of plague is viewed as the most likely route of 
infection ifthe organism is used in a bioterrorist attack (40). 
Pathogenicity of rersinia sp. results from its ability to overcome the defenses of the 
mammalian host and overwhelm it with massive growth ( 40). Yersiniae have a common 
tropism for lymphoid tissue and specifically evade the non-specific immune response of 
macrophages and polymorphonuclear leukocytes (PMNs) (29). Multiplication of r. pestis is 
largely extracellular (33) but it has also been found that macrophages and PMNs become 
nonphagocytic after infection by wild-type yersiniae (34 ). Pathogenic Yersinia sp. harbor a 
highly conserved 70-kb plasmid (pYV) that is essential for virulence (35). Plasmid pYV 
contains about 50 virulence genes encoding what is referred to as an type III secretion system 
(33). a mechanism for the injection of bacterial proteins into eucaryotic cells (referred to as 
Ysc or Yop ~ef.retion) (35) as well as several proteins called Yops (yersinia Quter membrane 
_Qroteins) that are secreted upon contact with eucaryotic host cells.(35). Secretions of some 
Y ops require the assistance of small cytosolic chaperones referred to as Syc (~pecific Y op 
fhaperone) (36 ). The type III secretion apparatus is complex. however related systems have 
been encountered in other pathogenic bacteria such as Pseudomonas aeruginosa, 
enteropathogenic Escherichia coli, Shigella sp. and Salmonella sp. (35). Under conditions of 
growth restriction (calcium ion depletion) and a temperature of 3 7 °C. yersiniae stop growing 
and p YV directs the synthesis of Y ops (33 ). Y ops have different functions during infection. 
Some are directly involved as effector proteins: for example, Yop H, Yop E, Yop Mand Ypk 
(yersinia _Qrotein kinase A) attack the host cell and prevents phagocytosis by disturbing signal 
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transduction (33. 34 ). Others Yops (Yop N and Yop D) have regulatory functions: for 
example. Yop N controls secretion. and Yop D is essential for the translocation of Yops (39). 
Fallowing the discovery of Yops. researchers were able to use genetic analysis to identify 
ysc genes involved in secreting many Y ops out of the bacterial cell ( 43 ). The mechanism of 
export is still being investigated but according to Comelis (2000) it is generally assumed that 
the ysc apparatus serves as a hollow condiut through which the exported proteins travel to 
cross the inner and outer bacterial cell membranes and the peptidoglycan barrier in one step 
\43). 
Syc c11osolic chaperones are required for some of the Yops. For example. Syc N. the 
chaperone of Yop N is necessary for the efficient secretion of the Yop N proteins (33). As in 
ysc. the exact function of syc chaperones are being delineated. however many believe that 
Syc chaperones can be divided into two different ··families"". One family of chaperones 
appears to be both secretion/translocation pilots and anti-association factors while the other 
family of chaperones appears to play an active role in Y op-cytoplasmic association until 
secretion (33 ). 
All patients suspected of having bubonic plague should be placed in isolation until two 
days after initiating antibiotic treatment to pre\ ent the spread of the disease in case the 
patient develops secondary plague pneumonia (34 ). Streptomycin and gentamicin are the 
drugs of choice for treating plague: tetracycline and chloramphenicol are effective 
alternatives (34 ). Because streptomycin is bacteriolytic. it should be administered carefully to 
prevent endotoxic shock ( 40). As a result of streptomycin's toxicity, patients typically are not 
maintained on streptomycin for the full I 0-day regimen but are switched to other antibiotics, 
usually tetracycline ( 44 ). Tetracyclines, sulfonamides and chloramphenicol can be used for 
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prophylaxis ( 40 ). Concern has been raised regarding antibiotic resistance in some variants of 
1·. pestis (40). Strains originating from Madagascar displayed resistance to ampicillin. 
chloramphenicol. kanamycin and sulfonamides but remained susceptible to trimethoprim 
( 44 ). Two types of vaccines are available to protect against plague: live and attenuated. The 
live vaccine is derived from a Pgm- attenuated strain (Qigm.ented negative: avirulent in mice 
as a result of decreased iron uptake) and the killed vaccine uses a formalin-fixed virulent 
strain of Y pestis (45). The current vaccine used in the United States is manufactured by 
Greer Laboratories (Lenoir. N.C.) and is administered as a series of three injections. The first 
dose is 1.0 ml of a suspension containing 1.8 X I 09 to 2.2 X 109 fixed bacteria/ml: this dose 
is followed 1-3 months later by a 0.2-ml dose (46). A third injection of0.2 ml is given 5-6 
months after the second ( 40). Two booster doses of 0.2 ml is given at 6-month intervals and 
additional booster shots are administered every I to 2 years ( 40). Only individuals who are at 
high risk for contracting plague are vaccinated. This includes individuals who work with or 
are potentially exposed to fully virulent strains and military personnel who are serving in 
areas where plague is endemic ( 40). Control of plague focuses on surveillance (by serology 
and active investigation of possible cases). keeping the public in plague-endemic areas 
informed about the disease. and eliminating habitats for plague-susceptible rodents as well as 
treating domestic pets for fleas ( 40). All human cases of plague in the United States are 
investigated by local and state health officials as well as the CDC ( 40). Information is used to 
determine if there is a further risk of infection to humans and to determine if any control 
measures are needed (40). 
Tularemia 
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The causative agent of tularemia, Francisella tularensis is a facultative, intracellular 
gram-negative bacterium. (40). The organism is small (0.2 to 0.7 µm) and highly virulent; the 
disease occurs in over 250 mammalian species, including humans (40). F. tularensis is 
considered fastidious since it grows slowly; the historical media of choice for isolation is 
cystine-glucose blood agar (however the isolation of cystine-independent strains have been 
documented) (47, 201). Good growth has been achieved using chocolate agar supplemented 
with IsoVitaleX (an enrichment substance used to shorten the lag phase of bacterial growth) 
and modified charcoal-yeast extract agar (201). There are four recognized biovars of F. 
tularensis, however, F. tularensis biovar tularensis (Jellison type A) and F. tularensis biovar 
palaeartica (Jellison type B) produce the majority of disease in humans and mammals (48). 
Biovar tularensis is the common causal agent of tularemia in North America; it has been 
recently observed in Europe (49). Biovar palaeartica is more widely distributed in nature and 
is found in Europe, Asia and (to a minor extent) in North America (47). Organisms can be 
recovered from contaminated water, soil, vegetation and in animal feces (50). The most 
frequent natural reservoirs of tularemia are voles, rabbits, hares, rodents and squirrels (50). 
Mammals acquire infection through bites by arthropods (ticks, flies and mosquitoes) as well 
contact with contaminated environments (51). Specifically, humans can acquire tularemia 
via arthropod bites, direct contact with infected tissues, inhalation or ingestion (53). Person-
to person transmission has not been documented (53). Individuals of all ages and both 
genders are equally susceptible to tularemia, however, activities such as hunting, trapping, 
butchering and farming are more likely to expose adult men (52). Tularemia can be spread by 
activities that aerosolize the organism (e.g. mowing and trimming tularemia-contaminated 
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grass and brush) (51 ). In the United States. 100-200 cases of tularemia are reported every 
year: most occurring in the states of Missouri. Arkansas. Oklahoma and Kansas ( 51 ). 
After an incubation period of 3 to 5 days (range 1 to 21 days). infection with F. tularensis 
can result in different clinical presentations. depending on the route of inoculation. the dose 
of the inoculum and the virulence of the organism (52). Ulceroglandualr tularemia is 
contacted by bites from blood-sucking arthropods or by handling infected or dead animals 
( 54 ). The initial symptom is a vesicular or papulovesicular lesion at the site of infection: the 
lesion typically is not a reason to seek medical attention (51 ). It may progress into an ulcer 
that may become tender and covered by an eschar (55). Regional afferent lymph nodes can 
enlarge and rupture ( 4 7). In glandular tularemia. no primary lesion (ulcer) is present but 
regional or superficial lymph nodes are involved ( 51 ). Oculoglandular tularemia results 
following direct contamination of the eye by the organism. It presents as a granulomatous 
conjunctivitis often accompanied by regional lymph node enlargement (51 ). Typhoidal 
tularemia displays no primary lesions or glandular enlargement: the mode of transmission is 
believed to be the gastrointestinal route ( 51 ). Respiratory tularemia is associated with the 
inhalation of contaminated aerosols or dust (55). Although uncommon. respiratory tularemia 
is the most severe clinical form of the disease, with a mortality rate as high as 60% in 
untreated individuals (51. 55). Tularemia sepsis can be severe and fatal. There are 
nonspecific findings of fever. abdominal pain. diarrhea and vomiting ( 51 ). The patient may 
appear very ill and develop confusion and coma (52). Unless treated promptly, complications 
such as DIC, bleeding. systemic inflammatory response, acute respiratory distress syndrome 
(ARDS), organ failure and death can result (51 ). 
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F. tu/ arensis is an extremely virulent organism: as few as 10 organisms of biovar 
tularensis (Jellison type A) administered subcutaneously are sufficient to cause infection in 
humans ( 51 ). Little is known about how the organism survives within host cells since. unlike 
many other facultative intracellular bacteria. it produces no toxin and harbors no secretion 
systems (51 ). Symptoms and lesions are believed to be secondary to host-derived responses 
to the vigorously multiplying bacteria (56). Mammalian cells that are infected by F. 
tulaerensis include macrophages and macrophage-like cells such as Kupffer cells in the 
spleen. liver and lungs (59). The organism also establishes in organs such as the lymph 
nodes, kidney and pleura (56). Adaptation of tularemia to macrophages and other target cells 
of the host is considered central to the pathogenesis of the organism (57). Initial tissue 
reaction to Francisella infection includes an accumulation of polymorphonuclear leukocytes 
(PMNs) followed by invasion of macrophages. epitheliod cells and lymphocytes (57). F 
tularensis is susceptible to the oxidative killing mechanisms of PMNs. particularly 
hypoclorous acid ( 51 ). During the initial inflammatory response of the host. the first cells to 
arrive at the site of infection are PMNs: extracellular bacteria exposed to antibody will be 
phagocytosed and killed by these cells (51 ). However. Francisella that enter macrophages 
will survive (202). It is possible that the capacity to enter macrophages derived from the need 
of Francisella to escape the lethal consequences of interaction with PMNs (202). Once inside 
an acidified vesicle such as an macrophage, Franciscella find a "successful niche'' for 
replication where iron, an essential nutrient for this bacterium is plentiful (202). Lai et al. 
(2001) have proposed that Francicella delay apotosis of macrophages in order to grow and 
proliferate and that signaling required to induce apotosis is triggered by the presence of high 
numbers of Francisella in the logarithmic growth phase inside the host cell (61). 
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The identification of F. tularensis has traditionally have been accomplished by gro\\th 
characteristics and biochemical analysis (59). Identification of biovars tularensis and 
palaeartica can be made biochemically: biovar tularensis ferments glycerol and glucose and 
produces citrulline ureidaes (59). Biovar palaeartica only ferments glucose and does not 
produce citrulline ureidase ( 48). However. culture techniques are susceptible to safety 
problems. and unvaccinated staff working with the organism usually acquire tularemia: work 
on F. tularensis can be performed only on special media in high-level biosafety containment-
equipped laboratories due to its highly infectious nature (48). Additionally. tularemia tends to 
be slow growing (48). Other serology methods such as agglutination techniques or enzyme 
immunoassay (EIA) are utilized for diagnosis. but antibodies to tularemia are not detected 
until the end of the second week of disease (47). A technique referred to as Shell Vial Cell 
Culture Centrifugation (Fournier. et al 1998) has been used to diagnose tularemia. In this 
procedure, human ~mbryonic lung (HEL) cells growing inside shell vials are inoculated with 
suspect material from an eschar. centrifuged. and allowed to grow for three days on a 
coverslip (47). The coverslip is later stained (Gram and Gimenez staining regimens) and 
observed under a microscope for presence of tularemia.( 4 7). This procedure may be a safe. 
useful and time-saving method of diagnosing tularemia.( 46). PCR has been also used to 
detect F. tularensis. Sjostedt et. al (1997) completed a study in which PCR was used to detect 
F. tularensis DNA in persons infected with ulceroglandular tularemia ( 46) and de la Puente-
Redono et al.(2000) evaluated extragenic palindromic element PCR (REP-PCR), 
enterobacterial repetitive intergenic consensus sequence PCR (ERIC-PCR) and random 
amplified polymorphic DNA (RAPD) assays in typing different strains of tularemia (47). 
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Both studies cited found PCR to be useful. more rapid and safer than traditional diagnostic 
efforts (such as serology). 
In treating tularemia. the aminoglycosides (streptomycin or gentamycin) are considered 
the optimal drugs to use ( 4 7). Although streptomycin has a 100 % cure rate. the antibiotic is 
not readily available and is potentially toxic (50). Gentamycin has a high cure rate, can be 
used intravenously. and is easier to acquire-but like streptomycin. there are concerns about 
toxic effects (62). Treatment with aminoglycosides is typically completed over an 10-day 
period (63). Tetracyclines and chloramphenicol are also used to treat tularemia. however 
relapses and primary treatment failures occur at a higher rate than with aminoglycosides: 
medication should be given for at least 14 days to reduce the possibility ofrelapse (63). The 
quinolones appear to be an attractive treatment option because they are well-tolerated. 
achieve adequate blood levels after oral administration and have excellent intracellular 
penetration ( 51 ). There are questions of whether ciprofloxacin (a quinolone) is useful in the 
treatment of tularemia. Lima ye et al. (1999). Dennis et al (2001) and others recommend 
ciprofloxacin for medical use. Even though it is not categorized for use in tularemia, it has 
been shown to be effective in vitro in animals (51 ). Ciprofloxacin has also been successfully 
used to treat adults and children (62). Nonetheless. Chocarro et al. (2000) caution that 
although quinolones have been used for antibiotic therapy, the treatment may be unsuccessful 
in some patients and relapse may occur (51). If used. treatment with ciprofloxacin should 
continue for 10 days (62). 
Clostridium botulinum toxin 
The causative organism of botulism is Clostridium botulinum, a gram-positive, obligatory 
anaerobic rod (0.3-1.9 x 2-10 nanometers) that produces spores (51). Distribution of this 
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bacterium is worldwide; it is found in diverse environments such as dirt, sea sediments and 
animal feces (64). The spores are resistant to cold; C. botulinum has been reported to grow 
and produce toxin at temperatures as low as 3.3 to 2° C (65, 66). Clostridium spores can be 
confused with Bacillus sp., but C. botulinum forms spores only under anaerobic conditions 
and almost never produce catalase (65, 66, 67). Clostridium also lacks a cytochrome system 
and reacts negatively with the cytochrome oxidase test; energy is obtained via ATP by 
substrate-level phosphrylation (68). Serotypes of C. botulinum are distinguished by the kind 
of neurotoxin produced (designated A, B, C, D, E, F, and G) (67). Four clinical 
manifestations of botulism have been characterized; food-borne, infant, wound and unknown 
(67). The classical food-borne illness is primarily due to ingestion of toxins in food-hence its 
name (botulism is derived from the Latin word for sausage or botulus) (67). Infant botulism 
results from an infection of the intestinal tract in which C. botulinum spores germinate and 
the vegetative form of the bacteria colonizes the lumen of the large intestines, releasing 
neurotoxin (69). 
The United States military discovered that Iraq chose to weaponize botulinum toxin during 
the Gulf War in 1991, however medical experts believe its usefulness as a weapon might be 
limited due to its instability during storage and modest range during aerosolization (69, 70). 
Nonetheless, it is expected that aerosolized botulinum toxin would produce cases of typical 
adult (food-borne) botulism (69, 70). Many feel that saboteurs could use botulinum toxin to 
harm food supplies (71). Epidemiologically, the diagnosis of botulism of a bioterrorist origin 
would be suggested by the appearance of a large number of patients with symptoms 
consistent with botulism (69). 
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The onset of botulism usually occurs 18-36 hours after exposure (range 6 hours to 8 days) 
and is characterized by a generalized muscle weakness. which compromises ocular and throat 
muscle functions later extending to all skeletal muscles (71 ). Generalized flaccid paralysis 
accompanied by impaired respiratory and autonomic function develops: in the most severe 
forms and death can result from respiratory failure (72). Ventilatory support and 24-hour 
nursing care is typically needed for 2-8 weeks but a few patients require support for up to 7 
months before the return of muscular function (70. 73). Massive fatal outbreaks of botulism 
occasionally takes place in animals. both in the wild and on farms (70). Botulinum toxin are 
some of the most potent toxins knmvn to exist in nature-more than 15.000 times more toxic 
than the nerve agent VX and 100.000 times more toxic than sairn (73). Lethal dose for mice 
is 0.3 mg/kg body weight and believed to be 0.2 to 2.0 nanograms/kg body weight for 
humans (73 ). The toxin specifically targets the pre synaptic membrane of motor neuron nerve 
endings (cholinergic nerve terminals) and does not cross the blood-brain barrier due to its 
large size (73 ). Therefore the toxin has no known action in the Central Nervous System 
(CNS) (69). 
In healthy neural function. synaptic transmission is based on the rapid and regulated 
exocytosis of the chemical neurotransmitter acetylcholine (75). Neurotransmitter release 
involves a discrete series of steps. including formation of acetylcholine-filled ~mall fil'naptic 
yesicles (SSV s ). targeting of SSV s to presynaptic release sites and calcium-triggered fusion 
of SSV with the presynaptic plasma membrane (75). Neurotransmitters are typically 
accumulated in SSV s via transporters generated by the A TPase proton pump (76). Most 
SSVs are bound to the actin cytoskeleton via phosphorylation reactions. however a small 
proportion of SSV s bind to the cytosolic face of the presynaptic membrane at active zones, 
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via protein-protein interactions (77). Essential proteins involved this process are referred to 
as SNARES or (SNAP* receptor proteins) (78). In neurotransmission, SNARES are believed 
to mediate membrane fusion of SSVs to the presynaptic membrane (78). Essential SNARES 
involved in this process include synaptobrevin (also known as yesicle-~ssociated membrane 
Qrotein or VAMP), SNAP-25 (§ynaptosomal-~sociated Qrotein of 25 kDa) and syntax.in (78). 
According to the current hypothesis of SNARE function, after an action-potential influx of 
calcium, VAMP (which is embedded in SSVs) forms an extremely stable complex with 
SNAP-25 and syntaxin (located on the presynaptic membrane) (79). It is believed that the 
formation of this complex provides the "driving force" for SSV fusion (76). SNARE proteins 
are later disassociated through the action of a fourth protein, a-SNAP and the ATPase N-
ethylmaleimide-sensitive factor (NSF) so they can participate in another round of membrane 
fusion (80). 
Botulism toxin is typically ingested in foods contaminated with C. botulinum spores. The 
spores grow into active vegetative cells and toxins are produced (80). Typically, most 
proteins are broken down into peptides and amino acids in the stomach and small intestines 
during the process of digestion, but botulinum toxin withstands proteases and the acidic pH 
of the stomach (normally around pH 2) as well as proteases in the small 
intestines (80). Toxins are then absorbed from the upper small intestines to presynaptic 
membranes via the lymphatic and circulatory systems (80). In the case of infant botulism, 
babies ingest honey or consume materials such as house dust and soil contaminated with 
spores (81). The spores later germinate and grow in the large and small intestines, releasing 
*SNAP= §Oluble NSF ~ttachment Qroteins 
*NSF= N-ethylmaleimide-§ensitive factor 
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toxin that migrates to presynaptic membranes (80). 
Clostridial toxins are zinc proteases which cleave specific proteins thought to be involved 
in the SSV docking-fusion complex (80). The neurotoxins are synthesized as biologically 
inactive single polypeptides of 150 kDa and are cleaved to active disulfide-linked dichain 
toxins (80). The heavy chain (I 00 kDa) carries the receptor binding and transmembrane 
domains of the toxin and the light chain (50 kDa) carries the catalytic domain that blocks 
nerotransmitter release (82). VAMP is cleaved by botulism neurotoxins (BoNT) B, D. F and 
G (82). BoNT A and E cleave SNAP-25 and BoNT C cleaves syntaxin (82). Cleaving of 
SNARES results in the blocking of acetylcholine release ( exocytosis) and the failure of 
neuromuscular transmission resulting in flaccid 
paralysis (79. 82). 
Clostridia typically produce adequate growth on commercially available CDC anaerobe 
blood agar and phenylethyl alcohol blood agar after 1-2 days of incubation (203). Brucella 5 
% sheep blood agar. Columbia agar or BHI agar supplemented with yeast extract. vitamin K 
and hemin may be also be used as the nonselective blood agar medium: colony 
characteristics vary among the different species of Clostridium (203). However to detect C. 
botulinum toxin. mouse assay is the only universally accepted method (82). The mouse assay 
involves intraperitoneal injection of suspect toxin into live mice (82). Mice are then observed 
for paralysis and time of death-which occurs rapidly (68). The mouse assay is highly 
sensitive and specific. but expensive. time-consuming. laborious and require handling of 
laboratory animals. As a result. only a limited number of samples can be analyzed at one time 
(203). Additionally. the procedure is politically sensitive because of animal rights issues (78). 
Alternative testing methods have been derived such as the PCR testing of serum, feces and 
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gastric aspirates (68). Different methods of PCR are based on the detection of the botulinum 
neurotoxin gene (69). Competitive Reverse-Transcription PCR. a quantitative version of the 
Reverse-Transcription PCR is one method in which a knov.n number of copies of 
exogenously synthesized control RNA are introduced together with a test RNA sample into a 
reaction mixture (72). The basis of this technique is coamplification of a nucleic acid of 
interest and the control cDNA (this is possible if the target and control have almost the same 
DNA sequence and have identical primer sites) (219). Quantification is then accomplished 
by comparing the PCR signal of the specific template with the PCR signals obtained with 
knov.n concentrations of the competitor (69). Another method. Multiplex PCR allows a 
simultaneous and specific detection of more than one serotype of C. botulinum ( 69). This 
method is based on a '·primer cocktail"' consisting of four pairs of oligonucleotide primers 
specific to botulinum neurotoxin types A. B. E and F genes ( 69). This method has been used 
to detect and identify C. botulinum types A. B. E and F in foods and fecal matter (219). A 
modified enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) technique has also been applied in 
the diagnosis of botulism. In this procedure. the measurement of chicken and human 
antibodies to C. botulinum neurotoxins A. B and E is accomplished by isolation of complexes 
containing these antibodies (219). A mixture of Clostridium toxin is allowed to form a 
complex in solution phase with the test antibody. fluoresceinated antibody and enzyme 
(Russell's viper venom factor X activator) (219). The complex is bound to a matrix 
containing antifluorescein antibody ( 83 ). All components not attached to the matrix are 
washed off and the complex is isolated by elution with fluorescein which competes for the 
binding to the antifluorescein matrix (83 ). The eluted complex is bound to a matrix that 
specifically binds the test antibody (anti chicken immunoglobulin Y [lg Y] or antihuman lg 
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G) ( 405). Multiplex PCR was found to be highly sensitive and specific for detection of 
botulinum toxin (83 ). Electromyography (the recording and study of the intrinsic electrical 
properties of skeletal muscle) has also been used for diagnosis but typically diagnosis is 
made on a clinical and epidemiologic basis (83 ). 
Clostirdium neurotoxin has been used therapeutically. Disorders caused by overactivity of 
muscles for which treatment of botulinum toxin A has been indicated include ophthalmologic 
disorders such as restrictive or myogenic strabismus (deviation of the eye) and tardive 
dystonia (painful muscle spasms) (83). Examples of conditions in which botulinum A toxin is 
used in treatment include multiple sclerosis, spinal cord injury, migraine headache and tennis 
elbow (72. 84). Additionally. cosmetic application ofbotulinum toxin has been used in 
diminishing the appearance of ··fro\.\>n lines" and .. wrinkles·· (85). 
In order to provide protection from botulinum toxin. especially to those exposed 
environmentally (e.g. horses exposed to toxin in anaerobically stored feed and laboratory 
workers in laboratories studying C. botulinum). botulism equine antitoxin (types A, B, and 
E) is available from the CDC through state and local health departments (85). Use of the 
antitoxin requires skin testing (85). Patients are injected intradermally with 0.2 mL of a I: IO 
dilution and if no reaction occurs, a slow infusion of antitoxin (I 0 mL diluted, 1: 10 normal 
saline) can be given intravenously (72). If a reaction occurs (wheal and flare), patients should 
be desensitized over at least 3-4 hours and diphenhydramine as well as epinephrine should be 
made available (72). An investigational pentavalent toxoid (types A. B, C, D and E) is 
available and is produced by BioPort under contract to the U.S. Army (72). Toxoid is 
administered as a 3-dose series (0.5 mL, subcutaneous doses at 0, 2 and 12 weeks) with 
annual boosters (72). Immunization is hampered by an increasing rate oflocal reaction to 
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each booster: there are also cold storage requirements that may decrease availability (71 ). It 
takes several months for the toxoid to confer immunity. therefore it is not recommended for 
post-exposure prophylaxis (71 ). In research efforts. USAMRIID investigators used 
recombinant technology to express a fragment of the heavy chain of botulin um toxin 
serotype A in Escherichia coli, which protected mice from intraperitoneal challenge with 
type A botulinum toxin (71 ). Additionally. ventilatory support and continuous nursing care 
may be necessary for victims of botulism intoxication. 
Smallpox 
Smallpox. which has been estimated to have killed at least 300 million people in the 
twentieth century alone (three times more than all the wars that took place in the past 100 
years) is caused by the variola virus (72). Variola viruses are categorized within the 
Orthopoxvirus genus of the Chrodopoxvirinae subfamily of DNA viruses in the Poxviridae 
family (89). They have linear. double-stranded DNA genomes of 186 kb and are large (about 
250 x 200 nm). brick-shaped particles (206). Variola viruses are large enough to be seen by 
light microscopy (206). The external surface of orthopoxviruses have ridges in parallel rows 
that are sometimes arranged helically (206) and contain approximately 200 proteins. about 
half structural and half unstructural (87). Electron microscopy reveal that the outer surface is 
composed of lipid and proteins that surround the core which is biconcave (dumbbell-shaped), 
in addition there are two .. lateral bodies .. whose function is unkno\Vn (87). The viral core is 
composed of tightly compressed nucleoprotein (87). Poxviruses contain both specific and 
common proteins and the common proteins induce cross-reactive immunity accounting for 
the ability to vaccinate against disease from poxviruses of the same genus (87). There are at 
least 10 enzymes present in viral particles that mediate gene expression-of all the poxviruses, 
46 
only those of the genus orthopoxvirus produces an hemagglutinin antigen (HA) (87). HA 
causes fusion of the virus and the target cell membrane. 
Portals of entry of variola virus include the respiratory tract. minute abrasions on the skin 
or oral mucous membrane, inoculation (e.g. vaccination or mechanical infection by 
arthropods) or rarely. via the conjunctiva or placenta (87). Infection can also take place by 
contact with infected scabs on fomites (this mode of infection was utilized by the British 
military in the 1700's to deliberately spread smallpox to Native American tribes) (87). The 
infectious dose is unknown but is believed to be only a few virions (89). 
Characteristically. the virus is transmitted from the respiratory tract to regional lymph 
nodes, where the initial phase of viral replication occur (90). Poxviruses are unique among 
DNA viruses in that the entire multiplication cycle takes place in the cytoplasm of infected 
cells (89). Initially. viral particles establish contact with the (lymphoid) cell surface and are 
engulfed in phagocytic vacuoles of the host cell (87). Uncoating of the virus takes place by 
means of hydrolytic enzymes in the vacuole (87). The viral core is then released into the 
cytoplasm. Viral RNA polymerase transcribes about half of the viral genome into early 
mRNA (87). These mRNA are transcribed within the viral core and are released into the 
cytoplasm (97). Among the early proteins made after variola infection are enzymes involved 
in DNA replication including DNA polymerase and thymidine kinase (87). Viral DNA 
replication then takes place. From 2-6 hours post-infection. there is cytological evidence of 
viral replication: viral ·'factories·· can be seen in B cell inclusions (87). Late viral mRNA is 
translated into large amounts of structural proteins and small amounts of other viral proteins 
and enzymes (88). After DNA replication terminates. the assembly of viral particles occur 
(87). Late in infection. cell necrosis and rupture may occur with the release of cell-
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associated virions (87). However, most of the assembled viral particles remain within the 
host cell (87). About 10.000 viral particles are produced per infected cell (88). After primary 
multiplication in the lymphoid tissue, released viral particles then infect reticuloendothelial 
cells throughout the body, causing a transient viremia (87). A second phase of multiplication 
later takes place leading to a secondary, more intense viremia and the clinical disease (87). 
In smallpox. scarring is one of the devastating. long-term effects (seen in 65 to 80% of 
survivors) (87). Scarring is believed to be the result of sebaceous gland involvement of the 
virus, resulting in accumulation of necrotic debris in the lumina of the glands (91 ). After an 
incubation period from 10-14 days (range 7 to 19 days). fever, malaise and prostration with 
headache occur with lesions throughout the oropharynx. nasal cavity and tongue (oral lesions 
may not be present in a few patients) (92). About 24 hours after the occurrence of oral 
lesions. maculopapular lesions appear on the face. especially on the forehead (90. 93 ). An 
initial rash may also occur on the forearms or some other part of the body (87). Oral lesions 
later extend lower in the respiratory tract and subsequently appear on the proximal portion of 
the extremities. on the trunk and lastly on the distal portion of the extremities (87). By the 
fourth day. all lesions have appeared and become vesicular and subsequently pustular (87). 
At about the ninth day of rash. pustules reach their maximum size and by the thirteenth day, 
scabbing occurs (87). Intense depigmentation (or redness) and scaring results after the scabs 
fall off (93 ). It is important to note that the lesions of smallpox evolve at the same rate and 
are centrifugal in distribution (most dense on the face and extremities): this characteristic 
differentiates smallpox from varicella (chickenpox) in which lesions are more superficial, can 
appear at different stages of development, and are almost never found on the palms or soles 
of feet (93 ). Additionally measles. secondary syphilis, erythema multiforme and drug 
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eruptions have been mistakenly diagnosed as smallpox (90. 93). Typically. laboratory 
diagnosis is made using cell culture (such as HeLa and Vera cells) and/or observing viral 
grov.th on the chorioallantoic membrane of fenile chicken eggs (206). Diagnosis of smallpox 
can also be made based on microscopic observation of characteristic virions in material taken 
from suspected lesions and later verification by biologic or molecular tests such as PCR 
(208). Histological staining of viral inclusions of lesions is used for diagnosis but staining 
methods are being replaced by techniques that use antibodies, PCR or hybridization to detect 
virus in situ (208). Retrospective identification of infection using convalescent-phase sera 
can also be completed using assays such as Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA). 
Western Blot and viral neutralization assays (208). 
Pathological changes of the skin can be remarkable in variola infection. In this process, 
edema of the dermis results in separation of the epithelial cells of the papillae as well as 
lymphocytic infiltration in the dermis, especially around small blood vessels (90). ''Balloon 
degeneration·· (extensive area of deterioration) is seen in the malpighian layer of skin (the 
outermost living layer just below the dead layers of skin) (92). As the pathological progress 
continues. the epithelial cells break down to produce multilocular vesicles and the vesicles 
are later infiltrated by polymorphonuclear leukocytes (PMNs) (92). Pustule formation then 
takes place (92). Eventually. the pustule forms a crust, beneath which a new epithelium 
grows to repair the surface (92). Lesions in which the sebaceous glands are not involved heal 
without leaving a scar (92). 
About 90 % of the smallpox cases are clinically characteristic (typical case presentation 
follows what has been written so far); these cases are referred to as "discrete ordinary-type 
smallpox•· (92). However, there are two additional forms of smallpox that are difficult to 
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recognize: hemorrhagic and malignant (92). Hemorrhagic manifestations are invariably fatal 
and occur among all ages and genders, but pregnant women are particularly susceptible (88. 
90). Illness begins with a shorter incubation period and is characterized by a severe 
prodromal illness with high fever as well as head. back and abdominal pain (90). Er)1hema 
develops, followed by petechiae and hemorrhages into the skin and mucous membrane: death 
occurs by the fifth or sixth day after onset of rash (90). In the frequently fatal malignant 
form. abrupt prodromal symptoms are similar to hemorrhagic smallpox. however lesions 
develop slowly and do not progress to the pustular stage (90). The lesions remain soft. flat 
and '·velvety" to the touch; the skin also has the appearance of "fine-grained reddish-color 
crepe rubber .. , occasionally with hemorrhages (90). If the patients survive, the lesions 
typically disappear without forming scabs, or in severe cases. large amount of epidermis may 
peel away (90). 
Smallpox is a disease that had a profound effect on historical events. The virus likely made 
its appearance as the first agricultural settlements that were being established in 10,000 B.C .. 
along the great river basins of North Africa and the Middle East (90). The earliest suspicion 
of smallpox infection in humans are the extensive lesions found on three Egyptian mummies, 
including Ramses V (90). It is known that Ramses died of an acute illness in 1157 B.C., at 
the age of 40 (89). When his mummified remains were discovered in 1898, his face displayed 
a rash of pustules strongly resembling smallpox (89). By 622 A.D .. Ad Ahrun. a Christian 
priest living in Alexandria described pox lesions and in 910 A.D., the Arab physician; Al-
Razi differentiated between skin rash caused by measles and the rash caused by smallpox 
(89). Frequent epidemics took place throughout history; introduction of smallpox into new 
areas took place as trade became more prevalent or as wars between different populations 
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took place. By the turn of the Eighteenth century. the disease had become endemic 
throughout the world: nearly one-tenth of the human population were killed. crippled. or 
disfigured by smallpox (89). The nursery rhyme that symbolized smallpox (and the bubonic 
plague) and their usual outcome was: "Ring around the rosie. pocket full of posies. a-tishoo. 
a-tishoo. all fall do\\>n." 
It was with this devastation that a treatment for smallpox was sought. Variolation. the 
transfer of smallpox as an inoculum into susceptible individuals is believed to have occurred 
in China as early as the first century (89). V ariolation consisted of obtaining dried smallpox 
scabs. compressing scabs into a powder. and inhaling the powder through the nose (89). 
Another method was to apply the either dried scabs or pustular material in a small incision or 
puncture wound. usually on the upper arm (89). After variolation of the skin. a primary lesion 
developed at the inoculation site and about the third day; satellite pustules were common (87, 
94 ). However. the rash was much less severe than what is seen with naturally occurring 
smallpox. Historically the case-fatality rates with variolation were between 0.5 and 2 percent, 
compared with 20 to 30 percent from naturally occurring smallpox (87). Since viral materials 
used for variolation was not attenuated. those receiving variolation could transmit smallpox 
to susceptible contacts (87). In 1796. Edward Jenner. a country physician from 
Gloucestershire. England conducted experiments using cowpox virus (also from the 
Orthopoxovirus genus) to in0culate an 8-year-old boy (87). Jenner had made an important 
observation that cowmaids had "'fair and almost perfect"" complexions when compared with 
the disfiguring pockmarks of villagers infected with smallpox (87, 89). Jenner obtained a 
··cowpox vesicle·· from the hands of a patient and used the material to inoculate the 8-year-
old (89). After the boy's slight fever and lesion disappeared, Jenner attempted to variolate 
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him by inoculating him with smallpox. The primary lesion did not develop and protection 
was complete (89). Jenner eventually published his findings in 1801 in a paper titled ·origin 
of the Vaccine Inoculation.(87. 95). Although vaccination was met v.·ith some initial 
skepticism and Jenner was harshly criticized by prominent members of the British medical 
establishment. vaccination became widely accepted (90). Edward Jenner was not the first to 
be aware of vaccination against smallpox , but credit is given to Jenner because he 
demonstrated vaccination·s protective effect by subsequent challenge inoculation (89. 95). 
Currently there is debate on whether Jenner used cowpox virus to inoculate the 8-year old 
boy or utilized another closely-related poxvirus (89. 95). At some point in time. vaccinia 
virus was used for protection against smallpox because it produced milder lesions and lower 
fever (88, 90). It is believed that the first vaccinia virus isolates used for human vaccination 
was isolated from a horse (91 ). 
Vaccinia virus. like smallpox (variola) is a member of Orthopoxvirus species (95). 
Vaccinia has a very broad host range and can infect most vertebrate animals: smallpox. on 
the other hand. has a very narrow host range (humans and monkeys) and this was a major 
reason that smallpox was eradicated (89). Vaccination against smallpox is most effective by 
infection of the skin with vaccinia virus. Following inoculation. the virus migrates to the 
lymph nodes and spleen where extensive replication takes place (89). Replication elicits cell-
mediated and humoral immune responses that provides protection against smallpox infection 
(89). The clinical events following primary inoculation of the skin with vaccinia virus are 
more rapid than the course of a natural smallpox infection but are localized. rather than 
generalized (89). Inoculation produces a papule at the vaccination site three days after 
vaccination (89). The papule becomes vesicular within 2-3 days and later become pustular, 
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mostly as a result of the entry of PMNs (89). Surrounding skin becomes tender and lesions 
reach maximum size between 8 and 12 days after infection (89). The lymph nodes enlarge 
and become tender: individuals may also experience mild fever and malaise ( 89). The pustule 
dries out and later becomes a scab that falls off about three weeks after vaccination. leaving a 
scar (89). 
Vaccination to provide protection against smallpox is normally performed using a 
bifurcated needle (89). A sterile needle is inserted into an ampoule of vaccine and a droplet 
of the vaccine is then pressed firmly into the skin of the upper arm using approximately 
fifteen strokes (90). Strokes typically produces a trace of blood at the vaccination site (90). 
After vaccination. a sterile bandage is placed over the site to deter the individual from 
touching the site and transferring vaccinia virus to other parts of the body (90). Before 1972. 
smallpox vaccination was recommended for all U.S. children at the age of I year (90). Most 
states required vaccination before children attended school (90). The only other requirement 
for vaccine was for military recruits and tourists visiting foreign countries (90). Most 
countries required that individuals be vaccinated within a 3-year period prior to travel (90). 
Routine vaccination stopped in 1972 and since then. fev..· persons younger than 27 have been 
vaccinated ( 90 ). In 1998. approximately 114 million persons or 42 % of the population were 
aged 29 years or older (90). 
Smallpox eradication was serious!~· considered as an option during the early 1950. s: this 
position was considered an ··abrupt"" reversal from past polices of control by vaccination (90). 
At the World Health Organization·s (WHO) I:zth World Health Assembly conference that 
took place in May 1959. Professor Viktor Zhdanov. Deputy Minister of Health of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and a delegate to the World Health Assembly 
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presented a detailed report arguing that the problem of smallpox was an important one for 
both endemic and non-endemic countries (93). In addition Zhdanov suggested that 
eradication was feasible and programs promoting eradication could be developed world-wide 
(93 ). The decision to undertake the global eradication of smallpox was approved by the 
World Health Assembly in 1959 (93). The WHO implemented global eradication efforts and 
documented their work in considerable detail (93 ). The last documented case of smallpox 
occurred in Somalia in 1977 and the World Health Assembly declared smallpox eradicated as 
of 1980 ( 93 ). The World Health Assembly also recommended that all countries cease 
vaccination (routine vaccination against smallpox had ceased in the United States in 197'2 
after smallpox was considered eradicated in the United States in 1949. (93). Vaccination 
ceased in part because it was recognized that there was a risk of complications from the 
vaccine: in the Cnited States. the risk for all complications was 1 per million for primary 
vaccinees and 0.1 per million per repeated revaccinees (93. 96). Complications include 
postvaccinial encephalitis. progressive vaccinia (necrosis of tissue). eczema vaccinatum. 
generalized vaccinia (secondary lesions after vaccination) and inadvertent inoculation 
(inoculation of vaccine to areas such as the face. eyelid. mouth and genitalia) (87). In 
addition. special populations exist who are at risk for smallpox vaccine complications. 
including 1) persons with eczema or other exfoliative skin conditions; 2) patients with 
leukemia. lymphoma or generalized malignancy who are receiving treatment with alkylating 
agents. antimetabolites. radiation or large doses of corticosteroids: 3) patients with HIV 
infection: 4) persons with hereditary immune deficiency disorders and 5) pregnant women 
(90). If individuals with special conditions have been in close contact with a smallpox 
patient or are at risk of smallpox due to occupation. vaccine immune globulin (VIG) is given 
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simultaneously with vaccination in a dose of 0.3 ml/kg of body weight to avoid 
complications (90. 92). VIG is also given to patients being treated for progressive vaccinia. 
eczema. severe generalized vaccina and periocular infections resulting from inadvertent 
inoculation (90. 92). VIG is administered intramuscularly in a dose of 0.6 mL/kg of bod~ 
weight over a 34-26 hour period (90. 92). The dose can be repeated if improvement is not 
occurring (90. 92). 
Concern has been expressed about the availability of treatments for smallpox-especially 
since bioterrorism preparedness is now a high national priority (97. 98. 99. I 00). In June .. 
2001. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) made recommendations for the use of smallpox 
(vaccinia) vaccine to protect persons working with Othopoxviruses. as v.·ell as in preparation 
for a possible BT attack (93. 94). A number of factors were considered in developing 
ACIP" s recommendations including (I) level of disease risk and threat. (2) expected severe 
adverse reaction to vaccine. (3) Vaccine and VIG supply and ( 4) state and local vaccination 
capacity (93 ). The ACIP determined that the vaccination of the general population was not 
warranted. as the potential benefits of vaccination do not outweigh the risk of vaccine 
complications (93 ). Additionally. specific groups were selected to receive the smallpox 
vaccination: I) public health officials who conduct investigation and follow-up of initial 
smallpox cases requiring direct patient contact (rderred to as smallpox investigation teams); 
and 2) designated personnel at hospitals selected to serve as referral centers that would 
provide care for smallpox patients (93). In the United States. there have been efforts to 
increase the supply of smallpox vaccine by diluting existing supplies; the current inventory is 
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believed to be sufficient enough to vaccinate betv,;een 6 and 7 million persons (93). Estimates 
are that \\'HO has only 500.000 doses remaining (90. 101 ). Pharmaceutical research is being 
conducted on antiviral agents including methisazone and cidofovir (l 02). Methisazone was 
determined effective in the prophylaxis of smallpox. In several trials during epidemics in 
India. methisazone reduced the attack rate by 75 to 95% (102). Promising results were 
reported in the treatment of complications of smallpox vaccination. progressive vaccinia and 
eczema vaccinatum (102). Side effects include severe vomiting (I 02). Cidofovir has the 
potential to be effective against poxvirus infections including smallpox ( 101. 103 ). Its in vivo 
efficacy against vaccinia virus has been demonstrated in both immunocompetent and 
immunodeficient hosts (101. I 03 ). Interestingly. in vivo efficacy of cidofiwir against 
vaccinia virus has been demonstrated against aerosolized or intranasal cowpox virus 
infection. transmitted by the route which may be used during an intentional exposure to 
smallpox virus or monkeypox (I 02. 103 ). The disadvantages of cidofovir are its poor oral 
bioavailability and dose-limiting nephrotoxicity during intravenous administration (I 02. 
103 ). 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fenrs 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHFs) refer to clinical illness associated with fever and 
bleeding ( 104. 105) that are caused by viruses belonging to one of four families: 
Arenariridae. Bunyariridae. Flaviriridae and Filuviridae (105 ). VHFs that are of interest in 
bioterrorism are from the families Filoviridae and Arenaviridae. Ebola and Marburg viruses 
are grouped within the family Filoviridae (genus. Filovirus) ( 106). Junin (the causative agent 
of Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever. or AHF) and Lassa viruses are classified in the family 
Arenariridae (genus. Arenarirus) ( 106. 214 ). Despite their diYerse taxonomy. \'HF Yi ruses 
share common characteristics. They are simple RJ\A Yiruses and have lipid en\'elopes. Both 
characteristics render them susceptible to detergents. low pH enYironments and bleach (207). 
However. they are stable at neutral pH. especially when protein is present (207). VHF \'iruses 
tend to be stable in blood for Jong periods and can be isolated from a patient" s blood after 
weeks of storage in a refrigerator or at ambient temperature (207). There has been e\'idence 
of Arenaviruses and Filo\'iruses being detected in bodily fluids other than blood. Ebola has 
been isolated from semen 61 days after onset of illness in an infected laboratory worker and 
detected by molecular techniques 101 days after onset in an Zairian patient (213 ). Marburg 
was isolated from the semen of one patient 2 months after recovery and from another patient 
83 days following disease onset from a spouse implicated in a sexually transmitted case 
(213). Additionally. Marburg \'irus has been isolated from the anterior chamber of the eye 
from a con\'alescent patient with U\'eitis (inflammation of the u\'ea. the Yascular tunic of the 
eye) 80 days after acute disease ( 107. 213 ). Lassa fever has also been implicated in spreading 
via sexual contact (92). 
VHFs are highly infectious as fine-particle aerosols and as a group are linked to the 
ecology of their vectors or reservoirs (typically arthropods and animal hosts) (214). The 
natural reserYoir of filoviruses are unknovm (214 ). Laboratory workers handling specimens 
believed to contain VHF particles should work in a class 2 biological safety cabinet 
following hio~afety level 3 (BSL-3) practices (214 ). Viral isolation should only be attempted 
in a BSL-4 laboratory (214 ). Special care must be taken when investigating possible cases 
of VHFs (214 ). Hospitalized patients should be placed in a room with negative air pressure; 
57 
any person entering the room should use a high-efficiency particulate respirator and adhere to 
strict nursing/barrier precautions (214 ). Arenaviruses and Filoviruses haw been associated 
with severe nosocomial outbreaks involving health care workers and laboratory personnel: 
one to 1 O viral particles can produce clinical infection ( 208 ). High morbidity and mortality 
rates (up to 90 % with Ebola-Zaire) are common. even after treatment (I 03. 208). 
The best method available for isolation of pathogenic Arenaviridae and Filoriridae is the 
inoculation of appropriate cell cultures followed by Indirect Fluorescent Antibody (IFA) or 
other immunologically testing of inoculated cells for presence of viral antigens (208). The 
Vero cell line (in particular. E6) is most widely used for virus isolation and propagation 
(106). Isolation has also been successful with MA-104 and SW 13 cells (106). Recently 
developed cell lines that are now being utilized include human microvascular endothelial cell 
line (HMEC-1 ). primary cultures of human umbilical cord vein endothelial cells (HUVEC). 
human diploid lung (MRC-5). BHK-21 and human peripheral blood 
monocytes!marcophages (108 ). Clinical specimens and clarified tissue homogenates are 
diluted in a suitable maintenance medium such as Eagle·s minimum essential medium with 
Earle·s salts and 2 % heat-inactivated calf serum and adsorbed in small volumes to cell 
monolyers grown in tissue culture T-25 flask or 60 mm petri dishes (103. 208). Maintenance 
medium is added to sustain the cells for seven days (103. 208). The course of infection can 
be monitored by an IFA or by plaque assay (103. 208). If there is very little c~1opathic effect. 
reverse transcriptase-poiymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on viral RNA isolated from cells 
and tissue culture supematants can be useful in quantification (206). 
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The arenaviruses are pleomorphic ranging in diameter from 50 to 300 nm. with a mean 
diameter of 110-130 nm (208 ). A membrane enclosing the viral particle is formed by 
budding from the viral glycoprotein-bearing host plasma membrane. Viral particles are 
covered with club-shaped 10 nm glycoprotein projections (208). A distincti\e feature of 
Arenaviruses are the presence of electron-dense particles (typically 2-10 per viral particle) 
that may be connected with fine filaments (208). The particles (20-25 nm in diameter) are 
identical to host cell ribosomes by biochemical and oligonucleotide analysis (208). The 
characteristic appearance of viral particles in electron micrographs give rise to the family 
name Arenaviridae. derived from arenas. the Latin word for sand (206). Arenaviruses 
contain a segmented R.NA genome with 31 and 22-S (small) strands (206).S RNA codes for 
3 virion proteins (206). The 60-70-kD nucleocaspid (N) protein (63.000 to 72.000 Da) is read 
first in a conventional negative sense. and later. a glycoprotein precursor polypeptide (GPC) 
is transcribed from genomic sense messenger RNA (this pattern has been termed ambisense) 
(208). The GPC protein is glycosylated and later cleaved to form the spike glycoprotein G 1 
(50.000 to 72 000 Da) and G2 (31.000 to 41.000 Da): both G 1 and G2 both serve as highly 
type-specific neutralization targets (206 ). The most serologically cross-reactive protein is N; 
it is not reactive to antibody but can readily be detected in acetone-fixed cells by 
immunofluorescence (206). Arenavirus L. or large RNA (31 S) codes for a viral polymerase 
and the Z protein. a presumed regulatory element (206). Lassa fever viruses attach to host 
cells via a-dystroglycan (a-DG) or possibly some other receptor not yet characterized. fuse. 
interiorize and uncoat within and acidic cellular department within the host cell (108). The 
role of a-DG is less certain regarding the Junin virus: Spiropoulou et al (2002) suggests that 
additional receptors or co-receptors not yet discovered are responsible for the binding and 
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internalization of Junin virus into the host cell (211 ). The family Arenariridae contains a 
single genus. A.renarirus (208. 211 ). Serological and phylogenic analysis divide arenaviruses 
into either two or three antigenic groups. A number of researchers divide Arenaviruses into 
two groups: the Old World. or Lymphoc:1ic Chorimeningitis (LCM) group. which includes 
Lassa Fever. and the New World. or Tacaribe group (including Junin virus) (92). Others 
divide Arenaviruses into three groups: the Lassa group in Africa. the LCM group in North 
America. Europe and South America and the Tacaribe complex in South America (which 
includes the Junin virus group) (104). 
Infection with arenavirus is initiated in the nasopharyngeal mucosa (92). Infection can 
also occur via cuts and abrasions in the skin (92). Viruses in Arenariridae replicate in the 
host cell c:1oplasm and are released from the plasma membrane by budding from the surface: 
all arenavirus infections progress to generalized multiorgan infection. especially in the 
reticuloendothelial svstem ( 104 ). In vitro infection with Arenaviridae demonstrate that viral 
particles spread throughout a variety of different cellular monolayers. with linle or no 
c:1opathic effects (92 ). Macrophages are particularly susceptible to infection (104 ). It is 
believed that these viruses may exert their effects in part by inducing the secretion of 
inflammatory mediators from macrophages (92). During the course of infection. macro-
molecular cell functions are disturbed. but the cells often survive (92). Arenaviruses do not 
infect lymphoc:1es. but CD8+ immune effector T cells are believed to play a role in both 
pathogenesis and recovery from infection ( 111 ). 
Lassa Fever is a disease of West Africa: particularly in Sierra Leone. Guinea. Liberia and 
Nigeria. An epidemic foci exist in eastern Sierra Leone and is directly related to the influx of 
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persons following discovery of diamond mine deposits in that area ( 111. 211 ). The 
prevalence of antibody to Lassa virus ranges from 5 % in Guinea and 15-20 % in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia to over 20 % in Nigeria ( 110, 111 ). Lassa Fever is believed to 
cause 100.000 to 500.000 infections a year ( 110) of which approximately 30 % result in 
illness ranging from mild flu-like symptoms to fulminant hemorrhagic fever with an overall 
mortality of 10-15 % ( 111 ). The mortality of hospitalized patients is about 17 % but in 
certain groups of patients such as pregnant women in their third trimester. more than 30 % 
die and fetal loss is about 88 % ( 111. 206). Deafness is a common complication of Lassa 
Fever. affecting as many as 15 % of patients and rendering an estimated 1to2 % of the 
population hearing impaired in areas with high rates of infection: tinnitus can develop as 
recovery begins ( 111 ). The natural host of Lassa virus is the Mas tom.vs sp. rodent. 
particularly M natilensis. The virus is profusely excreted in urine and blood and most 
human infections occur by exposure to rodent excerta or eating contaminated rodent meat 
(104. 119. 207). Person-to-person transmission (predominantly nosocomial) may also occur 
(208). Nosocomial infections typically takes place via contact with infected patients or 
through improper use or sterilization of needles (208). The arenavirus hemorrhagic fevers are 
characteristically rural and semi-rural diseases: however there is evidence that under certain 
conditions (poverty. overcrowding) rodent reservoirs may also establish urban habitats (203). 
Most Lassa infections in Africa are mild or subclinical (210). Infection leads to the gradual 
onset of fever and malaise after an incubation period of about 10 days (range, 5 to 21 days) 
(208. 210). As the infection intensifies. there is an increase in fever and myalgia with severe 
prostration (203. 210). Lassa fever patients typically present to hospitals within 5-7 days after 
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onset complaining of sore throat. severe lower back pain and conjunctivitis (203 ). Pharyngitis 
occurs in two thirds of cases and is often accompanied by inflammatory or exudative 
pharyngitis ( 114 ). Symptoms increase in severity during the second week and are 
accompanied by nausea. vomiting. diarrhea. chest and abdominal pain. headache. cough. 
dizziness and tinnitus (111. 203 ). Pneumonitis and pleural effusions can also develop (104 ). 
A diffuse maculopapular rash may occur by day 5 of illness. but hemorrhage is seen only in a 
proportion of the more severe cases ( l 04 ). Oozing blood from puncture sites and mucous 
membranes and skin are more common (203 ). Signs of increased vascular permeability such 
as facial edema or pleural effusions are present in a minority of patients and suggest a poor 
prognosis (203 ). Neurologic disease is not usually a clinical manifestation in Lassa fever but 
aseptic meningitis. encephalitis. encephalopathy with seizures. and more subtle neurological 
problems are more common (203 ). In convalescence. deafness is common and it provides an 
important diagnostic clue (208). Death occurs as a result of sudden cardiovascular collapse 
resulting from hepatic. pulmonary and myocardial damage (210). In survivors. symptoms and 
viremia persists until about 2-3 weeks after onset in which there is reduction of fever 
accompanied by the disappearance of virus from the blood. (210) Pericarditis can occur early 
in convalescence. especially in male patients (208). As mentioned. Lassa fever is a 
particularly severe disease among pregnant women (203 ). Lassa virus infection also causes 
serious disease and death in children. although initial clinical manifestations can be 
confusing (203 ). In infants. the virus causes a condition frequently referred to as ··swollen 
baby syndrome··. characterized by severe edema. abdominal distension and bleeding (208). 
62 
Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever (AHF). caused by the Junin virus was recognized in the 
1950s in the northwestern part of Argentina. an area of extremely fertile farmland and of 
great economic importance (208). The natural hosts for AHF are rodents from Calomys sp. 
specifically C. musculinus and C. laucha: infection occurs infrequently via other rodents: 
Mus musculus. Akodon azare and Oryzomysflavecens (208). In humans. despite the fact that 
all ages and genders are susceptible. the group most affected is the male working population 
(208). Evidence suggests that contaminated dust. rodent blood and urine is aerosolized during 
mechanized harvesting of crops in Argentina causing infection in farm workers (208). AHF 
has an subtle onset of malaise. fever, general myalgia. headache and anorexia (210). Within 3 
to 4 days. these symptoms worsen and the victim may experience severe prostration. nausea. 
vomiting and early indication of vascular damage (flushing over the head and upper torso. 
conjunctiva! and generalized patechiae) (209). There may be signs of gastric and retinal pain. 
dizziness. photophobia and constipation (208). Unlike Lassa fever. AHF infections do not 
usually lead to respiratory symptoms and sore throat (208). The disease may begin to subside 
after 6 days of illness: if not. a second stage of illness occurs and is most commonly 
manifested as severe bleeding or acute neurological disease (210). In more severe cases. 
mucous membrane hemorrhages and ecchymosis (large hemorrhagic spots) develop. 
especially at needle puncture points; secondary bacterial infections can also take place (210). 
Such patients are difficult to manage and severe bleeding is an indicator of a poor prognosis: 
up to 50 % of patients with severe hemorrhaging die (209). Neurological disease is common 
and is typically manifested by hyporeflexia. followed by gait abnormalities. tremors of the 
tongue and upper extremities and other cerebellar signs (209). If seizures and coma follow 
these changes. the prognosis is extremely grave (208). Pneumonia with necrotizing 
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bronchitis and acute tubular necrosis of the kidney is seen in about half of the fatal cases 
(210). For survivors. improvement occurs around day 10 to 13 as the appearance of Indirect 
Fluorescent Antibody (IF A) and neutralizing antibodies signal the onset of the immune 
response (209). Convalescence requires several weeks but occurs without sequelae (209). 
Alopecia. fingernail furrows and postural hypotension is common in recovering patients 
(209). 
Ebola and Marburg Viruses 
Both Ebola and Marburg viruses are members of the family Filoviridae and have common 
morphological and genomic organization (208). Initially. Filoviruses were grouped within 
the family Rhabdoviridae. however in 1982 they were reclassified as Filoviridae. with a 
single genus. Filovirus (213). Not surprisingly. molecular analyses of Filovirus genomes 
demonstrated that they are the closest relatives to Rhabdoviridae and Parmyxoriridae (213 ). 
The genus filovirus can be separated into two distinct species. Marburg and Ebola (213 ). 
Ebola is further divided into three distinct African subspecies. Ivory Coast. Sudan and Zaire 
as well as the Asian subspecies Reston (213 ). Virion RNA of Marburg and Ebola are 19.1 kb 
long and 4.0 X 106 to 4.5 X 106 Da: viral particles are very large, typically 790 to 970 nm 
long and 80 nm in diameter (208). There have been reports of filamentous forms up to 
14.000 nm long and one study demonstrated that unit length for peak infectivity is 790 nm 
for Marburg virus and 970 nm for Ebola virus (213 ). Electron microscopy of filoviruses 
produced in tissue culture show pleomorphic structures appearing as long and filamentous 
(and sometimes branched) or in shorter LT-shaped. 6-shaped. or circular configurations (211 ). 
Despite their unusual morphological properties. Filoviruses (like other lipid-enveloped 
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viruses) are susceptible to lipid solvents such as Beta-propiolacetone. formaldehyde. CY 
light and gamma radiation (208). 
Marburg and Ebola viruses have at least seven virus-related structural proteins. expressed 
from seven genes (208). Four proteins are associated with the viral genomic RNA in the 
ribonucleoprotein (R.NP) complex: Nucleoprotein (NP). Virion Structural Protein (VP) 30. 
VP3 5 and the Large (L) protein.(213) The three remaining structure proteins are membrane-
associated: Glycoprotien (GP). Virion Structural Protein (VP) 24 and VP40 (213). 
Additionally. there is some debate on whether both Ebola and Marburg has a non-structure 
protein referred to as a secreted glycoprotien (sGP) or if Marburg alone has sGP (Klenk. et 
al. 1999) (I 06). The NP is the primary structural protein associated with filovirus 
nucleocaspids (213 ). Filovirus NPs are the functional analog of the NPs of paramyxovirus 
and rhabdoviruses (208). VP30 is considered a .. minor nucleoprotein .. and may be involved 
in binding to viral RNA on the NP (208). VP35 is believed to have a role as a co-factor in 
transcription and replication. and the L protein is an RNA-dependant RNA polymerase (208). 
GP (derived from host -cell membranes). functions as a transmembrane protein that 
protrudes as a spike from the virion surface and is responsible for receptor binding and 
membrane fusion (which results in viral penetration of the host cell) ( 121 ). GP is the most 
studied of the filoviral proteins due to importance in viral entry. pathogenesis and being a 
possible target for vaccine development (208. 213). GP is post-transitionally cleaved by furin 
(a protein convertase) into GPI and GP2: protein convertases are considered an important 
control mechanism for the biological activity of viral surface proteins (121). GP2 is the 
transmembrane component that mediates membrane fusion and GPL the extracellular 
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component mediates \'irus attachment to a receptor at the cell surface ( 121 ). Additionally 
··free·· GPl is shed in a nonvirion-bound form and has been hypothesized to be pathogenic 
( 121 ). There is some evidence that clea\'age by furin is not necessary for the membrane 
fusion activity of GP (viruses in the Orthomyxo\'iridae and Paramyxoviridae families require 
cleavage by furin in order to infect the host) (108. 112). Phylogenetic analysis of GP genes 
from Filoviruses clearly separates Marburg and Ebola viruses and defines two distinct 
lineages for Marburg virus and for Ebola-virus subtypes ( 121 ). The role of VP24 is still being 
investigated but is believed to be a minor matrix protein (instrumental for the proper 
assembly of viral particles) or is involved in the uncoating of the virion (208 ). VP40 is also 
considered to be a matrix protein (VP 40 is thought to induce assembly and budding of 
virions through its association with the lipid bylayer); both VP24 and VP40 are likely located 
on the "inner portion·· of the viral membrane (113. 138. 208. 213). sGP has been recently 
been characterized but it is thought to have a role in pathogenesis by binding to and 
inhibiting the activation of neutrophils (114. 129. 213). 
Marburg and Ebola viruses were discovered in Africa in 1967 and 1976. respectively. and 
both are characterized by massive virus replication. widespread infection of tissues and fatal 
tissue necrosis ( 115 ). Person-to-person transmission by intimate contact with skin and 
secretion products of infected patients is the main route of infection for humans however, the 
natural reservoir( s) of human and non-human primate infection with filoviruses are unknown 
(although a simian reservoir is suspected) (92. 115. 120. 137, 140). Poor hospital hygiene has 
been responsible for amplifying outbreaks of filoviral diseases (208). Additionally, practices 
such as nursing and preparing bodies for burial are associated with an increased risk of 
becoming infected (208). It is hypothesized that once filoviruses enter through minor lesions 
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on the skin and1or mucous membranes. ,·iral particles access the blood directly or via the 
lymphatic system ( 108 ). Studies of experimentally infected animals demonstrate that 
filovirus infections follow a specific order. beginning with the blood or lymph fluid. the 
interstitium and the parenchyma with crucial pathogenic ewnts taking place in the 
bloodstream ( 108). 
Filoviruses infect a variety of cell types such as monoc)1es or macrophages. fibroblasts 
and hepatOC)1es as well as endothelial cells via interaction of viral GP with an unknown 
target cell receptor ( 113 ). The virus later enters the target cell. likely by endoc)10sis. 
acidification of the endocytic vesicle and fusion of virus and host membranes that releases 
the nucleocaspid into the cell C)1oplasm (the site of replication) (113). Following 
nucelocaspid release. transcription of the genome occurs (208). Translation of viral 
transcripts by the host cell machinery results in a buildup of viral proteins (particularly NP) 
followed by a switch from transcription to replication (208 ). This switch results in the 
synthesis of full-length positive-?ense RNA (antigenome) which serves as a template for the 
synthesis of full-length RNA that is rapidly encapsidated (208 ). When sufficient levels of 
negative-sense nucelocaspids and envelope-associated proteins are reached. both are 
combined at the plasma membrane (and to a lesser extent at membranes forming intracellular 
vacuoles (208 ). Matrix proteins are believed to facilitate budding from the host cell by 
drawing nucelocaspids tightly to the host cell membrane. where it is enveloped and extruded 
from the cell as an infectious virion particle (208). Host cell protein synthesis is not shut 
down. but expression diminishes as the infection progresses (208 ). Intercytoplasmic 
vesiculation and mitochondrial selling are followed by breakdown of organelles and terminal 
C)1oplasmic condensation.(208). C)1opathic changes can occur in connection with the 
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accumulation of massive amounts of virus nucelocasipd material in intrac)1oplasmic 
inclusion bodies and large numbers of extracellular virions (208. 211. 213 ). 
Filovirus disease has three phases: a silent incubation period. during which the virus 
replicates in its primary target cell and begins to disseminate: symptomatic illness. with 
fever. hemorrhage and shock: followed (in survivors) by elimination of the virus by antigen-
specific immune response ( 117). Following infection. there is an increased transcription of 
inflammatory C)1okines such as Iumor Necrosis factor (TNF). and interleukin (IL) I-beta. 
IL-6. and IL-8 (211) Cytokines and other macrophage-derived mediators such as oxygen 
radicals and proteases act on multiple organs but the endothelium and vascular wall seems to 
be the main targets (211 ). The endothelium responds with an increase in permeability. 
dysregulation of vascular tone. expression of cell adhesion molecules and a change in the 
anticoagulatory phenotype (213 ). Hemorrhages are likely caused by multiple factors. 
including C)1olytic virus replication in endothelial cells. cytokine-mediated processes and 
coagulation disorders (213 ). Notably. levels of C)1okines in patient serum are markedly 
elevated in fatal filovirus infection compared to those in survivors (213 ). 
Clinical symptoms are similar with Marburg and Ebola infections. Following and 
incubation period of 4-16 days. onset is sudden. marked by fever. chills. headache. anorexia 
and myalgia ( 118. 211 ). These signs are soon followed by nausea. vomiting. sore throat. 
abdominal pain and diarrhea (211. 212). When first examined. patients are typically overtly 
ill. dehydrated. apathetic and disoriented (211. 212 ). A morbilliform (measles-like) rash 
beginning on the abdomen is seen in Caucasians (212). DIC. liver necrosis. renal failure and 
shock ensure. causing bleeding disorders and death usually within a week after the 
appearance of symptoms (212). About 70 % of patients exhibit hemorrhagic problems; 
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bleeding is often from multiple sites. with the gastrointestinal tract. lungs and gingiva the 
most commonly involved ( 118). Bleeding and oropharyngeal lesions usually herald a fatal 
outcome (211. 213). Typically. about half of the infected patients with fatal disease die 1-3 
weeks following onset of the illness (211. 213). Typically. death occurs from shock. with or 
without severe blood loss: secondary bacteremia may also be a major factor in death (211. 
213 ). Ebola infection by subspecies Zaire is the most lethal form of the disease. followed by 
subspecies Sudan and subspecies Ivory Coast. The Reston subspecies appear to be less 
pathogenic in humans. but outbreaks in macaques result in a high degree of mortality in these 
monkeys (92). 
Methods of diagnosis of VHFs at specialized laboratories include antigen detection by 
antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). lg M antibody detection by 
antibody capture ELISA. Reverse Transcriptase-PCR. and viral isolation (typically in Vero 
or BHK-21 cell culture) (104. 106). Antigen detection by ELISA and RT-PCR are the most 
useful diagnostic techniques in the acute clinical setting ( 106). Most antigen-capture and 
antibody detection ELISAs can be performed with samples that have been inactivated by 
treatment with Beta-propiolactone (BPL) (207). However. antibody-capture ELISAs are of 
limited use early in illnesses because antibodies to these viruses do not appear until onset of 
recovery. approximately at the second week of illness (106). Diagnostic test based on RT-
PCR technology are safely performed on samples following RNA extraction using 
chloroform and methanol (207). Viral isolation is of limited value due to the requirement of a 
BSL-4 laboratory: additionally. diagnosis by virai isolation requires 3-10 days (207). 
However. when the identification of a VHF agent is unknown. cell culture isolation and 
visualization by electron microscopy. followed by immunological identification by 
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immunohistochemical techniques is also successful (207). Immunochemical techniques can 
also useful for formalin-fixed tissues: viral antigens can be detected and identified using 
specific immune serum and monoclonal antibodies (207). 
Patients with VHF syndrome benefit from rapid. non-traumatic hospitalization (207). 
Conditions such as restlessness. confusion and myalgia can be managed by reassurance and 
the use of sedatives, pain-relieving and amnestic medication (207). Aspirin and other 
antiplatelet or anticlotting-factor drugs should not be used (207) Bleeding may be managed 
by platelet transfusion and factor replacement as needed. but care should be taken with 
procedures requiring intravenous injection due to possible hemorrhage at venipuncture sites 
(I 03. 207). Isolation of patients and the use of gloves. gowns and the careful disposal of 
patient waste and fomites have generally proved to prevent the spread of infection (209). As 
previously noted. individuals with VHF should be placed in single rooms with isolated 
negative pressure airflow and medical personnel provided with goggles and positive-pressure 
filtered air respirators or absolute filter respirators (209) Access to patients should be 
restricted by medical personnel (207). Condoms should be used during convalescence 
because of the occasional sexual transmission ofVHFs (209). 
There are no antiviral drugs approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for 
the treatment of VHF (106). Ribavirin (a non immunosuppressive nucleoside with broad 
antiviral properties) has some in vitro and in vivo activity against Arenaviridae. but is of no 
use against Filoviridae ( 106 ). Small trials have shown that ribivirin may reduce mortality 
after infection with Lassa fever (92. 106. 199). Ribivirin does not penetrate the brain well so 
it is not expected to be effective against the neurological effects of arenaviruses ( 106). 
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Initially. 30 mg/kg is administered intravenously. followed by 15 mg/kg every 6 hours for 
four days. and then 7.5 mg/kg every 8 hours for and additional 6 days (207). Treatment is 
most effective if begun within 7 days of onset: lower intravenous doses or oral administration 
of 2 g followed by 1 g/d for 10 days may also be useful (207). Intravenous ribavirin given 
within the first 6 days of fever to patients with Lassa fever who had high levels of viremia 
decreased mortality from 76% to 9% (I 06). A controlled trial of 18 patients with AHF 
resulted in 12.5 % mortality in treated patients compared with 40% in untreated patients 
(106). The recommendation of the Hemorrhagic Fever Working Group (a group of health 
care professionals associated with the CDC to provide recommendations regarding 
bioterrorism-related hemorrhagic illness) is to administer ribivirin under an investigational 
new drug (IND) protocol (I 06). In addition. treatment of other possible causes. such as 
bacterial sepsis, should not be withheld while awaiting confirmation or exclusion of the 
diagnosis of VHF (I 06). The only significant side effect reported has been a dose-related. 
reversible hemolytic anemia and hyperbilirubinemia (excessive concentrations of bilirubin in 
the blood. which may lead to jaundice): ribavirin is contraindicated in pregnant women. but 
in the case of definite Lassa fever. the benefits appear likely to outweigh any fetal risk of 
ribavirin therapy ( 106. 107). The associated mortality of VHF tends to be higher and 
pregnancy and the safety of ribavirin in infants and children has not been established ( 106). 
The development of safe and effective vaccines for Arenaviridae and Filoviridae has been 
difficult. This is in part due to the fact that viruses from each family requires maximum 
biosafety containment. which reduces the numbers of laboratories researching these 
pathogens. and in part due to safety and efficacy concerns of existing vaccine candidates 
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(120). However. there has been promising results from researchers. Scianimancio. et al 
(2000) demonstrated when VP 40 (a matrix protein for Ebola virus) associates with the host 
cell membrane. there is a conformational change in VP 40 that likely forms the ··building 
blocks·· for initiation of virus assembly and budding (120). It is believed that such a 
conformational change may be a common feature of many viral matrix proteins and its 
potential inhibition may result in new anti-viral therapies (120). Researchers at the National 
Institutes of Health have designed a strategy against the Ebola virus that engaged both the 
cellular (T cells. antigen presenting cells. macrophages) and humoral (antibody) divisions of 
the immune system and stimulated them to recognize and successfully combat the virus 
(120). Additionally a vaccine was constructed that could provide immunity to the three most 
pathogenic strains of the virus (Zaire. Sudan and Ivory Coast) (120). The vaccine was 
developed in a two step process. The first step was completed in which four monkeys were 
directly vaccinated with strands of DNA encoding genomic sequences of the Ebola Zaire 
strain: the pathogenic sequences were carried by a plasmid vector. which was also injected 
alone in four additional control monkeys (120). This process is referred to as ··priming" in 
which direct DNA immunization is thought to engage APCs and stimulate cellular immunity, 
a arm of the immune system believed to be potent in combating viral infections ( 120). After a 
period of time. a second vaccine. an adenovirus vector. which contained GPs from Ebola 
subspecies Zaire. Sudan and Ivory Coast was given to the four monkeys vaccinated with the 
strands of DNA encoding genomic sequences of the Ebola Zaire strain: the 4 control 
monkeys received an empty (devoid of Ebola proteins) adenovirus vector (120). All eight 
monkeys were later challenged with a lethal dose of a highly pathogenic strain of Ebola: 
within a week. all the control monkeys died and the other four monkeys remained disease 
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free and had been asymptomatic for a 6-month period ( 120). Other experiments also utilized 
antibody-mediated protection from Ebola virus. Wilson et al. (2000) generated monoclonal 
antibodies (mAbs) to the Ebola GP and later evaluated them for efficacy (monoclonal 
antibodies are chemically and immunologically homogeneous antibodies produced by 
hybridomas used as laboratory reagents in radioimmunoassays. ELISA and 
immunofluorescence assays: they are also used in cancer immunotherapy) (107. 121 ). Ebola 
GP was seen as an important target of protective antibodies: researchers presumed that 
membrane-anchored GP is responsible for receptor binding and fusion of the virus with host 
cells ( 121 ). Varying amounts of monoclonal antibodies were administered to two strains of 
mice (BALB/c and C57BL/6 strains of mice: both strains of mice divided into groups and 
given 100. 50 and 25 micrograms ofmAbs) (121 ). Maximum protection against a lethal 
challenge with Ebola Zaire virus was observed with I 00 microgram of Ebola GP mAbs as 
opposed to 50 and 25 micrograms ofmAbs (121 ). As a result of this experiment. researchers 
believe that it is possible to elicit by vaccination. or produce for therapeutic use. antibodies 
protective against all Ebola \·iruses that are pathogenic for humans. Researchers estimate that 
the most effective mAbs amount for an acceptable human therapeutic dose would be from 3 
to 5 mg/kg (121 ). Wilson et al. conducted experiments utilizing cy1otoxic T Lymphocytes (or 
CTLs). CTLs are killer T cells. differentiated from T Lymphocy1es that can recognize and 
lyse targets bearing specific antigens recognized by their antigen receptors (l 07. 121 ). 
C.57BL/6 mice were submitted to either 2 or 3 injections of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 
(VEE) replicons encoding the Ebola virus NP or with a control replicon encoding Lassa viurs 
"'.\'protein (121 ). Replicons are a unit of DNA that contains an initiation point and a 
termination point and is capable of self-replication ( 121 ). Mice were later challenged with a 
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lethal dose of Ebola Zaire and CTL protection was expressed against a lethal Ebola dosage 
( 15/20 mice with 3 Ebola virus NP injections and 8/10 mice with 2 Ebola virus NP injections 
versus l /20 mice with 3 Lassa virus N protein injections and 0110 mice with 3 Lassa virus N 
protein injections) (107. 12L 122). 
Oven·iew of Salmonella 
Salmonella are motile. gram-negative. non-spore forming rod-shaped bacteria belonging to 
the Enterobacteriaceae family (123, 215). The bacillus is 2 to 3 by 0.4 to 0.6 micrometers in 
size: Enterobacteriacae are often labeled .. enteric bacteria., because of their association with 
intestinal colonization (215). These bacteria are widely distributed throughout various 
ecological habitats. having been isolated from soil. water. foods and the intestinal tracts of 
human and animals (215). Enterobacteriaceae account for about 80% of significant isolates 
of gram-negative bacteria in the clinical laboratory (215). The genus Salmonella is capable of 
causing a variety of disease syndromes: enteric fever. bacteremia. enterocolitis. and focal 
infections ( 123 ). The study of Salmonella began with the recognition in 1880 of the bacillus 
causing typhoid fever (now known as Salmonella typhi) ( 124). Shortly thereafter. D.E. 
Salmon isolated the bacterium then believed (but later disproved) to be the etiological agent 
of hog cholera ( 124 ). The genus was later named Salmonella in 1900 in honor of Salmon 
( 124). There has been much debate regarding the nomenclature and classification of the 
genus Salmonella. Until the 1970s. the species concept in the genus was based on 
epidemiology. host range. biochemical reactions and antigenic structure: i.e. the 0 (or 
somatic) antigens. Vi (capsular) antigen and the H ( flagellar) antigens (216 ). The process of 
typing by antigenic structure is referred to as serotyping (216). As a result, names such as 
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Salmonella ryphi. Salmonella nel1port and Salmonella f)phimurium began to appear (216). 
There were conflicting views of what these names represented: some workers believed that 
names represented biological species but others felt that the names represented antigenic 
differences and described biochemical varieties with an uncertain evolutionary relationship 
(216 ). However. there was universal agreement that the names were useful in describing the 
particular serotype (or serovar) (216). In 1973. DNA-DNA hybridization analysis 
demonstrated that Salmonella could be placed into five evolutionary groups (216 ). The vast 
majority of strains causing human infection occurred in DNA hybridization group 1 (I) and 
strains isolated from animals and the environment were clustered into the four other groups. 
DNA groups 2 (II). 3a (IIIA). 3b (IIIB) and 4 (IV): groups six (VI) and seven (VII) were later 
added to this scheme ( 125. 216). There are other researchers who group Salmonella into two 
species based on DNA hybridization. multilocus electrophoresis and nucleotide sequence 
analysis: those species being S. bongori (formerly subspecies V) and S. enterica. which is 
further subdivided into seven subspecies now designated I. II. Illa. Illb. IV. VI and VII(l25). 
In this proposal. S. bongori is considered one of the most divergent lineages of Salmonella. 
and along with most subspecies of S. enterica. it is recovered mainly from cold-blooded 
animals (125). About 99% of human-pathogenic salmonellae belong to S. enterica subspecies 
I ( 125. 126. 124 ). Yet another group of researchers have proposed grouping all salmonellae 
under one species name. either S. choleraesuis or S. enterica (216). Those who advocate 
classifying salmonellae as S. choleraesuis base this on experiments that indicated a high 
degree of DNA relatedness between the organisms (124. 215). However. concern was raised 
since the name S. cholera.mis would have two different meanings. one as a species and one 
as a serotype (215. 216 ). As a result. researchers have considered a compromise. making an 
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exception to the rules of the Bacteriological Code by using a name that would not cause 
confusion. There was a formal request for a new name (S. enterica) to replace S. choleraesuis 
as the species name representing most of the serotypes of Salmonella (216). In this proposal. 
there would be six subspecies of S. enterica: emerica. salamae. ari=onae. diari=mzae. 
houtenae. and indicia: S. bongori would be classified as a separate species (216). The 
advantage of classifying S. enterica as the species name is that it would reduce confusion 
(using a new name that has never been used as a serotype name) (215). Hov.·ever this 
proposal was rejected by the International Committee on Systematic Bacteriology and this 
group still considers S. choleraeasuis the correct name of all Salmonella species (215). The 
majority of the journal articles and textbooks reviewed by the author classify S. enterica as 
one species (with the majority of subspecies grouped here) and S. hongori as a second 
species (126. 215). 
The chromosome of Salmonella. Shigella and Escherichia coli comprised a single circular 
DNA molecule consisting of about 4 X 109 bp. with a molecular mass of 4 X 109 and a total 
length of about 1.4 mm ( 127). Like Salmonella. E. coli and Shigella are both members of 
Enterohacteriacae: analysis utilizing 16S rRNA and the gyr B gene demonstrates a close 
phylogenic relationship between E. coli strains. Shigella and Salmonella (127). It is believed 
that Salmonella evolved from E. coli from 100 to 160 million years ago and a common 
ancestor of Salmonella existed until about 25-40 million years ago ( 126. 128. 129. 130). 
Baumler et al. ( 1998) believe that Salmonella virulence evolved in three phases. The first 
phase involved acquisition of .S.almonella gathogenicity island I (SPI 1) by plasmid or phage 
mediated horizontal gene transfer ( 126). SPis are defined as virulence genes that cluster in 
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localized regions of the bacterial chromosome (126). Galan and Zohu (2000) as well as Ohl 
and Miller (2001) postulate that the acquisition of SPis during evolution represented a 
··quantum leap·· in which pathogens opened up new host niches of lifestyles ( 13 2. 134 ). SPI 1 
was likely obtained as a lineage ancestral to all Salmonella serotypes. since it is present in all 
phylogenetic lineages of the genus Salmonella but is absent from E. coli and other related 
organisms (779). The second phase of Salmonella virulence took place when two lineages of 
Salmonella diverged from one another during evolution (126). It has been proposed that these 
lineages represented two distinct species later designated as Salmonella enterica and 
Salmonella bongori (126). Serotypes belonging to S. enterica posses a second pathogenicity 
island termed SPI 2 that is not present in S. bongori serotypes ( 126). The third phase of 
Salmonella virulence was postulated to have taken place when the lineage of S. enterica 
branched into several phylogenetic groups (126). The formation of one of these groups. S. 
enterica. subspecies I. involved a dramatic expansion in host range (warm-blooded 
vertebrates) while S. bongori and the remaining S. enterica subspecies (II. Illa. Illb. IV. VI 
and VII) are mainly associated with cold-blooded vertebrates and the environment (126). 
Salmonellae has derived both biological and genetic mechanisms for survival and 
proliferation. Prior to invasion of any cell. bacteria must encounter and attach to one of more 
cell types. Salmonellae use a variety of methods to colonize target cells. The first are 
organelles that promote the adherence of bacteria to muscosal surfaces-referred to as 
adhesions ( 124. 215). Virtually all gram-negative organisms examined ultrastructurally 
possess surface organelles known as fimbriae or pili (215). Salmonella has four types of 
fimbriae that have been genetically defined including type 1 fimbriae (Fim), long polar (LP) 
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fimbriae, plasmid-encoded (PE) fimbriae and thin aggregative fimbriae (123). Studies 
suggest that these fimbriae each have a certain tropism for a certain cell type or for cells from 
particular animal species.(123) A typical bacterium has several hundred of these hair-like 
organelles radiating in a peritrichous fashion (e.g. covering the entire surface of a cell) which 
effectively doubles the radius of the organism (215). Fim is believed to be an adhesion 
which binds a-D-mannose receptors on various eucaryotic cell types which is considered the 
first step in the pathogenic process (128). Phase variation (switch between a fimbrated and 
nonfimbrated state) does occur with Fim, however, it is not certain how environmental 
signals manifest changes in Fim expression (128). Studies with LP fimbriae demonstrated 
that expression is also phasic and the switching "on and off' of production of LP fimbriae 
allows salmonellae to adapt to different environments during the infective process (123). 
Homologues of LP have been found in pathogenic Enterobacteriaceae including strains of E. 
coli and Shigella; moreover, at least two Salmonella strains, S. typhi and S. arizonae have 
lost or never acquired LP (123). Studies with PE demonstrate that they enhance attachment to 
the small intestines and are involved in fluid accumulation (123). Thin aggregative fimbriae 
were found to be antigenically similar to E. coli curli fibers and have been suggested to 
enhance the survival of salmonellae facing hostile barriers such as stomach acid and other 
biocides (123). 
Another adaptation mechanism of many serotypes of Salmonella is the acid tolerance 
response (A TR), where the acid resistance of the bacteria is greatly enhanced when 
salmonellae are exposed to acidic conditions (pH of 4.0 or less) (123). Under slight to 
moderate acid stress, Salmonella synthesizes proteins that protect the bacterium from more 
78 
severe acid challenge ( 134 ). Acid adaptation of S. f)phimurium appears to have an important 
role with survival in various stress conditions (e.g. conditions found within the stomach or 
within the macrophage phagolysosome) (135). S. f)phimurium mutants that were more 
sensitive to acid were also highly attenuated. suggesting a strong correlation between the 
ability to mount an ATR response and virulence (135). According to Bang et al. (2000). 
there are two A TR responses: the first is considered a general response and occurs in log 
phase when cells are under a rapid transition to low pH: over 50 acid response proteins 
(ARP) are produced (136). The second ATR system is induced by exposing stationary-phase 
cells to low pH ( 136). This system consists of 10 ARPs and is distinct from the general stress 
response system; the second A TR system is induced by entry into stationary phase regardless 
of the culture pH (135). The infectious dose of Salmonella cells in foods with low water 
content are decreased. possibly as a result of acid tolerance that occurs after sub-lethal 
osmotic stress (135). This has intensified concerns over the survival of the bacteria under 
conditions oflow water content (135). 
Tv;o-component systems are signal transducers that promote change in gene expression or 
bacterial behavior in response to distinct physical or chemical cues ( 142 ). They consist of a 
sensor protein that responds to chemical or physical signals and modifies the phosphorylation 
state of the second component. typically a transcription factor (143 ). Two-component 
systems are found in many gram-negative bacteria including Salmonella (133. 144). PhoP-
PhoQ. a two component system that controls virulence in Salmonella plays a central 
regulatory function. mediating the survival of intracellular bacteria within phagocytic cells 
and exerting a negative control of bacterial gro\\th (145). Additionally PhoP-PhoQ governs 
the modification of many components (e.g. increased peptidoglycan synthesis) in the 
bacterial cell envelope (145).The fact the PhoP homologues are present in both pathogenic 
and non-pathogenic bacteria of the family Emerobacteriaceae supports the hypothesis that 
PhoP-PhoQ represents an ancestral locus originally dedicated to controlling functions 
unrelated to pathogenesis (130). Researchers believe that the PhoQ protein harbors distinct 
sites for Mg:::--- and Ca:::--- and these cations modulate PhoQ activity ( 143 ). In the presence of 
extracellular Mg:::- and Ca:::-. there is a conformational change in PhoQ proteins resulting in 
transcriptional repression of PhoP-activated genes (143). Typically. Mg2- and Ca2-levels are 
high in extracellular spaces and low within the cytoplasm of host cells: by sensing Mg2 ... and 
Ca2•• PhoQ appears to sense whether salmonellae are extracellularly or intracellularly located 
( 130). Following invasion. Salmonella encounters the low Ca2-. low Mg2- intracellular 
environment. Under these conditions. the PhoP-PhoQ system become active. positively 
regulating many genes involved in intramacrophage survival (including those contained 
within SPis 1 and 2) as well as genes required for resistance to acid pH. bile salts and 
cationic antimicrobial peptides ( 144 ). 
As discussed ~almonella Eathogenicity Islands (SP Is) are large regions of DNA encoding 
for virulence determinance of salmonellae ( 163 ). Pathogenecity Islands constitute a major 
driving force in the evolution of bacterial pathogens because their acquisition usually 
determines the viulence properties of microorganisms (pathogenic islands are not present in 
phylogenetically related non-pathogenic bacteria) (14 7. 163 ). Most genetic studies involving 
Salmonella have been preformed with Salmonella enterica. subspecies. enterica, serovar 
l)phimurium (S. t;phimurium) ( 163 ). This serotype is kno\\n to have five SPis ranging from 
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17-kb to 40-kb (818). SPI-1 and SPI 2 (mapping at centrisomes 63 and 30.5. respectiwly) are 
40-kb long DNA regions encoding for components of type III secretion systems (TTSS) 
( 163 ). It appears that the functions of SPI-1 and SPI-2 are largely independent of one 
another and exerted at different stages of infection (148). While the SPI-1 encoded TTSS is 
required for the initial interaction and invasion of intestinal epithelial cells by Salmonella. the 
SPI-2 encoded system is required for survival of Salmonella within macrophages and 
svstemic infection of the host ( 14 7). SPI-1-mediated invasion allowed Salmonella access to a 
new niche in the intestines: the intracellular environment of intestinal epithelial cells (149). 
The functions of SPI-2 suggests acquisition after SPI-1. since genes related to modifying the 
intercellular environment wold have selective value for an invasive pathogen. but not an 
organism confined to the intestinal lumen ( 149). 
SPI-1 TTSS are composed or more than 20 proteins are among the most complex protein 
secretion systems known: SPI-TTSS allow salmonellae to export proteins that permit their 
survival within host cells (149. 151. 153). A few proteins and their proposed functions 
include Inv.! (required for the formation of an organelle identified as the ··needle complex·· 
and protein secretion): SipA (binds host cell actin. subverts host cell signal transduction and 
stimulates internalization of Salmonella into membrane-bound vacuoles): and Sip C (TTSS 
effector protein translocator across eukaryotic cell membranes) (149. 150. 152). A list of 
Salmonella proteins secreted through the SPI-1 TTSS is found in Galan (2001) and Galan 
and Zhou (2000). As mentioned. a number of TTSS components assemble into a ··needle 
complex .. that spans both the inner and outer membrane of the bacterial envelope (132). The 
needle complex is composed of two inner and two outer rings that anchor the structure to the 
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inner and outer membranes of the bacterial envelope (132 ). A needle-like structure of about 
80 nanometers in length extends outwards from the base of the needle complex (132). The 
needle complex is about 100 nanometers in length and about 40 nanometers in diameter at its 
widest section (130) It is not entirely understood how proteins are translocated from 
Salmonella to the host cell. however functionally equivalent proteins in other TTSS (e.g .. 
J'ersina sp. ). are proposed to form a pore or channel through with effector proteins cross the 
eucarvotic cell membrane (132). 
After invasion of host cells. SPI-2 contributes to the survival of Salmonella in deep tissue 
by promoting bacterial replication ( 126). Once inside the host cell. a different set of virulence 
factors (distinct from SPI-1 TTSS) contribute to survival and establishment of systemic 
disease by modifying the intracellular environment encountered by Salmonella ( 130). Genes 
involved in intramacrophage survival include SsaC. Sse C and Sse J that function to 
translocate effector proteins into infected cells (155). SPI-2 TTSS is hypothesized to inject 
proteins from S. l)ph;murium through the phagosomal membrane and into the macrophage 
C)10sol (155). Notably. SPI-2 is absent in S. hongori; this is one reason why S. hongori is 
classified separately from S. enterica (149). 
Genetic and functional characteristics of additional SPis (SPI-3. SPI-4 and SPI-5) have 
been described. SPI-3 is 17 kb long and is located in the selC locus at centrosome 82 of the 
Salmonella chromosome (163) It contains genes such as mgtB and mgtC. encoding for a high 
affinity Mg2+ transporter and a protein required for macrophage survival respectively (148). 
SPI-4 (a 27kb chromosomal fragment located at centrisome 92) has not been fully 
characterized. however it contains a gene required for Salmonella survival within 
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macrophages as well as a supposed Type I secretion apparatus (148). SPI-5. located at 
centrisome 20 contains six l.!enes that are believed to affect Salmonella·s capacity for 
eliciting intestinal secretory and inflammatory response ( 148). 
Salmonella grow best at moderate temperatures (35-3 7 ° C) but can grow over a wide 
temperature range (as low as 4 °C and as high as 48 °C) (163 ). Grav.th is best at a moderate 
pH (6.5-7.5) in conditions of high water activity and low osmolarity (163). Salmonella are 
non-sporeforming. oxidase-negative. facultative anarobes ( 163 ). Like other 
Enterobacteriaceae, they produce acid on glucose fermentation. reduce nitrates and generally 
do not ferment lactose (215). With few exceptions. salmonellae are motile by means of 
peritrichous flagella (exceptions being S. gallinarum and S. pullorum) ( 21 7). Five steps are 
common for isolating Salmonella and include 1) pre-enrichment of a sample in nutritious. 
nonselective broth: 2) selective enrichment in broth that allows salmonellae to grow but 
suppresses the grov.1h of competing bacteria: 3) isolation of Salmonella by streaking onto 
selective planting agar: 4) biochemical characterization of isolates: and 5) serological 
confirmation of biochemically screened isolates ( 163. 217). Numerous selective and 
differential media have been developed for the culture and presumptive identification of 
Salmonella. Examples include xylose lysine decarboxylase (XLD) agar. Salmonella-Shigella 
(SS) agar. brilliant green agar (BGA). MacConkey·s agar. lysine iron agar. triple sugar iron 
(TSI) agar and eosin-methylene blue (EMB) agar ( 163 ). 
In the United States. approximately 40.000 non-typhoidal Salmonella infections are 
confirmed by culturing every year: the true figure of infection is estimated to be between 
800.000 and 4 million infections. with approximately 500 fatalities (135). The estimated 
83 
annual cost of food borne salmonellosis in the United States is 0.9 to 3.5 billion dollars (157). 
Worldwide. non-typhoidal Salmonella accounts for 1.3 billion cases of acute 
gastroenteritis/diarrhea with 3 million deaths ( 135). Recently. S. typhimurium DT 104 has 
emerged as an important Salmonella strain in Europe and the United States (135 ). The 
percentage of antibiotic-resistant S. typhimurium DT 104 isolates increased from 1 % in 1979 
to 34 % in 1996 in the United States (156). S. typhimurium DTl 04 is of particular concern. 
due to the severity of the human disease which it causes. its multiple drug resistance. and the 
extensive animal reservoirs of the organism (156). S. l}phimurium has also been used to 
intentionally contaminate 10 restaurant salad bars in an Oregon community (156). As a 
result. seven hundred and fifty one persons became ill with gastroenteritis over a one-month 
period ( 156). A subsequent criminal investigation revealed that members of a commune had 
deliberately contaminated the restaurants to influence the outcome of an election and a S. 
typhimurium strain found at the commune was indistinguishable from the outbreak strain 
(156). 
Salmonellae typically enter their animal host as food or water-borne contaminants and 
must survive the acidic environment of the stomach and the degradative action of bile salts in 
order to reach their primary site of colonization. the small intestines (215). Human volunteer 
studies have suggested that I 05 to I 0 10 bacteria are required to initiate an infection ( 169). 
However. data from outbreaks of salmonellosis suggest that low inocula (less than 103 
organisms) may produce nontyphodial Salmonella gastroenteritis and that the ingested dose 
is an important determinant of the incubation period. symptoms and disease severity (215 ). 
Human volunteer studies involving many Salmonella serotypes have shown that the attack 
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rate increases with increasing inoculum size and varies with the host specificity of the 
orn:anism ( 130). As noted. the acid tolerance response (A TR) is actiYated on exposure to low 
pH. promoting surYival in acidic host environments such as the stomach ( 134 ). In addition. 
SPI genes allow Salmonella to manipulate target cells. altering the intracellular enYironment 
and facilitating bacterial growth within infected cells (128). After entering the small bowel. 
salmonellae transverse the intestinal mucus layer before adhering to cells of the intestinal 
epithelium ( 134 ). This is achieved by manipulation of c:1oskeletal function in the eukaryotic 
cell. Salmonella encodes invasion proteins (such as sipC and sipA. that are secreted via the 
SPI-1 TTSS) to interact directly with host cellular actin and induce actin c:1oskeletal 
rearrangements and membrane ruffling (123. 147. 158). Salmonellae are internalized in 2 to 5 
nm membrane-bound vacuoles in a process referred to as macropinocy1osis: these vacuoles 
are formed by the fusion of the ends of membrane ruffles ( 153 ). Although S. typhimurium are 
able to invade columnar epithelial cells along the intestinal wall. they show a tropism for 
microfold or M cells. located in the follicle-associated epithelium of the lymphoid follicles or 
Peyer· s Patches ( 131 ). Destruction of M cells result in a gap in the follicle-associated 
epithelium. facilitating increased invasion of enterocy1es and penetration into deeper tissues 
where phagoc:1ic cells. including macrophages and polymorphonuclear neutrophils are 
encountered ( 128 ). Conversely. S. typhi attaches to and invade M cells but invasion does not 
destroy the M cells ( 159). In order to penetrate deeper tissues. salmonellae must be able to 
avoid and/or survive the oxygen-dependent (e.g. hydrogen peroxide. superoxide anions) and 
oxygen independent (e.g. defensins. acidification of the phagolysosome) killing mechanisms 
of professional phagocy1es following internalization ( 151 ). S. l)phimurium prevents 
phagosome-lysosome fusion: dividing salmonellae are primarily found within unfused 
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vesicles ( 151 ). Invasive Salmonella can persist within the macrophages and/or induce 
apoptosis: Salmonella shares the ability of inducing macrophage apoptosis with rersinia and 
Shigella. suggesting that this may represent a selective advantage for the establishment of 
enterobacterial infections ( 160). 
The mechanisms by which non-typhodial salmonellae cause gastroenteritis remains obscure 
despite extensive study ( 131 ). Darwin et al. ( 1999) proposes a model in which Salmonella 
triggers diarrhea. They suggest that the interaction of Salmonella with the epithelium results 
in the invasion of epithelial cell and production of a variety of signaling molecules on the . 
part of epithelial cells ( 131 ). Intestinal epithelial cells secretes IL-8 (a powerful neutrophil 
chemotactic factor) and a second powerful chemoattractant. PEEC (Qathogen-~licited 
~pithelial fhemoattractant) that stimulates inflammation and neutrophil migration ( 131 ). The 
secretion of IL-8 requires an intact SPI-1 system (215). Production of prostaglandins by 
neutrophils and/or epithelial cells and the synthesis oflns(l .4.5.6)P-t (a phospholipid that 
antagonizes an inhibitor of Cl- secretion) causes enhanced Cl- secretion. which triggers fluid 
secretion that is manifested as diarrhea in the host (123. 211 ). In addition. degranulation and 
release of toxic substances by neutrophils (e.g. TNF. interferon-gamma) may contribute to 
inflammation and result in tissue damage and fluid secretion or leakage across the intestinal 
mucosa via alterations in epithelial cell tight junctions (146). Little is known about the 
biochemical and molecular characteristics of S. t;phi infection (the causative agent of 
typhoid fever) as well as the mechanisms of survival utilized by this pathogen ( 162. 219). 
Research has focused on S. typhimurium in mice and there is little information about S. typhi 
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proteins and genes which may be involved in virulence or which are important in eliciting a 
host immune response ( 161 ). 
Disease caused by salmonellae are divided into two major groups: 1) a localized self-
limiting bacterial infection of the intestinal epithelium (non-typhoid salmonellosis or 
gastroenteritis) and 2) a systematic infection (typhoid salmonellosis or enteric fever) (163 ). 
The onset of non-typhoidal gastroenteritis tends to be dramatic. Onset is rapid. occurring 
v-:ithin 12 hours to a few days after consumption of contaminated food or beverage ( 163 ). 
The initial symptoms are a severe diarrhea. which is sometimes accompanied by abdominal 
pain. nausea. vomiting. headache. chills, myalgia and low-grade fever ( 163 ). Extremely 
virulent organisms may cause bacterima or nontyphoid enteric fever. and a high fever should 
be a warning that the organism has invaded from the intestines (163). When invasion occurs. 
organisms may establish themselves within various tissues and organs throughout the body 
(163 ). However. healthy adults only experience a self-limited. uncomfortable diarrhea that 
resolves without treatment in 2 days to a week: notable exceptions include the 
immunocompromised (e.g. AIDS patients) who are 20 times more likely to be infected with 
non-typhoidal salmonellosis. often life-threatening and relapsing (163. 167). Except when 
invasive disease is suspected. gastrointestinal salmonellosis requires no treatment beyond 
fluid and electrolyte replacement ( 163, 167). Antibiotic therapy typically is not indicated 
unless septicemia develops: antibiotics clear much of the normal floral in the intestinal tract 
and make one more likely to develop other infections (163, 167). Additionally. the treatment 
of such illnesses with antibiotics can select for organisms resistant to the antibiotic ( 163, 
167). If drugs are used. bismuth subsalicylate (the active ingredient in Pepto-Bismol) is 
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recommended. howe\'er some researchers question the benefit of bismuth subsalicylat~ since 
it is one of the components of culture media selective for salmonellae ( 163. 16 7). 
Typhoid fever (S. f)phi and S. parat;phi) continues to be a global health problem. with an 
estimated 12 to 22 million cases occurring worldwide each year with nearly 600.000 deaths 
(163. 215). The disease is endemic in many developing countries. particularly the Indian 
subcontinent. Central and South America. and Africa (215). These countries share several 
characteristics including rapid population gro\\th. increased urbanization. inadequate human 
waste treatment. limited water supply and overburdened health care systems (215 ). Recent 
outbreaks of typhoid fever in Eastern Europe and its newly independent states have followed 
political and social collapse as well as civil war (215). Both water and food have been 
vehicles for transmission of typhoid fever (215). Pasteurization has eliminated S. f)phi 
contamination in milk products. however S. typhi continues to be a problem in countries 
where raw milk is served ( 124 ). Shellfish and raw salads have also been identified as vehicles 
for typhoid fever ( 124 ). During the time the bacteria are within macrophages. they are 
thought to be resistant to antibiotics. which explains the high relapse rate in cases of typhoid 
fever (124 ). Multiple treatments with antibiotics (such as chloramphenicol. ampicillin and 
ceftriaxone) are required (124). The reservoir for S. typhi is the human carrier: long-term 
carriers tend to be asymptomatic ( 124 ). The organism can be excreted not only in the feces, 
but also in the urine. a characteristic fact that is used in diagnostic testing ( 124 ). 
Like non-typhoidal Salmonella. the gastrointestinal tract is the portal of entry for typhoid 
fever ( 124 ). The disease begins with multiplication in the small intestines without producing 
entercolitis (124 ). Rather. upon reaching lymph nodes. S. t;phi multiplies within 
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mononuclear cells and eventually spreads to reticuloendothelial cells in the liver. spleen and 
bone marrow during the incubation period (range 5 to 21 days) (124). Continued 
multiplication results in ··seeding•· the bloodstream with bacteria. necrosis of 
reticuloendothelial cells. and onset of clinical enteric fever (38.8 to 40.5 °C or 101.8 to 
104. 9° F) ( 124. 217). There is splenic enlargement. ulceration of the intestinal walls 
(sometimes with perforation leading to fatality). infection of the gallbladder. bones 
( osteomyelitis). as well as brain and meningies involvement (124 ). None of these features are 
unique to typhoid fever and each may occur after infection by almost any Salmonella serovar 
(124 ). Many patients will develop "rose spots·'. a faint salmon-colored maculopapular rash 
on the trunk. ( 124. 21 7) If left untreated. the illness may last for 2 or more weeks. sometimes 
causing death (124. 217). Survivors may become asymptomataic carriers of the disease with 
excretion of the organism from the gallbladder and intestines (124. 217). The carrier state 
becomes a substantial public health hazard if the carrier also happens to be a food handler 
(124. 217). It should be noted that any Salmonella infection can produce varying degrees of a 
post-infection carrier state (124. 217). As previously noted. chloramphenicol is the treatment 
of choice for typhoid fever. however there is reluctance to use chloramphenicol because of a 
1 in 30.000 chance that a rare bone marrow aplasia will occur (124. 217). Ampicillin. 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. some quinolones and thrid generation cephalosporins have 
demonstrated clinical effectiveness (124. 217). In recent years. there have been concerns of 
antibiotic resistance. T we Ive percent of S. typhi isolates were resistant to ampicillin, 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole and chloramphenicol (124. 217). Supportive fluid and 
nutritional therapy is also required for those with enteric fever (124. 217). Treatment of the 
chronic carrier is difficult: high dose ampicillin therapy for 4-6 weeks is successful in only 
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25 % of cases without a cholecystectomy (gallbladder removal) (124. 217). Enteric fever can 
be prevented by immunization. and three commercially available vaccines are approved for 
administration to travelers to typhoid-endemic regions (parenteral inactivated whole-cell 
vaccines. orally attenuated S. typhi Ty21 a vaccine and parenteral Vi polysaccharide rnccine) 
(205 ). S. f)phi vaccines have been extensively evaluated in endemic populations and achieve 
about 50-80 % efficacy depending on prior exposure. and confer protection that only lasts 
several years (205 ). As noted. there is no inexpensive animal model in which to study 
typhoid fever. therefore little is known about virulence factors that are responsible for its 
adaptation to the human host and its ability to cause typhoid fever ( 165). Research for new 
vaccine development is focusing on the capsular polysaccharide of S. t;phi. both an essential 
virulence factor and a protective antigen (166) 
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Overview of molecular subtyping 
The introduction of pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) techniques for separating large 
DNA molecules has made an important impact on genetic studies of both prokaryotic and 
eucaryotic organisms (174). PFGE is replacing more traditional phenotypic methods of 
typing organisms such as bacteriophage typing (the characterization of bacterial isolates by 
their susceptibility or resistance to lysis by bacteriophages) and serotyping (classification of 
organisms by the expression of antigenic determinants on the cell surface) (171, 173, 192). 
Schwartz and Cantor first demonstrated the usefulness of PFGE by separating chromosomes 
of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae and later publishing their results in the journal Cell 
(168). In PFGE, genomic DNA, typically from 2,000 to 5,000 kb pairs in size is embedded in 
agarose and later digested with a restriction enzyme (or restriction endonuclease) (170, 173, 
174 ). Restriction endonucleases have only a few recognition sites generating 10 to 30 
restriction fragments ranging fromlO to 800 kb in size (173). The generated fragments are 
later separated by gel electrophoresis using a specially designed chamber that positions the 
gel between electrodes surrounding the gel (173 ). Electrical current is applied first in one 
direction from one set of electrodes, then shifts to the second set of electrodes for a short 
period of time (a pulse) and so on; the shifting of current is constant as long as the gel is 
"run" (173). DNA migration in the gel takes place as a result of pulses alternating from 
electrodes (173). Specifically, DNA travels "back and forth" through the gel, resulting in a 
higher level of fragment resolution (173). After completion of PFGE, the gel is stained with 
ethidium bromide solution (typically 0.01 percent), digitized and photographed with 
ultraviolet illumination from a fixed camera position. All bacterial species are typeable by 
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PFGE, although the isolation of intact chromosomal DNA is difficult for some species (173). 
PFGE has been applied successfully to a wide range of bacterial species, both gram-positive 
(e.g. Staphylococcus, Enterococcus and Mycobacteira) and gram-negative (e.g. Escherichia 
coli and Salmonella) (173). For Salmonella, PFGE has been shown to be a powerful tool in 
discriminating bacterial strains within the same serotype and or even within the same phage 
type ( 169). However, in other species of bacteria, PFGE is impractical; for example, the 
chromosomal DNA of some strains of Clostridium difficile spontaneously degrades during 
the cell lysis procedure, making PFGE typing impractical (173). 
Basic components of a pulsed field gel system include a gel box with temperature 
regulation, power supply and a switching unit to control electric fields (173). PFGE gel boxes 
consist of an array of electrodes and a means of circulating electrophoresis buffer (173). 
Buffer circulation is important because it eliminates temperature variations within the gel and 
alleviates buffer breakdown due to electrolysis (173, 175). Migration of DNA molecules is 
sensitive to temperature, therefore a uniform temperature across the gel is necessary to ensure 
equal DNA migration in each lane of the electrophoresis gel (173). Buffer is recirculated 
through the gel box and temperature is controlled by a heat-exchange mechanism; heat 
exchange can be accomplished by using a small chiller unit or by recirculating 
electrophoresis buffer through plastic tubing that is submerged in a cooling bath (173). 
Pulsed Field Gel (PFG) separations can be carried out without a cooling water bath provided 
that the temperature of the buffer is not excessively high (e.g. above 25° C) (173). However 
room temperature in buildings can vary, resulting in different DNA migration rates (173). 
Precise control of the electric field gradient is necessary to obtain consistent PFG separations, 
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therefore the output rating of the power supply should be high enough to meet both the 
voltage and current supply of the gel box (173). A power supply with a maximum voltage 
rating of 300 V is required to achieve voltage gradients of 1.5-10 V /cm, which suffices for 
most PFG experiments (173). Finally, the ability to control the switch interval is critical for 
DNA migration. High voltage solid state electronics have been developed that offer high 
reliability as well as high-speed switching, ample voltage and current range (0.1 msec, 1 OOV 
and 0.5 A respectively) (173). The Clamped Homogeneous Electric Field (CHEF) 
electrophoresis machine (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, CA) uses two homogeneous 
electric fields that have variable reorientation angles (90 to 120 degrees) that could be used to 
separate very large molecules. Additionally, CHEF PFG machines tend to give better gel 
runs because of the highly uniform fields it generates and the accommodation of wider gels 
than other conventional systems ( 1 73 ). 
The laboratory characterization of bacterial pathogens to provide evidence for their 
biologic and genetic relatedness is often useful to microbiologists, epidemiologists and 
clinicians as an aid in the investigation of infections (191 ). Molecular typing of pathogens 
provides a useful tool that can be used to track sources of infection and to determine the 
epidemiological link between isolates from human and environmental sources ( 179). Typing 
methods fall into two broad categories: phenotypic methods and genotypic methods (173). 
Phenotypic methods are those that detect characteristics expressed by the microorganism 
(948). Properties such as biochemical profiles, bacteriophage types, antigens present on the 
cell surface and antimicrobial susceptibility profiles are examples of phenotypic properties 
that can be determined in the laboratory (172). Because they involve gene expression, these 
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properties have a tendency to vary, based on changes in growth conditions. gro\\,1h phase and 
spontaneous mutation (172). Genotypic methods are those that involve direct DNA-based 
analysis of chromosomal or extrachromosomal elements and include polymorphisms in DNA 
restriction patterns based on cleavage of the chromosomes by restriction enzymes ( 1 73 ). 
Genotypic methods are less subject to natural variation, however they can be affected by 
insertions or deletions of DNA into the chromosome. the gain or loss of extrachromosomal 
DNA or random mutations that may create or eliminate restriction endonuclease sites (I T2). 
Several criteria have been proposed for evaluating typing systems. Typeability refers to the 
ability of a technique to assign an unambiguous result (type) to each isolate* ( 171. 192). 
First. typing methods should be reproducible. Reproducibility refers to the ability of a 
technique to yield the same result when the same strain is tested repeatedly (171 ). Next, the 
procedure should have superior discriminatory power. The discriminatory power of a 
technique refers to the ability to differentiate among unrelated strains* (171, 192). Ease of 
interpretation is also essential. Interpretations are most reliable if they are based on logical, 
objective, readily applied criteria (171 ). Finally. the ideal typing system should be rapid. 
inexpensive and technically simple (171 ). Nontypable isolates are most common with 
phenotypic methods, however, they have been recognized with genotypic methods as well 
*A bacterial isolate is defined as a pure culture of a particular bacterial species grown from a 
source (e.g. patient. environmental), with no other information given except its genus and 
species. A bacterial strain is an isolate or group of isolates of a particular species that based 
on typing methods can be distinguished from other members of that same species. Outbreak 
strains are genetically linked (e.g. by time. place, type of infection) and genetically linked as 
determined by a typing method such as PFGE (Sahm, 1996) 
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(173). As previously noted, the PFGE of C. difficile isolates is not practical; it is believed 
that chromosomal DNA is of some strains of C. difficile is degraded by endogenous 
nucleases before it can be cleaved properly by restriction endonucleases (173). 
Laboratories play an important role in assisting epidemiologists both with recognition and 
characterization of outbreaks. Typing systems such as PFGE can be used for outbreak 
investigations, to confirm and outline the patterns of transmission of one or more epidemic 
bacterial strains, to test hypotheses about the sources and vehicles of transmission of these 
microbes and to monitor the reservoirs of epidemic organisms (170). Additionally, typing · 
contributes to epidemiological surveillance and evaluation of control measures by 
documenting the prevalence over time and the circulation of epidemic bacteria in infected 
populations ( 170). The basic premise of epidemiological typing is that isolates of an 
infectious agent that are also part of the same chain of transmission are clonally related, that 
is the progeny of the same ancestor cell (170). Clonally related isolates exhibit significantly 
more similar characteristics than unrelated isolates; these characteristics (called 
epidemiological markers) are scored by typing systems designed to optimize discrimination 
between epidemiologically related and unrelated isolates of the pathogen of interest (170). 
Although PFGE has been used very successfully in the characterization of microbes, the 
procedure does have some limitations. One issue is the technical demands of the procedure 
and the initial expense of the equipment (171 ). Preparation of suitable genomic DNA takes 1-
3 days and the equipment required (including the electrophoresis apparatus and 
transilluminator) could cost about $40,000 (172). Another issue is the interpertation of 
completed gels. For instance, while many countries utilize PFGE, reports regarding 
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comparisons of data between different laboratories seem to be absent ( 169). This is likely the 
result of lack of standardization of PFGE techniques and gel interpretation ( 169). Attempts 
have been made to resolve this issue. Researchers including Maslow et al. (1993), Tenover et 
al. ( 1995), and Struelens et al. ( 1998) have developed protocols intended to standardize 
PFGE (171, 172). In particular, Tenover and his coworkers at the CDC's National Center for 
Infectious Diseases (NCID) released a paper on how to interpret chromosomal DNA 
restriction patterns produced by PFGE. Tenover and his laboratory group correlated 
information from dozen of outbreaks and created guidelines intended for clinical 
microbiologists (173). His methods were intended for laboratory workers to analyze gel 
patterns visually using detailed criteria. PFGE analysis was considered reliable if each isolate 
resolved into at least 10 distinct restriction fragments (173). Tenover also documented 
optimal restriction enzymes for representative gram-positive and gram-negative organisms, 
noting the approximate number of restriction fragments, sizes of fragments and references for 
additional information on each bacterial agent (173). Additional laboratory methods were 
discussed including the use of well-characterized control strains and molecular size standards 
to process along with the unknown isolates being tested, the appropriate use of voltage to 
separate DNA fragments and laboratory safety (173). The author will use the criteria of 
Tenover et al. (1995) when analyzing PFGE patterns in suspect Salmonella isolates. The 
criteria will be discussed in chapter 3 (PFGE Experiments). 
Chapter 3 PFGE EXPERIMENTS 
Materials and Methods 
In May, 2001 a total of 86 samples taken from various locations on five cattle farms in 
Texas were submitted to laboratory of J. Dickson (Iowa State University) in two separate 
shipments. One shipment (32 samples) was labeled with the locations where samples were 
taken (e.g. Plantation river, cantaloupe cooler). The second shipment (54 samples) was either 
labeled with a "general locale" (farm environment) or where samples were taken from 
animals (e.g. rectal, hide, carcass). However, the exact farm location was not specified on the 
second shipment (see appendix). Of those 83 samples, 63 of were identified as Salmonella. 
The National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL), Ames, Iowa, serotyped all isolates. 
Iowa State University's College of Veterinary Medicine, Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory 
(Ames, Iowa) completed antibiotic susceptibility tests using the Kirby-Bauer disc method. 
Of the 63 isolates of Salmonella, there were eleven serotypes: 3,10: L monophasic (1 ), 
3, I O:nonmotile/ Alamo (1 ), agona (15), anatum (17), carru (2), cerro (1 ), edinburg (1 ), 
kentucky (17), madelia (1 ), mbandaka ( 4 ), newport (2) and oranieburg ( 1). Twenty antibiotics 
were used in the antibiotic susceptibility tests: ampicillin (Am), apramycin (Ap), ceftiofur 
(XNL), chlortetracycline (Cl), clindamycin (CC), enrofloxacin, (ENO) erythromycin (E), 
spectinomycin (SH), sulfachloropyridazine (SI), sulfadimethoxine (Sd*), sulphathiazole 
(ST), tiamulin (Ta*), tilmicosin (TIL *) trimethoprim/sulphamethoxazole (SXT) and tylosin 
(Ty*). S. nel1port amOl 144 standard was obtained from the laboratory of D.L. Harris (Iowa 
State University); additionally lambda ladder PFG marker were used (New England Biolabs, 
*Abbreviations designated by the author 
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Beverly. MA). 
Preparation of Chromosomal DNA 
Isolates were plated on Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) in a "bacterial lawn" fashion and 
incubated at 37°C from 16-24 hours. All reagents were made with nanowater obtained from a 
Nanopure Infinity Ultrapure Water System (Bamstead/Thermolyne, Dubuque, IA.) at the 
setting of 18 Q/cm or higher. Sterilization of nanowater occurred before making reagents. 
Chromosomal DNA was prepared following the PFGE protocol developed by CDCs 
PulseNet Program (Atlanta, GA), the State of Minnesota Department of Health (DOH) and 
the laboratory of D.L.Harris. After incubation, cells were harvested and suspended in 3.5 ml 
Cell Suspension Buffer (CSB). The optical density of each cell suspension was adjusted 
between 0.65 and 0.75 at 612 nm wavelength using a 21 D spectrophotometer (Spectronics 
Corporation, Westbury, NY.). Four hundred µl of each suspension was pipetted to safe-lock 
eppendorftubes (Brinkmann Instruments, Westbury, NY) and 20 µl of RNA-grade proteinase 
K solution (lnvitrogen Life Technologies, Carlsbad, CA.) was added to the top of the 
eppendorf tube, not allowing mixing with the cell suspension (to prevent premature cell 
lysis). Plug agar was melted and allowed to cool slightly: the plug agar had previously been 
prepared per protocol instructions using Seakem Gold Agarose for PFGE (FMC Bioproducts, 
Rockland, ME.). While the plug agar cooled, plug molds (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, 
CA) were cleaned with 70 % ethyl alcohol, assembled, and allowed to dry. Four hundred µl 
of warm plug agar was mixed thoroughly with the cell suspension and proteinase K. The 
mixture was pipetted into a well of the plug mold; each well of the plug mold being filled to 
about 300ul. The mixture was allowed to solidify at ambient temperature. Sterile snap top 
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tubes (Polystyrene Culture Test Tube 12 X, 75 MM; Fisher Scientific, Pittsburgh, PA.) were 
filled with 1.5 ml cell lysis buffer and 40 ul proteinase K. After the plugs had solidified, each 
plug was placed into the 1.5 ml cell lysis buffer-proteinase K mixture and incubated in a 54° 
C shaking water bath with constant vigorous agitation for 1.5 -2 hours. The spatulas used to 
place plugs into the cell lysis-proteinase K solution were wiped with 70% alcohol before and 
after each plug was placed in the snap top tubes. After incubation, plugs were transferred to 
screen caps (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA), again using a spatula cleaned with 70 % alcohol before 
and after transferring plugs to screen caps. Screen caps were inserted into PVC washing 
pipes, and washed twice with warm sterile water (50° C and 10 minutes per washing). While 
washing, the PVC pipe was placed in the 54° C water bath with vigorous agitation. The plugs 
were later washed with warm TE buffer four times (50° C, 10 minutes per washing) and 
again placed into the 54 C water bath with vigorous agitation. Plugs were stored in 
eppendorf tubes containing TE buffer at 4° C until use. 
Restriction Endonuclease Digestion and PFGE 
Again, plugs were prepared using the PFGE protocol by PulseNet, the Minnesota DOH and 
D.L. Harris with modifications. Fifteen plugs were used for each gel run. Fourteen plugs (10 
isolates and 4 S. newport amOl 144 standards) were incubated as described below; one PFG 
lambda ladder (also used as a standard) was not. A mixture of 173 µl water, 20 µl specialized 
buffer to be used with Xba I restriction enzyme (lnvitrogen Life Technologies, Carlsbad, 
CA) and 2µ 1 of acetylated bovine serum albumin (BSA, Promega, Madison, WI.) was 
pipetted in eppendorf tubes. One 3mm slice of the prepared plugs was cut with a razor blade 
previously swabbed with 70 % alcohol and placed in the eppendorf tube mixture. The 
99 
process was repeated with each plug to be analyzed. Five µl of the restriction enzyme Xba I 
(lnvitrogen Life Technology, Carlsbad, CA) was added to each eppendorf tube, mixing 
completely to ensure complete restriction digestion. All eppendorf tubes were incubated at 
37° C for 18-24 hours. 
After incubation, 150 ml of 0.5X TBE buffer was then mixed with l.5g ultra-pure DNA 
grade plused-field certified agarose (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA.) in a 250 or 300 ml flask, 
covered with cotton or saran wrap and placed in a microwave for 4.5 minutes. The mixture 
was allowed to boil for only one minute to prevent excessive loss of volume. While agarose. 
mixture cooled slightly, the casting stand and gel comb (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA.) were 
cleaned and assembled. The cooled agarose was later poured into the casting stand (the gel 
comb created each "well" for plugs to be placed in). No bubbles were allowed to form in the 
agarose mixture; if bubbles formed, they were promptly pipetted out. After the agarose in the 
casting stand had solidified (30-45 minutes), the comb was removed and each well loaded 
with one lambda ladder standard (lane 1), four S. newport amOl 144 standards (lanes 2, 5, 10 
and 15) and the 10 isolates to be tested (remaining lanes). Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
was then preformed using 2.5 L of 0.5X TBE buffer in a CHEF-DRiii apparatus (Bio-Rad, 
Carlsbad, CA). Electrophoresis was performed at an induced angle of 120 degrees, 6V/cm for 
21 hours at 10-11° C, with a ramped switch time of 2.2 seconds to 64 seconds. Gels were 
later stained for 15 minutes in nanowater containing 1 mg/ml solution of ethidium bromide. 
Unbound ethidium bromide was removed by destaining gel for 10 minutes in nanowater. 
DNA fragments were visualized on an UV transilluninator (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA.), and the 
gels were photographed. The photographs were scanned and analyzed according to the 
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guidelines ofTenover et al. at the NCID (1995) (173). In summary, isolates are considered 
indistinguishable if there are no (0) genetic differences compared with outbreak strain(s) 
(173). Restriction fragment patterns of indistinguishable isolates have the same number of 
bands and the corresponding bands are the same size (173). For the purposes of this work, 
genetic differences will be compared between strains since there was no additional 
information about the isolates other than what was previously discussed (e.g. outbreak 
strain(s) were not provided to the laboratory for analysis). Isolates are considered closely 
related if there is one genetic difference between strains. This corresponds with one genetic 
event (such as a point mutation resulting in the creation or loss of a restriction site) resulting 
in a 2-3 restriction fragment difference (173). Strains are considered possibly related ifthere 
are two genetic events (such as simple insertion or deletion of DNA or the gain or loss of 
restriction sites) between strains being compared (173). Possibly related strains have a 
difference of 4-6 restriction fragments (173). Strains are considered different if there are 2:._3 
genetic differences and 7 or more restriction fragment difference between strains; the 
implication is that <50% of the resolved restriction fragments will be the same between 
isolates being compared (173). Tenover et al. noted that these criteria are indicated for use in 
analyzing discrete set of isolates during epidemiological studies of potential outbreaks in 
hospitals or communities spanning short periods (1 to 3 months). Additionally, the criteria 
are not appropriate for studies of large populations of organisms collected over extended 
period of 1 year or longer (173). These guidelines are based on the assumption that 
laboratories will have limited time and resources to perform typing studies and will analyze 
strains with a single restriction endonuclease (173). 
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Results 
When observing antibiotic profiles of the 63 isolates, trends in resistance become 
apparent. As noted in the literature regarding Salmonella, increasing antibiotic resistance is a 
concern of investigators ( 177). In appendix 1 there are graphs that support this trend. Many 
seroptypes tested for this project demonstrate broad resistance. Some examples include S. 
agona (12114 isolates resistant to P and Ta) and S. kentucky (15117 isolates resistant to P, Ty 
and OXT. Moreover, 16117 S. kentucky isolates are resistant to CC and 17117 isolates 
resistant to Cl). Conversely there are serotypes that are sensitive to antibiotics. One example 
is S. mbandaka; all isolates are sensitive to antibiotics such as SI, Am, Ap. and E (0/4 
resistant). In addition, 0/17 S. kentucky isolates are resistant to ENO, Gm and N. Emerging 
antibiotic resistance is a major reason for advocating practices such as educating future 
clinicians about appropriate prescribing methods, restricting the use of antibiotics in human 
and veterinary medicine and including the input of clinical microbiologists and infection 
control personnel in decisions regarding antibiotic use (178). However, there are researchers 
who disagree with this view (see chapter 3 discussion section of this thesis). Detailed 
descriptions of the serotypes and antibiotic resistance patterns of the isolates analyzed in this 
project are included in appendix 2. 
Results from PFGE experiments were grouped according to the procedure of Tenover et 
aL observing the numbers of fragments and comparison to the PFGE lambda ladder. The S. 
ne"»port standard was used to confirm appropriate implementation of experiments (e.g. use 
of proper amount ofrestriction endonuclease, appropriate incubation times). The 14 isolates 
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of S. agona demonstrated three PFGE patterns: group 1 (AV, BA, BB, BV, BW, BY, CA, 
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Figure 1. Ethidium bromide-stained 1.5 % agarose gel of S. agona. Lambda ladder standard 
(lane 1, in kilobases or kb), S. newport amOl 144 (lane 2), group 1 S. agona (BB, lane 3), 
group 2 S. agona (BC, lane 4) and group 3 S. agona (BX, lane 5). 
Group 1 S. agona had at least 11 restriction fragments (or bands) that were clearly defined 
(between approximately 727.5 kb and 194.0 kb. However, there were "clusters" of restriction 
fragments at approximately 350 kb that were difficult to interpret. Group 2 S. agona had 10 
restriction fragments that were easily visible (between 800 kb and 145 kb), however there 
were "clusters" of fragments at about 500 kb. Group 3 S. agona had 10 bands that were 
clearly seen (from about 800 kb to 110 kb). However, there were clusters of bands at 520 kb. 
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When comparing Sagona groups using the criteria of T eno\'er et al.. it appeared that the 
groups were at lest closely related (there are at least 10 or 11 restriction fragments in each 
group). however. the clusters ofrestriction fragments make it difficult to determine an exact 
relationship. Serotyping and antibiotic susceptibility data was then used to delineate 
relationships (it is common to use more than one technique in molecular typing to determine 
relatedness between isolates) (179). When comparing antibiotic profiles. group 1 S. agona 
isolates were sensiti\'e to Ap. ENO, Gm. SH and SI. Group 2 S. agona isolates were sensitive 
to Am, Xnl. Cc. FFC. N and OXT. Group 3 S. agona isolates were sensitive to Am. Xnl. Cl. 
FFC. N. OXT. Sd. ST and SXT. The sensitivity patterns of groups 2 and 3 were more similar 
than group 1 (e.g. groups 2 and 3 are sensiti\'e to Am. XNL. FFC. N and OXT). The groups 
of S. agona would likely be noted as closely related with S. agona groups 2 and 3 having a 
closer clonal relationship than group 1. 
The two serotypes of S. carru also showed similar restriction fragment profiles. BN had 7 
clearly defined fragments between approximately 650 kb 97.0 kb. CF"s had at least 7 
restriction fragments between 640 kb and 242.2 kb. In the PFG profile of BN. there may also 
be additional fragments at approximately 242.5 kb and l 00 kb (restriction fragments were 
difficult to discern from the gel so they were not included in the total). CF demonstrated 
more defined restriction fragments between 350 and 291.0 kb: this may be the result of the 
chromosome of CF having more restriction sites than BN. Hence the smaller restriction 
fragments of CF when compared to BN. The author also included the isolates of BE (S. 
madelia). BF (S. edinburg), CD (S. oranienburg), BT (3. JO:nonmotile/Alamo) and BU 
(3.1 O:monophasic) for review. Although BT and BU were different serotypes of salmonellae, 
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both had the same antibiotic profile (both resistant to Cc, E, P, Ta, TIL and Ty) and very 
similar PFG profiles. The locations of restriction fragments are almost identical (with the 
exception of a 9th fragment at about 97.0 kb). 
(A) (B) 










Figure 2. (A) Ethidium bromide-stained 1.5 % agarose gel of Salmonella isolates. Lambda 
ladder standard in kb (lane 1), S. carru (BN, lane 2) and S. carru (CF, lane 3). (B) A second 
1.5 % agarose gel. Lambda ladder (lane 1), S. madelia (BE, lane 2), S. edinburg (BF, lane 3), 
S. oraineburg (CD, lane 4), 3,JO:nonmotile/Alamo (BT, lane 5) and 3,JO:monophasic (BU, 
lane 6) 
The PFGE profiles of S. newport isolates (AK, AU and BG) were identical. However, 
there were some differences in the antibiotic profiles of the isolates. BG was susceptible to 
Am, Xnl, Cl, FFC, OXT, SI, Sd and ST. However, isolates AK and AU demonstrated 
resistance to the same antibiotics. Given that the PFG profiles are the same, Tenover et al. 
would consider the isolates from a clonal source. It is of interest that BG has a different 
antibiotic profile than isolates AK and AU (although their PFG profiles are identical.) 
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The 3 serotpyes S. mbandaka demonstrated two different PFGE profiles. Group 1 
consisted of isolate C and group 2 included isolates L, AH and AJ. Isolate C consisted of 12 
restriction fragments; isolates L, AH and AJ have 10 clearly defined restriction fragments. 
However, among group 2 isolates, at approximately 300 kb, there appears to be "cluster" of 
fragments; therefore that area was not counted. When reviewing antibiotic resistance among 
S. mbandaka, there were three antibiotic profiles among the four isolates. The isolates had 
almost identical profile except that isolate L was susceptible to Cl while the remaining 
isolates were resistant to the same antibiotics. Additionally, isolates L, AH and AJ were 
susceptible to SH while C was resistant. Given the information provided, S. mbandaka would 
likely be classified as closely associated. 
There was only one isolate of S. cerro (AW). The serotype, PFG pattern and antibiotic 
(A) (B) 
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Figure 3 (previous page). (A) Lambda ladder standard in kb (lane 1 ). S. cerro (AW. lane 
2). (B) Lambda ladder standard in kh (lane 1 ). S. kentuc/...:y (B. lane 2). S. kemucky (D. lane 3 ). 
S. kentuckr (M. lane 4 ). S kentucky (AL lane 5) and S. kentucky (AL lane 6 ). 
profile of AW has been provided on this page and the appendix. S. kentucky isolates were 
placed in five different groups. Group 1 isolates include B. E. G and S. Group 2 was 
represented by isolate D. Similarly. group 4 consisted of AI and group 5 consist of AL 
Group 3 isolates include H, I. M. N. P, AP. AQ. AR. AS and AT. Group 1 had 9 clearly 
observable restriction fragments (from 725.5 kb to approximately 260 kb). However. the 
restriction fragments were difficult to see below 240 kb). The restriction fragments of group 
2 \Vere clearly visible from about 740 kb to about 540 kb (six fragments are present). From 
about 500 kb to 300 kb. the numbers of fragments were difficult to count. There were 
approximately 6 fragments about 680 to 194.5 kb. Group 3 had three restriction fragments 
that were clearly visible from 600 to 533.5 kb. Difficulty in interpretation was evident about 
350 to 300 kb. Three faint restriction fragments could be seen between 242.5 and 194.5 kb. 
Group four had large bands at 750 and 545 kb. It appeared that at 500 kb. there were at least 
two restriction fragments at both 350 and 300 kb. From about 260 to 80 kb. there were 7 
fragments. Group 5 was the most easily discemable of all S. kentucky isolates. Ten restriction 
fragments was observed from about 800 kb to about 500 kb. The antibiotic profiles of S. 
kentucky form 11 patterns. however all isolates were resistant to Cc and a majority were 
resistant to antibiotics such as E (16/17). P (15/17) and TIL (15/17). There were isolates that 
were resistant to antibiotics that the majority of isolates were susceptible to including AP 
(resistant to ENO). AL (resistant to SH) and AQ (resistant to ST). There were isolates that 
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shared antibiotic patterns that did not share PFGE patterns. Isolates B. D and E shared the 
same antibiotic profile but the PFGE profile of D (group 2) was different from the PFGE 
profile of B and E (group 1 ). It appeared that group 3 isolates differed very little in antibiotic 
susceptibility patterns. For instance PFGE group 3 H differed from PFGE group 3M by one 
antibiotic (e.g. H was resistant to Ta while M was susceptible to Ta). Conversely. isolates B 
and D had the same antibiotic profile. however. they were in different PFGE groups (B was 
in PFGE group 1 and D was in PFGE group 2). S. kentucky was more difficult to classify 
than previous serotypes. however, given the close antibiotic profiles as well as viewing the 
PFGs. the author would classify PFGE groups 1 and 2 as having a closer genetic relationship 
than groups 3. 4 and 5. However. all of the PFGE groups were similar when reviewing 
antibiotic profiles and restriction fragment patterns (for example in PFGE groups 1. 2. 3 and 
4. there were ··clusters·· of fragments at about the 300-400 kb are that were difficult to count). 
Like S. kentucky. the 18 isolates of S. anatum had variable antibiotic profiles ( 10 groups). 
S. anaTUm had three PFGE profiles. Group one consisted of 16 isolates (A. J. K. U. V. W. X. 
Y. Z. AA. AB. AC. AD. AE. AF and AG). Group 2 and group 3 consisted of one isolate each 
(Rand T. respectively). All experimental isolates of S. anaturn were resistant to Ta and TIL. 
Additionally, most were resistant to OXT. P and Ty (17118). Antibiotic profiles were similar 
the number of antibiotic profile groups ( 10) was misleading: being in a different antibiotic 
group was often the difference between resistance or susceptibility to one antibiotic. For 
example. although A and J had indistinguishable PFGE restriction patterns. A and J were 
members of different antibiotic groups (A was in group 1 and J was in group 5). J was 
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Figure 4. Ethidium bromide-stained 1.5 % agarose gel of S. anatum isolates. Lambda ladder 
in kb (lane 1), S. anatum (J, lane 2), S. anatum (R, lane 3) and S. anatum (T) lane 4. 
PFGE group 1 S. anatum had 14 restriction fragments (from approximately 740 kb to 200 
kb). PFGE group 2 S. anatum had 15 restriction fragments (from approximately 740 kb to 
200 kb). Group 3 S. anatum had 9 restriction fragments that were clearly visible (from about 
740 kb to 97.0 kb), however interpretation was difficult below 97.0 kb. Notably, PFGE group 
2 isolates had more restriction fragments between 500 and 291 kb compared to both group 1 
and group 2. Perhaps this is the result of group 2 having more restriction fragments to resolve 
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through the gel (both group 1 and 3 possessed larger restriction fragments which may have 
be the result of a genetic event such as fewer restriction sites for the restriction enzyme to 
cleave fragments.) The S. anatum isolates appeared to have a close relationship to one 
another. Antibiotic profiles were very similar (there may be a few isolates that did not have 
the exact pattern as other members of S. anatum.) In addition. the PFGE profiles were easily 
discernable and demonstrated similar restriction fragment profiles. 
Serotyping. antibiotic profiles. PFGE profiles and information provided by the cattle farm 
v;as used to determine if an outbreak of Salmonella in humans resulted from cattle wastes 
that possibly contaminated water sources used to irrigate crop fields. The information 
provided by the farms was very limited. No map was provided nor --outbreak strain .. 
isolate(s). Five cattle farms were in the vicinity of the water supply and produce fields 
(Plantation. Suntex. Starr. Udale and J and D). Bacterial samples were taken from the farms 
as well as unspecified locales (e.g. hides of cattle. environment and cattle carcass). A 
diagram was created including all Salmonella isolates and corresponding laboratory tests to 
determine if there was an association bet\veen specific serotypes of Salmonella. This diagram 
is located in the appendix. In several locations. there were prevalent serotypes of Salmonella. 
For example. the majority of samples taken from hides of cattle were S. kentucky ( 12) and S. 
anatum (7). S. anatum isolates also were prernlent in samples taken from cattle carcasses 
( 7). Of note. S. agona with a PFGE profile of 1 and an antibiotic profile of 1 (P 11 ap 1) was 
found on 4/5 farms: Plantation (2). Suntex (l ). Starr Farm (2) as well as J and D (3). S. agona 
(Pl I ap 1) was also found the hide of one animal as well as in an unspecified environmental 
location. Specifically. S. agona (Pl! ap 1) was found in the cantaloupe cooler of J and D 
farms. There is a possibility that S. agona (Pl! apl) was the bacterial agent that made persons 
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ill with salmonellosis. However. this is not certain because no isolates from ill humans were 
provided for study. Additionally. it is uncertain if samples taken from cattle were from sick 
animals or healthy animals that harbored salmonellae (as part of their skin microflora. for 
example). 
Discussion 
PFGE has been a very useful tool in the study of organisms. This tool has been useful in 
the clinical laboratory and has proven to be useful in diagnosis. therapy. and epidemiological 
investigations and infection control ( 180). Specifically. PFGE has been useful in linking 
outbreaks originally thought not to be related ( 181 ). When combined with other typing 
methods (e.g. serotyping. antibiotic profiles. ribotyping). epidemiological associations can be 
evaluated with a high degree of confidence ( 179). However, PFGE can be difficult to learn 
and initial costs of setting up a laboratory equipped to perform this procedure can be 
expensive (179). Both the usefulness and complexity of PFGE was demonstrated in this 
experiment. While many PFGE profiles were straightforward and allowed for quick 
interpretation. others were not. and additional experiments had to be conducted until a 
method was developed that resulted in improved interpretation. The result was a revised 
experimental methods section in which incubation time of PFGE plugs and restriction 
endonucleases were increased to 18-24 hours and staining with EtOH increased from 10 to 
15 minutes. Additionally. antibiotic profiles were used in conjunction of serotyping to 
support decisions regarding genetic relatedness. 
When reviewing the data from Salmonella experiments. trends were evident regarding the 
prevalence of Salmonella serotypes in certain environments (specifically, the pervasiveness 
of S. anatum and S. kentucky on cattle hides and S. anatum on carcasses). Additionally S. 
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agona (P 11 ap 1 ) was identified as one isolate that could had caused human illness. Although 
limited data was provided regarding the isolates (e.g. analysis of an outbreak strain). the 
generated data could be used in activities such as observing trends in infection and 
implementing procedures to minimize the presence of Salmonella in foods meant for human 
consumption. 
Many researchers believe that emerging antibiotic resistance is a direct consequence of 
escalating antibiotic use despite many calls for moderation ( 182 ). There is dissention in what 
constitutes appropriate antibiotic use. In veterinary medicine. antibiotics are used for a 
variety of activities including growth promoters and feed additives to decrease the incidence 
of salmonellosis in animals used for human consumption ( 185 ). Proponents of use of 
antibiotics in food animals point to studies such an one by Gustafson et al. (1991) that 
demonstrate that restrictive use of antibiotics in animal feed would not restore antibiotic 
sensitivity in pigs: furthermore. antibiotic resistance in human clinical isolates were not 
increasing ( 185 ). Those at the other end of the spectrum advocate changing how antibiotics 
are used in animal (and human) health as well as in food production because antibiotic 
resistance is an unfortunate reality (186). Outbreaks in humans have been traced to animal 
feed and many researchers advocate implementing some control programs to limit the spread 
of antibiotic resistance (186). In human medicine. advocates of curbing antibiotic are 
implementing plans such as reducing the prescription of antibiotics as '·cycling .. the use of 
certain antibiotics in hospitals to prevent emergence of antibiotic resistance (186). 
Conclusions 
112 
Molecular typing methods has greatly improwd the understanding of the epidemiology of 
infectious disease. However. the rapid expansion and incomplete comparative evaluation of 
these methods leave the microbiologist and epidemiologist faced with many questions 
dealing with the selecting the appropriate typing system(s) for solving a particular problem 
and the lack of consensus about interpretation and communication of results ( 180). This was 
the case with the analysis of Salmonella isolates covered. Although researchers recommend 
that PFGE be considered the optimal method in typing bacterial pathogens. others suggest 
that additional typing methods (such as serotyping and antibiotic susceptibility testing) be 
used in conjunction to PFGE to assist in confirming or refute genetic relatedness of isolates 
being tested (180 ). While assessing the relatedness of the Salmonella isolates in this project. 
serotyping and antibiotic susceptibility methods were extremely useful in determining if 
isolates were genetically related-specifically with the S. agona (al/ Pl) isolates). Despite 
limited information about the background of the Salmonella isolates provided for study, 
genetic relatedness could still be determined. A simple diagram provided useful information 
that could be exploited in the microbiological and epidemiological investigation of the Texas 
farms. However. corresponding epidemiological information is extremely useful in outbreak 
investigations. For example. with the Salmonella isolates provided in this experiment. 
additional information would have been helpful (e.g. location of cattle in the environment. 
provision of outbreak strain(s) of Salmonella). Routine subtyping and epidemiological 
follow-up would be beneficial in decreasing the risk of future Salmonella outbreaks. 
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CHAPTER 4. A Three-Year Study (2001-2003) of Bioterrorism Preparedness in 
State Health Departments: Accomplishments and Dilemmas. 
A paper submitted to the Morbidity and Mortality Week(r Report 
Ginger Shipp, James Dickson, Nancy Franklin, Patricia Quinlisk and Cortland Loli.ff 
Summary: A three-year study (2001-2003) was initiated by the Iowa State University 
Department of Microbiology and the Iowa Department of Public Health. Centers for Acute 
Disease Epidemiology (CADE) to determine how states were utilizing bioterrorism funding 
awarded by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). After the attacks of September 11. :WOI. 
the survey evolved to assess how states were using BT funding to improve epidemiological 
capacity. All 50 states responded to two surveys. The surveys found that ID epidemiologists 
are essential in BT preparedness but concerns remain in issues such as finding qualified staff. 
setting up disease surveillance. and finding time for planning. The development of a 
competent workforce has become a priority in public health preparedness and CDC is 
funding initiatives that states are undertaking such as developing training programs to 
educate public health workers. CDCs funding is also being used to improve the public health 
infrastructre to respond to emerging infectious diseases (e.g. west nile virus. monkeypox) as 
well as BT events. 
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A Three-'\·ear Study (2001-2003) of Bioterrorism Preparedness in State 
Health Departments: Accomplishments and Dilemmas 
A paper submitted to the Morb;dity and Mortality Weekly Report 
Ginger Shipp. James Dickson. Nancy Franklin. Patricia Quinlisk and Cortland Lohff 
The deliberate use of anthrax during the terrorist acts of fall 2001 has highlighted the rate 
of infectious disease (ID) epidemiologists needed to prepare for bioterrorism (BT). In 2000. 
the State of Iowa Department of Public Health. Center for Acute Disease Epidemiology 
(CADE). and the Iowa State University Department of Microbiology conducted a study to 
determine how states were utilizing BT funding. After September 11 2001. the survey 
evolved to include the use of BT monies in improving ID epidemiology capacity. The survey 
found that ID epidemiologists are essential in BT preparedness activities but concerns remain 
in issues such as hiring qualified personnel and finding time to conduct daily activities. 
Federal officials devising response plans for state HDs should be aware that ID 
epidemiologists operate in an environment where there is much political and public scrutiny. 
ID epidemiologists should continue to participate in BT preparedness with other groups (e.g. 
police and fire departments) to promote consensus building and cooperation. 
Health departments in all 50 states responded to both surveys. The number of ID 
epidemiologists employed in 2001-2003 (projected) is illustrated below. Between September 
2001 and June 2003. 46 state health departments added at least one ID epidemiologist to their 
staff and the utilization of ID epidemiologists was broad (see table 1 ). ID epidemiologists 
were also asked about challenges to BT planning on a scale from 0 (no challenge) to 4 (high 
challenge). Their responses are summarized in table 2. 
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Table 1 
How epidemiologists hired with BT Percentage and # of respondents 
monies were utilized 
Develop and test epidemiological plans to 100 % (46/46)* 
respond to BT 
Develop new or enhance existing 100 % (47/47) 
surveillance activities for BT or infectious 
disease 
Participate in outbreak or BT related 100 % ( 48/48) 
investigations 
Train health care providers 92 % (44/48) 
Train public health workers 96 % (46/48) 
Grant Writing 62 % (29/47) 
Other activities 50 % (25/50) e.g. community education, 
assessing zoonotic diseases, collaborating 
with other agencies 
* number ofrespondents that answered "yes" versus all respondents who answered question 
Table 2: 
Question "high challenge" response "medium challenge" 
response 
Finding qualified staff 60% (28/47)* 28 % (13/47) 
Training health care 59% (27/46) 37 % (17/46) 
professionals 
Training first responders 24 % (11/46) 65 % (30/46) 
Setting up disease 62 % (29/47) 28 % (13/47) 
surveillance 
Finding time for planning 72 % (34/47) 28% (13/47) 
*number ofrespondents answering with a specified response (i.e. high challenge) versus all respondents who 
answered question 
Despite considerable efforts at BT preparedness, ID epidemiologists reported that barriers 
still exist. A majority of state HDs surveyed had difficulty finding time for activities such as 
planning and setting up disease surveillance (72 and 62%, respectively). Additionally, 60% 
of state HDs had difficulty finding qualified ID epidemiologists. Other barriers to BT 
preparedness included dealing with food security issues, hiring freezes and budget deficits, 
political concerns and preparing for pre-event smallpox vaccination. 
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There were some limitations with the study. The first survey was administered prior to the 
events of September 1 L 2001. Subsequently. a revised questionnaire was developed 
emphasizing workforce capacity. State HDs responded to the revised questionnaire owr a 
period of nine months. (between October 2002 and June 2003.) It should be noted that some 
states (such as Vermont) have small populations and a large number of state-employed ID 
epidemiologists because there are no local/regional HDs. 
During FY 2001-2003. CDC appropriated increasing amounts of funding to improve the 
capacity for BT preparedness (from 177 million in FY 2001 to over 1 billion in FY 2003.)(l) 
Both surveys suggest that CDC funding was used in part to increase the numbers of ID 
epidemiologists. Additionally. ID epidemiologists are involved in a wide range of activities 
from responding to emerging infectious diseases to training health care workers to recognize 
BT threats. However. barriers to preparedness remain. notably obtaining qualified staff and 
finding time for planning activities. 
Number of state workers employed in Infectious Disease Epidemiology and BT 
preparedness: 2001-2003 
State employed (2001) new employees (2002) Projected new employees (2003) total (%change) 
AL 3 0 -' 
AK 3 0 -I 
AZ 7 6 -I 








































































Number of state workers employed in Infectious Disease Epidemiology and BT 
preparedness: 2001-2003 (continued) 
State employed (200l)new employees (2002)* Projected new employees(2003) total(% change) 
MA 30 0 0 0 
MI 3 7 -5 -400 ° o 
MN 4 0 .,..7 -175°0 
MS 9 3 _.., -55°0 
MO 7 35 +6 -586 °10 
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Prior to the events of September 11. 2001 there was recognition by public health officials 
that the public health infrastructure was not equipped to respond to BT events or national 
public health emergencies. The public health system has been described as being in disarray. 
··resulting in ... fractionated interests and programs. organizational turmoil among new 
agencies. and well-intentioned but unbalanced appropriations without coherent direction by 
well-qualified professionals. '"(2) 
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The development of a competent workforce is a priority in public health preparedness. A 
2000 study found inadequate knowledge by federal health officials about the competencies of 
the public health workforce. lack of formal training in public health. limited public health 
certification. absence and fragmentation of funding for public health initiatives and failure to 
use advance technology and indecision about workforce development.(3) Activities such as 
developing training programs to educate public health workers about BT threats and 
participation in BT preparedness drills will contribute to improving public health workforce 
readiness. 
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Discussion 
Substantial efforts have been made to ensure that state and local public health agencies 
have the ability to respond to BT events. Grants awarded by the federal gowrnment have 
been utilized in improving the public health infrastructure. Federal officials have recognized 
that the public health system is .. at the forefront of. .. defenses against Br· (220). As 
demonstrated by the anthrax attacks of 2001. the first indication of a BT incident may be the 
appearance of large numbers of sick people in emergency rooms or doctors· offices (220). 
BT preparedness funding has had a positive effect on the public health infrastructure. Prior to 
the attacks of September 11. 2001. public entities such as pubic health laboratories. state and 
local health departments. and emergency medical response teams (often connected to fire and 
police departments) were understaffed and underfunded. After the attacks. the United States 
Congress recognized that a competent and well-trained public health workforce was 
instrumental in responding to national emergencies. Public health programs received an 
infusion of funding by the CDC (from 177 million in 2001 to over 1 billion in 2003.) (220) 
Public health entities also forged relationship with ··non-traditional partners .. including urgent 
care medical centers. pharmacies and poison control centers to monitor changes in actions 
such as patient visits and purchased medications. Efforts were also made to improve public 
health surveillance and epidemiological response activities. Many state health departments 
used BT grants to hire more personnel and to provide training about BW agents as well as 
emerging infectious diseases. Improvements in the public health infrastructure were helpful 
in responses to West Nile Virus and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (189, 190). 
Despite progress in improving the public health infrastructure. concerns exists among public 
health workers. Examples of concerns include the general public· s commitment to long-term 
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funding of health initiatives. funding of federal mandates and integrating public health 
responsibilities with objectives of other agencies that may be different from the objectives of 
public health (e.g. homeland security. law enforcement.) 
Conclusions 
After the anthrax incidents of October 200 I. it was quickly realized that a well-trained and 
properly equipped public health infrastructure was significant in BT preparedness and 
response. The role of ID epidemiologists in BT planning has become more important as 
well. However. their role has also become more complicated. ID epidemiologists have the 
responsibility of not only engaging in BT preparedness activities. but also having to manage 
day to day public health activities. Most are adjusting to this challenge by activities such as 
hiring new employees. planning and coordinating responses with other groups and training 
health care workers to later train others (""train the trainer""). Additionally. ID epidemiologists 
are taking a proactive role in addressing needs and concerns of their professions. There are 
professional organizations that advocate for their interests (e.g. The Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists) and many ID epidemiologists continue to educate the public 
about their responsibilities and how their duties are related to keeping the public healthy. ID 
epidemiologists are also becoming increasingly active in legislative affairs. However. many 
ID epidemiologists realize that to better manage their time. it is necessary to collaborate with 
diverse groups working in BT preparedness and response (e.g. public safety departments. the 
armed forces reserve). ID epidemiologists should continue to participate in activities that 
demonstrate their responsibilities to the public as well as advocate for support of their 
activities (financial. political). Institutions that train public health workers (e.g. 
epidemiologists. clinical microbiologists) should inform students about careers in ID 
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epidemiologists. Federal agencies are addressing shortages in ID epidemiologists by 
continuing to provide services such as employee training and funding. However many 
epidemiologists polled express concern that BT funding will decrease if BT becomes a lower 
priority issue. 
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Appendix 1. Resistance of Salmonella isolates tested 
Serotype No. of strains tested Am Ap 
Agona 14 9 0 
Ana tum 16 1 1 
Cerro 1 1 0 
Carru 2 0 0 
Edinburg 1 1 0 
Kentucky 17 2 2 
Mbandaka 4 0 0 
Mandella 1 0 0 
Newport 2 2 0 
Oran le burg 1 0 0 
3, lO:nonmoVAlamo 1 0 0 
3,10:1 w-monophaslc 1 0 0 
% Resistance within serotypes to antimicrobial agent 
Cc Cl E ENO Fie 
11 10 11 0 9 
16 6 16 3 2 
1 1 1 0 1 
2 0 2 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 
17 16 14 1 0 
4 3 4 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
2 2 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 
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Appendix 2. Grouping of antibiotic resistance profiles 
ID number Lener Location Berotype (NVSL) - .,, XNL Cl cc ENO E FFC Om N OXT p SH .. 8d ST To Tll SXT Ty GROUP r AGONA 
232 AV ""'"" Agona x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 51 BV Wflterlield sta1T Agona x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
243 BA hid• Agona x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
279 BB """""...,,..,, Agono x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
61 CA 'l'llftlerriversi..rr AgorVJ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
63 CB OIAlel P4>8 UV Agona x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
65 cc pM!ntmion rTYer AgoM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
73 CE Mier nver suil&Jll Agona x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
52 BW CMtalol4Je cooler y'd Agona x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
56 BY plllnf.8tionriller A.goM x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
GROUP 2 , AG ONA 
1 BC N'llOr nver str1lex Agona 
GROUP 3 AGONA 
53 BX olllel pipe Yd Agona 
58 Bl Ntler nver slarr Agona 
ID numbet" L•tt•r Location S.rotyJM (NVSq - .,, XNl Cl cc ENO E FFC Om N OXT p SH .. 8d ST To Tll SXT Ty GROUP 1 CARRU 
26 BN CMlak:H-"e cooler Yd c.,.,, 
GROUP 2 CARRU 
78 CF Wfller nver stArr C•"" 
ID number Lener Loe.Hon S.rotyJMI (NVSL) - .,, XNL Cl cc ENO E FFC Om N OXT p SH .. 8d ST To Tll SXT Ty 4 BE Mer !Mk start Ma.101111 x x x x x x 
5 BF Mllorl.:Ylksl1m Ertnburg x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
67 co Ntler over slarr Orarnonbury x x x x x x x x x 
46 AT 80Vlmmen111I cool tN 3 10 nonmoVAlamo x x x x x 
-iB BU erMromental coo! uv 3. 10 1.w monophasic x x x x x 
234 AW ""'"'' Ce~ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
10 number Len., location S.rotype (NVSL) - .,, XNl Cl cc ENO E FFC Om N OXT p SH .. 8d ST To T1l SXT Ty GROUP 1 ANA TUM 
16 A ""''"' AmhlTI 78 A ""'"'' AMllln 87 w ""'" Ar1.1llln 88 x hide Arvih.rn 
GROUP 2 ANA TUM 
41 K ""'"'' Anall.lfl 90 z h•le AMllln 
92 AB """""'' Ani.hll'l GROUP 3 ANA TUAI 
93 AC carcass ""''"" 94 AD carc..ss ""''"" % AE "'"""' """'"" OROUP 4 ANA.TUM 
81 T h'1e """'"" 98 AG "'"""' """'"" GROUP 5 ANA TUAI 
29 J Cllrcass AN11t1.n1 
GROUP tJ ANA TUM 
83 u hide AM1m> 
GROUP 7 ANA 1UM 
91 AA """"'' """'"" GROUP I ANA TUAI 
89 y hide Ana1m> 
GROUP 8 ANA TUii 
97 AF "'"""'' """'"" GROUP 10 ANATUll 
84 v hide """'"" 
K19J: Am• Ample-. Afl-.Apr.mycln IN...• 09ftlofur c .. otdor ... lr.ayc.,.• CC• cllnd9fftycln ENO• ..,ono .. c9"roflo•.cln E• 9'ythomycln Ff Fie• horfenk:lol Om• gertlamloln ,.,. n.ornycln OXT • owytetr.cyc trecycHn• P• p.nlol Hlln SH- apectlnomycln Bl• •ulllehloropyrldHln• 




Appendix 2. Grouping of antibiotic resistance profiles 
ID number Lener LoceOon S.rotype (NVSL) .... AP XNl Cl cc ENO E FFC Gm N OXT p SH SI Sd ST To Tll 8XT Ty 
OROUP 1 KENTOCKY 
18 B - Kenh.cky '1 D hide Kentucky 
22E hide Kentl.Cky 
GROUP 2 KENTUCKY 
271 """""' Kentucky GROUP 3 KENTUCKY 
24 G hide Kem1.eky 
224 AR environment Kenlucky 
OROUP 4 KENTUCKY 
25 H hide Kentucky 
GROUP 5 KENTUCKY 
46 M hde Kenh.cky 
GROUP I KENTUCKY 
52 p hide Kenh.cky 
79 s hide Kentucky 
141 Al hde Kentucky 
GROUP 7 KENJCKY 
47 N hide Kenh..cky 
OROl.F 8 KENTUCKY 
206 AO hide Kentucky 
GROUP 8 KENTUCKY 
225 AS emnronment Kenll.Cky 
226 AT """'"''''"'"' Kentl.Cky GROUP 10 KENTUCKY 
170 Al =as• Kemucky 
GROUP 11 KENTUCKY 
205 AP - Kentucky x x x x x x x x -hJ 
10 numbef" Letter LOC91k>n S.rotype (NVSL) .... AP XNL Cl cc ENO E FFC Gm N OXT p SH S1 Sd ST To TIL SXT Ty °' OROl.F 1 MBANOAKA 
20 c hide """""-GROUP 2 MBANOAKA 
43 L hide ~.tllin:111.ka 
GROUP 3 MBANDAKA 
104 AH erMrnnmont Munjillka 
1.C6 A.J hide ""'"""'"" 
10 number Lener loctitlon Serotype (NVSL) .... AP XNL Cl cc ENO E FFC Gm N OXT p SH SI Sd 8T To Tll SXT Ty 
GROUP 1 NEWPORT 
184 AK hide Ne""°" 
230 AU ...,,.I NellllPOrl 
GROUP 2 NEWPORT 
14 BG water nver S!Jlle11 Ne....port 
K•y: Am• Amplctltln Ap-Apr9mycln XNL• 09ftlofur Ct- chkJr•tetr.cycflne CC· cUndemycln ENO• enofloxKenrofloHcln E• erythomycln Fl Ftc• tk>rlenlcol Om• a-nt.mk:ln N-neomycln OXT•oiry1etr-.cyctrecycllne P• penk:l HMn 8""" ..,.ctlnomycln SI• •ul.chloropyrkillzln• 
Sd• •uft9dm.tho•ln• ST• •utph•tMHo .. T•• Ti.muHn TIL• tltmlco•ln SXT• trtrnethoprlnWulph•melhoHZO .. Tyaeyloaln 
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River Water 
Plantation 
BY-agona l (ap l) 
CC-agona l (ap l) 
BC-agona Pl (ap 3) 
CE-agona Pl (ap I) 
CD-oranieburg (X) 
BG-newport PI (ap 2) 
Unspecified Locales 
Hide 
BA-agona Pl (ap I) 
T-ana!um Pl (ap 4) 
U-anatum Pl (ap 6) 
V-ana!um Pl (ap 10) 
W-anaium Pl (ap I) 
X-anatum PI ( ap I) 
Y-ana!um Pl (ap 8) 
Z-anatum Pl (ap 2) 
B-ken!ucky Pl (ap l) 
D-ken!ucky P2 (ap l) 
E-kemucky Pl (ap l) 
G-ken!ucky Pl (ap 3) 
H-ken!ucky P3 (ap 4) 
M-ken!ucky P3 (ap 5) 
N-keniucky P3 (ap 7) 
P-keniucky P3 (ap 6) 
S-kemucky PI (ap 6) 
Al-kemucky P4 (ap 6) 
AP-kentucky PJ (ap I l) 
AQ-kemucky P3 (ap 8) 
C-mbandaka Pl (ap l) 
L-mbandaka P2 (ap 2) 
AJ-mbandaka P2 (ap J) 
AK-newport Pl (ap I) 
Starr Farm 
Tank: 
BE Madelia Pl (X) 
BF Edinburg Pl (X) 
Water Field: 
BV agona Pl (ap I) 
Water River: 
BZ-agona P3 (ap 4) 
CA-agona PI (ap I) 
CF-carru P2 (ap 2) 
Environment 


















AV-agona Pl (ap 
2) 
Rectal 
A-anatum Pl ( ap 
I) 
K-anatum Pl (ap 
2) 





















J-anatum Pl (ap 5) 
AA-anaium Pl (ap 7) 
AB-anaium Pl (ap 2) 
AC-ana!um Pl (ap 3) 
AD-ana!um Pl ( ap 3) 
AE-ana!um Pl (ap 3) 
AF-ana1um Pl (ap 9) 
AG-ana1um Pl (ap 4) 
1-keniucky P3 (ap 2) 
AL-kemucky PS (ap 10) 
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Appendix 4. Bioterrorism Survey, December 2002 
Name State----------
Date interviewed. _______ Phone/e-mail -----------
Interviewer--------------
The Iowa Department of Public Health is conducting an update of a bioterrorism survey that 
your health department participated in last year. Last year's survey specifically addressed 
surveillance and preparedness for biological terrorism. The current survey addresses the 
same issues and is short--it takes 5-10 minutes. 
1. a) How many infectious disease epidemiologists do you have on staff? __ 
b) How many infectious disease epidemiologists have been hired with new bioterrorism 
(BT) funding since September 11, 2001? __ 
c) How many infectious disease epidemiologists do you plan to hire with BT funding 
between now and September, 2003? _____ _ 
2. The next group of questions deals with how the epidemiologists hired with BT funding 
between September 11, 2001, and September, 2003, will be utilized. 
a) Will they develop and test epidemiological plans to respond to acts of BT? 
Yes No 
b) Will they develop new or enhance existing surveillance activities for BT or 
infectious diseases? Yes No 
c) Will they participate in actual investigations? 
Yes No 
d) Will they train health-care providers? Yes __ No 
e) Will they train public-health workers? Yes __ No __ 
f) Will they do grant writing? Yes __ No_ 
g) Are there any other activities that we haven't mentioned? Yes __ No 
If yes, briefly specify------------------
3. Is your state doing any non-traditional surveillance activities specific to BT? 
Yes No 
If yes, briefly describe activities. ----------------
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We would like to thank you for your participation in this survey. A summary of your 
comments will be sent to you by e-mail. If you have any questions, please feel free to 
contact us (!..!'h1!'1'f'1 1;1,tall' . .:Ju or ntr;111i1''' 1ci1'11.,1;1tl'.1a.u,) We know that this survey has been 
sent before but we want to make certain that your state will be included in the survey. If 
you have any questions about the survey, feel free to contact the supervisor of this 
project, Dr. Patricia Quinlisk, State of Iowa epidemiologist (pquinJi,<r: 1d11h.s1;11c· 1a.11,) (515) 
281-4941. 
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BT survey pg. 2 
State: ______ _ 
4. Can you estimate how many BT threats your state has received in the last three months? 
5. Please rank the following challenges to BT planning in your state this year as low, 
medium, or high. If anything on this list is not a challenge, please specify. 
(0 =no, low =l, medium=2, high=3) 
a) hiring qualified epidemiologists __ _ 
b) training health care professionals __ 
c) training first responders __ _ 
d) setting up disease surveillance __ 
e) time for planning activities __ 
6. Are there any immediate concerns that your current level of BT funding 
does not allow you to address (between now and September, 2003)? 
Yes No ---
If yes, please specify.-------------------
7. During this year, what do you see as the biggest challenge to your state's BT planning? 
Please update your information regarding the numbers of infectious disease epidemiologists: 
Year 2001 (in last survey, had __ ) 
Year 2002 (from line la on previous page) 
States that were able to complete this survey were later able to update their information-we 
are just including an update for your state on this BT survey update form. 
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Appendix 5. Syndromic Surveillance Survey, 2001 
Syndromic Surveillance Questionnaire 
Be sure to get the name of interviewee, organization and date interview took place. 
The Iowa Department of Health is conducting a survey on Syndromic Surveillance and 
preparedness for biological terrorism. Surveillance is defined as the systematic collection, 
analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health data (CDC, 1998). A syndrome is a set 
of signs or a series of events occurring together that often point to a single disease or 
condition the cause ( Graylabs Medical Dictionary). Your answers to these questions will 
assist in identifying how to better plan for unexpected incidents. Thank you for your 
participation. 
Has your agency ever prepared for a possible terrorist act involving the use of 
biological agents? ____ _ 
If not, is it possible for you to demonstrate how you would handle an incident of this nature? 
1. Name of event. ---------------------------
2. Location of event.-------------------------
3. What type of event was this (i.e. political convention, athletic event)? _____ _ 
• What was the purpose of the meeting?---------------
• Was this a local, regional, national or international event? ________ _ 
• Were there a variety of age groups represented? ____________ _ 
4. Date(s) the event was held.--------------------
• How often is the event held (i.e. monthly. yearly)?-----------
• If known, why was this location chosen?---------------
5. Size of community where event took place. ----------------
• How many participants attended the event? ---------------
Past surveillance activities: 
6. Have you ever organized a surveillance system for a possible bioterrorism event for 
emerging disease?-------------------------
• If so, please describe one occcasion that you can recall. ----------
• If not, were there any organizations or individuals you contacted for assistance? 
• List the organizations that assisted and how they did so. ----------
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7. Why was a surveillance system set up?----------------
• Did you encounter any type of pressure from any group (i.e. political)? ___ _ 
• If so, how did you resolve the issue?-----------------
8. Did you receive any assistance from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)? __ _ 
• If so, what type?-----------------------
• How many persons from the CDC were present?------------
• Why did you contact the CDC?------------------
Present Surveillance Activities: 
9. Were there any threats made before, during or after the event? 
• If so, describe why and how the threats were made. -----------
• If known, who made the threats? ------------------• What was the outcome? ---------------------
10. Did law enforcement become involved in planning?------------
• Specify the group(s) involved.------------------
• How did they offer support? -------------------
11. Were there any barriers to the law enforcement assistance offered? 
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• If so, why do you think baniers existed?---------------
• How was the issue resolved?--------------------
12. Did law enforcement have any concerns about syndromic surveillance activities?_ 
• If so, what were they?-----------------------
13. How long did it take to plan surveillance activities? Describe how this took place._ 
14. What type of surveillance system was used (i.e. active, passive)? ______ _ 
• How was infonnation sent to your surveillance system?----------
15. Did you use computer software (such as EPI info)? ____________ _ 
• If so, please specify-----------------------
16. Were there any type of briefing or training of the reporters in your surveillance system? 
• If so, how was this accomplished?------------------
• What amount of training did they have?---------------
• How were they trained? 
• What criteria were used to select reporters for the surveillance system? ___ _ 
• Were there any plans how to follow-up on reports coming in from the surveillance 
system? ___________________________ _ 
• Who was responsible for follow-up? ________________ _ 
• How were the reports resolved?-------------------
17. Were there any illnesses related to the event?---------
• If so, give an estimate of how many people were affected.---------
• Were there any links with the cases involved?--------------
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18. Name of illness(es) reported at event.------------------
19. Did the surveillance system work for you (i.e. reported what you expected)? __ _ 
20. If the surveillance system was useful, depict the positive aspects of the 
system. ______________________________ _ 
21. If not describe what would you have done differently.-----------
22. Was there something unique to your community that placed restraints on planning? 
23. If so, please describe. ______________________ _ 
24. How was situation resolved? 
25. Is there additional information you would like to add that you feel would be helpful? 
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